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Great authors keep repeating themselves.  Something profound lies in this.  They are working 
through a few big thoughts and intuitions.  These come from the heart; they rise up; and one 
tries to sound the music in a thousand different ways.  It is a thought, a set of thoughts, or one 
complex thought, that is lived through many years. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This project revisits the work of Nikolai Berdiaev, one of the first Russian Silver Age 
religious philosophers to be widely read in the West.  The focus of this research is his thought 
on freedom and the „creative act‟.  We will argue that Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom contains 
two types of freedom – a freedom understood within the created order and a freedom 
„outside‟ of creation.  It will be shown that in the former type, the reader finds a nuanced and 
insightful multi-layered conception of human freedom, which offers intriguing possibilities 
for exploring freedom and its implications for humanity.  It will also be demonstrated that 
this type of freedom is closely related to his innovative view of creativity.  Berdiaev 
conceives of freedom and creativity as distinct concepts, and yet so integrally related that 
they are interdependent.  In the latter type of freedom, the reader will encounter a highly 
speculative and original metaphysical view that attempts to explain freedom as non-
determination and answer the challenges of theodicy, which, this research will maintain, fails 
to do. 
This research will contend (contrary to Berdiaev‟s own statements) that his thought is 
most comprehensible from a broadly theological perspective.  This perspective will 
underscore the significant tension within his work that arises from his speculative 
metaphysics.  Unlike earlier works on Berdiaev that glossed over this tension, we will attempt 
to ameliorate it by engaging Jürgen Moltmann‟s theology of freedom.  Moltmann‟s theology 
will provide a number of ideas and concepts for an analysis, critique, and reconfiguration of 
Berdiaev‟s vision.  This reconfiguration will seek to remain faithful to Berdiaev‟s core 
concerns, while providing a new interpretation of his thought that is relevant for a 
contemporary dialogue concerning the significance of freedom and creativity for the person 
and community in relation to God. 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 – Context, Influence, and Ultimate Questions 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Andrew Kirk observes that the “pursuit and defense of freedom in its many forms has 
been the dominant global movement of human societies world-wide over the last 300 years.”1  
Since theology is not only concerned with the knowledge of God but also with lives of people 
and communities – people and communities who are pursuing freedom – we see that freedom 
is as much a concern for the theologian as it is for the social scientist.
2
  As Leander Keck 
states, “Freedom is the dominant motif in Christian theology today . . . .”3 
Our project is concerned with the implications of freedom for theology, particularly 
the concept of freedom that is voiced in the writings of Nikolai Berdiaev.  Berdiaev asserted 
that God desires the person to be „free‟, and that the person who is free will be a person who 
brings forth „creative acts‟.  This research will explore and analyze Berdiaev‟s unique 
understanding of freedom, of the „creative act‟, and of what he believes to be the essential 
interdependence between the two concepts.  We will argue, contrary to his own assertions, 
that his work on freedom is most comprehensible from a theological perspective.  The 
specific theological perspective we will use to investigate and critique Berdiaev‟s work will 
be the theology of Jürgen Moltmann – a theologian who has engaged with Berdiaev‟s work 
and shares certain similarities in perspective and in life history. 
Our objective is to show that Berdiaev‟s thought on freedom and the „creative act‟ 
offers a “fresh horizon”4 for the theological discourse on freedom.  We will provide a detailed 
critique of Berdiaev‟s conception of freedom in which we will supplant the weaker lines of 
his thought with select ideas from Moltmann‟s theology.  Through this we will demonstrate 
the dialogical nature of Berdiaev‟s work and will present a reconfigured conception of 
freedom that is not only theologically comprehensible but also significant for the exploration 
of what it means to be free in relation to God, others, and self. 
 
                                                 
1
 J. Andrew Kirk, The Meaning of Freedom: A Study of Secular, Muslim and Christian Views 
(Cumbria, UK: Paternoster Press, 1998), 6. 
2
 Moltmann: “For me, theology comes into being wherever men and women come to the knowledge of 
God and, in the praxis of their lives, their happiness and their suffering, perceive God‟s presence with all their 
senses.”  ET, xvi. 
3
 Leander Keck, “The Son who creates Freedom,” in Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas van Iersel, eds., 
Jesus Christ and Human Freedom (New York: Herder and Herder, 1974), 71. 
4
 Frederick C. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev (Kent, England: 
Search Press Ltd., 1986), 389. 
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§2  NIKOLAI BERDIAEV 
 
1.  A Biographical Sketch 
 
Nikolai Alexandrovitch Berdiaev (1874 – 1948) was born in the province of Kiev into 
a Russian aristocratic family.
5
  Berdiaev had one brother, Serge, who was fifteen years older 
and thus Berdiaev basically grew up as an only child.  His mother was half French and 
Berdiaev described her as being “more French than Russian.”6  She was born into the 
Orthodox Church, but Berdiaev believed that “she felt herself to be more of a Roman 
Catholic.”7   His father was descended from a long line of decorated military officers.  Lowrie 
describes the father as a „free-thinker‟ who “took pleasure in criticizing religion and the 
church”8 – Voltaire appears to have been more significant for the father than the Orthodox 
Church.  The other noteworthy adult in Berdiaev‟s early life was his Russian nurse, who 
“made a most enduring impression” on him, and who he described as a „classical‟ Russian 
nurse of “ardent Orthodox faith, of extraordinary kindness and tenderness . . . .”9 
Berdiaev remembered his early years as a solitary experience.  He recounts that he 
struggled to get along with other boys, finding them to be “very coarse, and their talk low and 
stupid.”10  He did not follow in his father‟s footsteps and rejected anything that had to do with 
the military.  He cites the reason for this rejection as a rebellion against „regimentation.‟11 
In 1894 Berdiaev enrolled at the University of Kiev and this proved a critical juncture 
in his life, for this was when Berdiaev was exposed to Marxism and became a Marxist.  He 
writes, “I soon became aware that something new and decisive had intervened in Russian life, 
and that I must meet the issues raised by the Marxist movement.”12  Berdiaev committed 
himself to the Marxist cause to such a degree that by the end of his third year at university 
(1898) he was arrested, spent several months in prison with other dissidents, was released, 
and was then eventually exiled to Vologda in northern Russia for three years. 
                                                 
5
 Space forbids a detailed biography of Berdiaev.  The reader wishing more information can turn to the 
three biographies of Berdiaev: Donald Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet: A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev, Matthew 
Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom, Michel Alexander Vallon, An Apostle of Freedom: Life and 
Teachings of Nicolas Berdyaev, as well as Berdiaev‟s autobiography, Dream and Reality: An Essay in 
Autobiography. 
6
 DR, 3. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Donald A. Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet: A Life of Nicolai Berdyaev (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 
1960), 16-17. 
9
 DR, 7. 
10
 DR, 11. 
11
 DR, 10. 
12
 DR, 116. 
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In exile Berdiaev began to question his commitment to Marxism as he came to believe 
that Marxist thought ignores the value of the person.
13
  During this time (he returned from 
exile in 1902) Berdiaev underwent a “rapid evolution,”14 in which he left the Marxist 
movement, became involved with the Neo-Idealists and eventually, along with others from 
the intelligentsia (most notably Sergei Bulgakov, Simeon Frank, and Piotr Struve),
15
 turned 
towards Orthodox Christianity.  Russian society by this time was going through tremendous 
upheavals with the failed revolution of 1905, World War I, and finally the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  Berdiaev survived the Revolution and, through his former Marxist contacts, was 
able to teach in the “almost-official Free Academy of Spiritual Culture.”16  But, this did not 
last and in 1922 he was exiled again moving first to Berlin and then, two years later, to Paris 
where he lived out the rest of his life as a teacher, an editor of Put‟, and an author.17 
 
2.  Russian Philosophy 
 
Early in Berdiaev‟s life he came to understand himself as a philosopher: “There was 
never any question for me what I should choose in life and which path I should take; for, 
while still a boy, I was sure that my calling lay in philosophy.”18  Berdiaev never wavered 
from this conviction; he always understood himself as a philosopher.
19
  This commitment to 
„philosophy‟ must be understood in its proper context. 
The philosophy of Berdiaev‟s Russia has little resemblance to contemporary 
philosophy as it is practiced in many Western academic circles.
20
  For Berdiaev, philosophy 
                                                 
13
 Berdiaev: “At the moment the influence of Marx and Nietzsche is active in the direction of the 
dehumanization of society and culture.  And this dehumanization is at the same time de-Christianization.”  
FMW, 25.  The influence of Marx upon Berdiaev can be seen in his evaluation of economics, labor, and 
government. 
14
 Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet, 65. 
15
 See Nicolas Zernov, The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1963), 131-164. 
16
 Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet, 150. 
17
 This extremely condensed sketch of Berdiaev‟s life does not address the numerous conflicts Berdiaev 
faced, especially during his life in Russia.  He was threatened with life-long exile to Siberia for an article 
published against the Church (Quenchers of the Spirit), but was spared by the outbreak of World War I.  He was 
questioned by the authorities on a number of occasions (both by the Tsarist and Communist regimes) and he 
reports that once, while imprisoned in 1920 for political activity, he was brought before Dzerzhinsky in the 
middle of night for questioning and was then released.  He states that when he was banished from Russia in 
1922 he was told that if he attempted to return to the USSR he would be shot.  DR, 237-239. 
18
 DR, 37. 
19
 DR, 86. 
20
 An example of this dissonance between early 20
th
 century Russia philosophy and contemporary 
Western approaches can be seen in Andrzej Walicki‟s comments in the foreword to Problems of Idealism.  
Walicki observed, after attending one of the first international conferences on philosophy to be held in Moscow 
after the fall of communism (March 1993), that the approach of Russian philosophy was problematic when 
4 
 
was the search for ultimate truths, and in this search for truth, philosophy leads to change.  
“My conception of this vocation was in some ways similar to that of Marx, who proclaimed 
in his famous Theses on Feuerbach that hitherto philosophy had been concerned with 
knowing life, but that the time has come for it to change life.”21  Berdiaev‟s understanding of 
himself as a philosopher was not as someone who was addressing a specific philosophical 
enquiry and developing a carefully constructed argument.  Philosophy was meant to uncover 
truths that would overcome the disintegrated world.  As his commitment to Christianity grew, 
his philosophy incorporated central themes and dogmas of the Christian faith.  This 
development is not unique to Berdiaev. 
N. O. Lossky writes, “Berdyaev belongs to the group of thinkers who strive to 
develop a Christian world conception . . . .”22  Philosophy for this „group of thinkers‟ is an 
inherently philosophic and religious exercise – philosophy and religion for these thinkers 
cannot be separated.  We thus end up with a „philosophy‟ that is hard to classify using current 
Western lines of demarcation.  Paul Tillich states that Berdiaev‟s thought is not quite a 
philosophy of religion, nor is it a theology.
23
  Donald Lowrie explains this approach by 
stating: 
Whereas similar groups in western Europe tended toward separation of theology from 
philosophy, in Russia the two were joined in an original type of religious philosophy 
characterized by independence from scholastic traditions and church authority, and by 
great freedom of thought, with philosophy justifying religious faith and religious 
experience providing bases for philosophy.
24
 
 
This highly synthetic approach was made possible not only because of the religious 
renaissance that was occurring in Russia at that time (of which Berdiaev was considered a 
leader), but also because of the innovative cultural developments of Russian society – what 
has come to be known as Russia‟s Silver Age. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
brought into dialogue with the current Western philosophic tradition.  He writes, “To be sure, there is much of 
great interest and richness in this tradition, but its tendency to focus on Russian historical and spiritual 
experience must be resisted if professional philosophers are to listen.”  Randall A. Poole, ed., Problems of 
Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy, trans. Randall A. Poole (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2003), ix. 
21
 DR, 86. 
22
 N. O. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1952), 247. 
23
 Paul Tillich, “Nicholas Berdyaev,” Religion in Life 7:3 (Summer 1938), 408. 
24
Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet, 116.  See also Robert Slesinski: “. . . it should be specifically noted that 
Russian religious philosophy as it was largely fashioned in the nineteenth century and subsequently developed 
in the twentieth is a conscious rejoinder to Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment western philosophy and, 
indeed, constitutes a rejection of the immanentist world view of modernity that would decisively cut man off 
from the transcendent order, be it in the sphere of knowledge or in the realms of being itself.”  Robert F. 
Slesinski, “Believing Thought as a Category in Russian Religious Philosophy,” Communio 26 (Fall 1999), 572. 
5 
 
3.  The Silver Age
25
 
 
While the complexities of Russian culture are beyond the scope of this research, it is 
important to note the culture in which Berdiaev‟s thought developed.  Although our research 
is concerned with Berdiaev‟s „mature‟ writings, which commence with the closing of this 
period, the influences of this time made a lasting impression on his thought.
26
 
The so-called Silver Age is a term that roughly denotes the time period of 1890 - 1920 
in Russia.  It was a time of intense intellectual, artistic, and religious activity.  Catherine 
Evtuhov states that the designation has often been used in literary and art-historical studies, 
but she helpfully broadens the term to include “the complex of ideas, literature, art, 
philosophy, and politics that together constituted the cultural explosion of those years.”27  
Within this period she detects “four general lines or orientations along which Russian culture 
evolved . . . ,”28 which are an “elaborate aestheticism,” “so-called new idealism,” “politics,” 
and a “new religious consciousness.”29  These four general lines are not separate or individual 
developments, but rather co-existing developments that impact and influence each other. 
The Silver Age was a time that stressed novelty, where ideas and concepts in 
philosophy, art, politics, and religion, were juxtaposed against each other in the search for 
new ideas.  The blurring of the distinction between religion (theology) and philosophy in the 
Russian milieu was also true for other fields of study and praxis.  In this context a dialogical 
approach was practiced that stretched across Russian culture.  Hence they looked to 
Dostoevsky not only as Russia‟s great novelist, but also a philosopher who impacted religious 
thought.  Vladimir Solov‟ev‟s highly influential work not only provided the systematic 
approach to philosophy, but also the means to understand how the person works with God to 
                                                 
25
 This section is indebted to two outstanding accounts of the Russian Silver Age: Catherine Evtuhov, 
The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), see especially chapter 1, “The Silver Age as History,” and Christopher Read, Religion, 
Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia 1900-1912: The Vekhi Debate and its Intellectual Background 
(London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1979). 
26
 The beginning of Berdiaev‟s „mature‟ phase follows the publication of Sub specie æternitatis in 
1907.  Although he publishes Philosophy of Freedom in 1911 (a series of articles that appeared previously from 
1908 onwards), the work that is normally attributed as the first „mature‟ work is The Meaning of the Creative 
Act (1916).  For the purposes of this research Berdiaev‟s mature work is considered to be MCA onward.  See 
also Matthew Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950), 44-
45, and Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet, 106-107. 
27
 Evtuhov, The Cross and the Sickle, 3 fn. 
28
 Ibid., 8. 
29
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change the world.
 30
  Even though the political fabric of Russia was being torn apart, there 
was a flowering of culture and thought that was remarkable in its scope and achievements. 
With this context in mind we can now turn our attention to the specific influences on 
Berdiaev‟s thought. 
 
4.  Influences 
 
Berdiaev‟s varied influences can be seen in his description of his „philosophic 
Weltanschauung‟:  
In this, which touches upon past thinkers, particularly close to me were Heraclitus, 
Origen and St. Gregory of Nyssa among the Church Fathers, Jakob Boehme – who 
had enormous significance for my spiritual development, and to some extent also 
Kant.  Regarding philosophers of our time, I have a point of contact with Bergson, 
Gentile, Max Scheler.  Among the representatives of existential philosophy the closest 
to me is Jaspers.  Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoy, Nietzsche, each in his own turn played a 
great role in the working out of my Weltanschauung, just as did Marx, Carlyle, Ibsen 
and Leon Bloy – in the formation of our social views.31 
 
We can see that Berdiaev‟s influences were drawn from three different streams: 
philosophy, theology (dogmatic and mystical), and the arts.  Berdiaev utilizes the concepts 
and ideas he finds within these three disciplines to formulate his view on the origin and 
embodiment of freedom.  This results in an approach that is both distinctive and highly 
synthetic.  Zenkovsky states that Berdiaev‟s “exceptional gift for synthesis” was seen in “. . . 
his constant and intent concern for other men‟s ideas and theories . . . .”32  In addition, as 
Lowrie points out, Berdiaev not only has the ability for synthesis but also for originality.  
Berdiaev engages diverse material and instills it with a distinctively “„Berdiaev‟ carom to 
clinch the thought as his own.”33 
                                                 
30
 Vladimir Solov‟ev (1853 – 1900) is considered by most to be Russia‟s first true systematic 
philosopher.  V. V. Zenkovsky calls him “the most brilliant and influential philosopher of the „period of 
systems‟.” V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd, 1953), 472.  The creative adaptation of various ideas is demonstrated in the ways in which 
different thinkers engaged Solov‟ev‟s concept of „Godmanhood‟.  Read states that for Christians „Godmanhood‟ 
meant that the person “was intended to work jointly with God in the business of creation, transformation and 
salvation of the world.”  The socialists took the term and turned it into „mangodhood‟ “in the Nietzschean sense 
that man was himself God and that he was himself the ruler of the universe.”  Read, Russian Intelligentsia, 58. 
31
 Nikolai Berdiaev, “МОЕ ФИЛОСОФСКОЕ МИРОСОЗЕЦАНИЕ,” in N. A. Berdiaev: pro et 
contra, ed. A. A. Ermichev, trans. mine (St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanities Institute, 1994), 23. 
32
 Zenkovsky, 762. 
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 Lowrie, 187. 
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In what follows we will examine some of the more significant influences on Berdiaev, 
beginning with his philosophical influences.
34
 
 
A.  Philosophy 
Philosophy was the earliest influence in Berdiaev‟s life.  He recalls, “I read 
Schopenhauer, Kant and Hegel when I was fourteen, having discovered Schopenhauer‟s 
World as Will and Idea, Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason, and Hegel‟s Phenomenology of 
Mind and the first part of the Encyclopedia in my father‟s library.”35  Although Berdiaev‟s 
discovery of philosophy was new for him, the material he read was not new to the Russia 
intelligentsia in the latter part of 19
th
 century Russia.  German idealism had a significant 
impact on Russian thought.  Zernov writes that the leaders of the religious renaissance 
(Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, and Struve) were all influenced by similar thinkers. 
They were nurtured in the school of German philosophy; Kant, Schelling, Hegel and 
the neo-Kantians were their recognized teachers.  They were equally familiar with the 
western mystical tradition, for Solovyev introduced them to Jacob Boehme, Master 
Eckhart, Swedenborg, Erigena and Nicholas of Cusa.
36
 
 
Hence, even though Berdiaev describes his education in solitary terms (encountering material 
as a teenager in his father‟s library, his solitary life in school37), the philosophy he was 
absorbing was a part of the contemporary intellectual tradition in Russia. 
Within his reading of philosophy Berdiaev soon began to develop a hierarchy, with 
certain philosophers taking precedence.  So, although Schopenhauer „impressed‟ him more 
than the Bible at the time of his “spiritual awakening,”38 it was Kant who, along with Plato, 
were the philosophers par excellence.  He writes, “A fundamental discovery in philosophy 
was made by Plato and Kant who must be regarded as the greatest and most original 
philosopher [sic] in the history of human thought.”39 
Berdiaev holds Kant in such high esteem because he interprets Kant to be the 
philosopher of freedom.  Berdiaev appropriated two central Kantian concepts, which became 
cornerstones for his thought.  As James McLachlan observes, “From his reading of Kant, 
                                                 
34
 Space forbids a detailed examination of the wide range of influences on Berdiaev‟s thought.  The 
following represents what we believe are the influences that form lasting impressions and guide his work.  It is 
recognized that there are other important people and ideas to be considered (e.g., Hegel, Schelling, 
Romanticism, the Russian Symbolists, et al); however, in each case, while Berdiaev engages with these 
individuals and movements he has substantial disagreements with them as well. 
35
 DR, 37. 
36
 Zernov, Religious Renaissance, 295. 
37
 DR, 11. 
38
 DR, 41. 
39
 BE, 5. 
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Berdiaev took a strong sense of the antinomic character of reality and of the radically 
unobjectifiable character of freedom.”40  Berdiaev believes that it is in these doctrines where 
Kant‟s “genius is most conspicuously displayed.”41 
It is Kant‟s antinomic thought, Berdiaev writes, which led to the discovery that reality 
exists in two parts, and “that what refers merely to appearances and phenomena must not be 
transferred to what is noumenal, to things-in-themselves.”42  The idea of the reality as 
phenomenal and noumenal becomes foundational for Berdiaev‟s understanding of freedom.43  
Therefore, Berdiaev concludes, “There is eternal truth in the distinction which Kant draws 
between the order of nature and the order of freedom.  It is precisely Kant who makes 
existential metaphysics a possibility, the order of freedom is indeed Existenz.”44 
From Platonic thought Berdiaev takes the idea of the τό μή őν (meon), which Berdiaev 
designates as a particular type of nothing that can be described as “one possessing a 
potentiality of being, a desire for realization.”45  This „meonic‟ nothing (distinguishable from 
τό ούκ őν, which does not possess potentiality46) is crucial for Berdiaev‟s thought when he 
appropriates and modifies Boehme‟s Ungrund. 
Berdiaev‟s high regard for Kant47 does not prevent Berdiaev from distancing himself 
from Kant early in his career, believing that Kantian thought is inimical to „personalism‟.  
The initial move away from Kant and the Russian neo-idealists follows the publication of the 
1902 collection of essays, Problems of Idealism, to which Berdiaev was a contributor.
48
  
Poole notes that following publication, Berdiaev “soon drew quite illiberal conclusions from 
idealism.”49 
                                                 
40
 James Morse McLachlan, The Desire to Be God: Freedom and the Other in Sartre and Berdyaev 
(New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1992), 148. 
41
 BE, 9. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Berdiaev believes that his appropriation of a „Kantian‟ conception of reality as phenomenal and 
noumenal does not negate the reality of the physical world.  He writes, “It would be very inexact to say that the 
spiritual world is a thing in itself (Ding an sich) and that the natural world is a mere appearance. . . . The thing 
itself is not life nor is it given in the experience of life, it is a mere thing, an object.  The spiritual life has 
nothing in common with the noumenon of metaphysicians and epistemologists.”  FS, 56. 
44
 BE, 9. 
45
 Michel Alexander Vallon, An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings of Nicolas Berdyaev (New 
York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960), 163.  See also DM, 163. 
46
 Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev, 120. 
47
 Berdiaev writes, “My true master in philosophy was Kant, and I have devoted most of my studies to 
his thought: to Kant himself rather than to Kantianism or neo-Kantianism.”  DR, 93. 
48
 Berdiaev was part of a select group who contributed to the three major publications of the Silver Age: 
Problems of Idealism (1902), Vekhi (1909), and Out of the Depths (1918).  The group, comprising Berdiaev, 
Bulgakov, Frank, and Struve, were all ex-Marxists who were moving towards Orthodoxy and would become the 
leaders of the religious renaissance.  See Poole, Problems of Idealism, and Zernov, The Russian Religious 
Renaissance of the Twentieth Century. 
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 Poole, Problems of Idealism, 45. 
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The move away from neo-idealism was precipitated by Berdiaev‟s realization that 
within Kantian thought there was no possibility to experience the noumenal.  Without the 
ability for spiritual experience, Berdiaev believed that an individual could not develop into a 
person – what Spinka identifies as “antipersonalism.”50  Berdiaev writes, “It was a 
fundamental mistake in Kant that he recognized sensuous experience, in which appearances 
are the data, but he did not recognize spiritual experience, of which the data are noumenal.”51 
Berdiaev‟s move from neo-idealism led him to the position of „mystical realism‟ – a 
belief that there is a more fundamental reality „behind‟ what can be observed, which is 
accessible through „spiritual‟ experience.52  This position will become modified over the 
ensuing years – especially as he breaks ties with Merezhkovsky and his „neo-Christianity‟ in 
favor of what many would consider a liberally interpreted Orthodox faith.
53
  The turn to 
mystical realism, however, does not indicate a complete abandonment of Kant.  Kant‟s 
philosophy made a deep impression on Berdiaev and his thought became an important 
element in Berdiaev‟s thought.  
After his initial break with Marxism and the neo-idealists, Berdiaev re-affirms what 
he believes to be Kant‟s great contributions – the “dualism of two worlds” and “the 
antinomies involved in that dualism . . . .”54  Lowrie writes, “In later years he [Berdiaev] 
altered this opinion [of his initial break with neo-idealism], feeling that in Kant‟s very 
insistence upon the „real,‟ „phenomenal‟ world, the philosopher had laid a foundation for 
Berdiaev‟s own type of thinking – which insists upon the primacy of the noumenal.”55 
 
B.  Theology 
Berdiaev‟s theological influences are not as clearly referred to in his writings.  Part of 
the reason for this is that his religious commitment developed only after his identity as a 
philosopher was firmly established.  The theological influences upon Berdiaev‟s philosophy 
of freedom develop from three primary sources: the Christian mystical tradition, patristic 
                                                 
50
  Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev, 97. 
51
 BE, 14.  See also BE, 85. 
52
 For the discussion of „mystical realism‟ see chapter 2.  Also, Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev, 20. 
53
 Berdiaev‟s „liberally interpreted Orthodox faith‟ is most clearly seen in his reliance on Jacob 
Boehme‟s understanding of freedom.  This will be examined in chapter 2. 
54
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literature, and Russian religious philosophy.
56
  The mystical tradition will be examined in 
Chapter 2, so we begin with patristic literature. 
Although Berdiaev expressed apprehension about theology (he believed philosophy 
was better equipped to search for truth), his philosophy is significantly influenced by 
theology.  In his autobiography Berdiaev writes,  
I also read a great deal of Patristic literature, but this, I must admit, did not on the 
whole excite my enthusiasm.  Among the Doctors of the Church I took especially to 
Origen and even more to Gregory of Nyssa; and of ascetic and mystical writers I was 
greatly impressed and moved by Isaac the Syrian.”57 
 
The importance of patristic literature for Berdiaev can be seen in the influence of 
Origen on his thought.
58
  Also, Gregory of Nyssa receives a favorable commendation from 
Berdiaev, “Among patristic writers St. Gregory of Nyssa came nearest to it [a real Christian 
anthropology].  He was the greatest philosopher among the doctors of the Church and he 
endeavoured to raise the dignity of man.”59 
Patristic literature provided Berdiaev with key elements that he could not find in 
Marxism or Neo-Idealism.  His finds in Christianity an affirmation of the person based upon 
the imago Dei, the Incarnation, and God‟s sacrificial love for the person.  Originally 
Berdiaev‟s religious impulse “was bound up with a bitter feeling of discontent with and 
dissent from the world with its evil and corruption.”  As he began to understand that the 
existence of evil was not an obstacle to faith but “a proof of God‟s existence, a challenge to 
turn towards that in which love triumphs over hatred, union over division and eternal life over 
death,”60 his commitment to the Orthodox Church was secured.  He writes, 
When I became conscious of myself as a Christian, I came to confess a religion of 
God-manhood: that is to say, in becoming a believer in God I did not cease to believe 
in man and in man‟s dignity and creative freedom.  I became a Christian because I 
was seeking for a deeper and truer foundation for belief in man.
61
 
 
His commitment to Christianity and his interpretation of its central doctrines did not 
detract from much that he had discovered to be „intuitively‟ true – it reinforced his belief.62  
                                                 
56
 Zernov: “Russian Orthodoxy was however the source of their [the leaders of the religious 
renaissance] inspiration.  Patristic theology, the writings of the Church Fathers and the works of the Slavophils 
shaped their outlook.”  Zernov, Religious Renaissance, 295-296. 
57
 DR, 165. 
58
  See Matthew Spinka, “Berdyaev and Origen: A Comparison,” Church History 16 (March 1947): 3-
21. 
59
 DH, 23. 
60
 DR, 174. 
61
 DR, 180. 
62
 Berdiaev‟s view of intuition will be addressed in chapter 2. 
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Gregory of Nyssa, in particular, provided a theology that supported his initial intuitions 
regarding freedom and the person. 
The primary significance of patristic literature for Berdiaev is the dogma the Church 
developed to define Christianity.  Berdiaev places great importance on dogma stating that 
dogmas “possess absolute and indefectible truth. . . .”63  Berdiaev‟s understanding of God as 
creator, the Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection, and eschatology all form central threads in his 
conception of freedom.
64
  These doctrines were mediated to him, however, not only through 
his study of patristic literature, but also through the context of the Silver Age. 
Consequently, despite his commitment to philosophy and his early philosophical 
influences, it is a combination of philosophical and theological influences from which he 
draws to build a framework for his synthesis of thought.  Thus even though he states, “I am 
not a theologian, and my approach to and formulations of these problems are not 
theological,”65 the importance of theology to Berdiaev‟s work (as will be demonstrated) is 
such that without the above-mentioned dogmas his entire vision would collapse. 
 
C. The Arts 
As with philosophy and theology, the arts, particularly literature, are an important 
influence upon Berdiaev.
66
  The two main influences within this category are Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy.  Berdiaev attests to the significance of these authors when he writes,  
I have always been tormented less by theological, dogmatic and ecclesiastical 
questions, or by questions of academic philosophical interest, than by problems 
concerning the meaning of life, freedom, the destiny of man, eternity, suffering, and 
evil.  The heroes in Tolstoy‟s and Dostoevsky‟s novels were of greater importance for 
me than philosophical and theological schools of thought, and it was at their hands 
that I received Christianity.
67
 
 
These two authors not only influence Berdiaev but an entire cohort of thinkers and writers.  
Carnegie Calian writes, “The literary critics of the Russian Renaissance drew and received 
inspiration from both Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky . . . .”68 
                                                 
63
 FS, 75. 
64
 For a helpful description of how Berdiaev interprets dogma, see Vallon, Apostle of Freedom, 207-
208.  This aspect of Berdiaev‟s thought will be addressed in chapter 2. 
65
 DR, 177. 
66
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(Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1965), 25. 
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Although Berdiaev frequently links Tolstoy with Dostoevsky, the two do not hold the 
same place within his thought.  As Calian observes, Berdiaev “found Tolstoy‟s religious 
philosophy weak, considering it unacceptable from the Christian point of view; nevertheless 
he saw value in Tolstoy‟s spiritual striving for the perfect life.”69  Tolstoy was clearly 
secondary to Dostoevsky, for in Dostoevsky‟s writings Berdiaev finds the primary elements 
to build not only his faith but also his philosophic thought.
70
 
The reliance upon Dostoevsky is not surprising.  As Evtuhov observes, Dostoevsky 
was part of a group of writers who were “devoured” by the “makers of the Silver Age.”71  
Zenkovsky points out that Dostoevsky is considered more than a novelist; Dostoevsky 
“belongs as much to philosophy as to literature.  This is to be seen most clearly in the fact 
that he continues to inspire philosophic thought to our own day.”72  The influence of 
Dostoevsky on Berdiaev is well noted by commentators on Berdiaev, and by Berdiaev 
himself.  As we shall see in chapter 3, Dostoevsky, in particular his Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor, becomes central to Berdiaev‟s thought.  Berdiaev:  “It might be said that taking 
my stand as a Christian I accepted the picture of Christ in the Legend of the Grand  
Inquisitor . . . .”73 
Although Berdiaev describes his life in solitary terms, we see that his thought arises 
out of a vast web of influences that stretches across multiple disciplines.  It is clear that even 
though Berdiaev might have felt alone in his convictions and ideas, how he formulates his 
thought is part of a complex intellectual, religious, and cultural context. 
 
5.  Personalism/Existentialism 
 
Moltmann observes that “Berdyaev was neither a professional theologian nor a 
professional philosopher, so he has often been apostrophized as a „thinker‟.  It is certainly 
true that his very originality makes it hard to fit him into any particular category.”74  Part of 
the reason for this difficulty, as we have just seen, is the culture in which Berdiaev‟s thought 
developed and matured.  The need for categorization that is inherent in contemporary 
                                                 
69
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research was simply not a concern for Berdiaev and many in his context.  Nonetheless, as we 
begin to examine his thought we need a starting point from which to consider his work.  One 
of the simplest approaches is to begin with the classification that Berdiaev himself offers. 
Early in Berdiaev‟s career he identified himself as a personalistic philosopher.  
Throughout much of his career Berdiaev favored the term „personalism‟ over the term 
„existentialism‟ believing that existentialism denied the integral image of the person.75  Yet, 
in his later works there is a shift in his thought, so that by the end of his career he had fully 
embraced the term „existentialism‟ (although with the qualifiers that his work was different to 
that of Sartre, Heidegger, and others who were regarded as existentialist at the time).  He 
asserts that although the existentialism of the early to mid-twentieth century “has become 
something of a fashion,”76 the origins of existentialism are actually very distant.”  Thus, by 
the time Berdiaev reaches the mature phase of his career, we can consider his work, in the 
broadest possible sense, as a Russian existentialism that relies significantly on Orthodox 
Christianity.  This characterization is broad enough that it does not contradict our basic 
premise – that Berdiaev‟s work is most comprehensible from a theological perspective – and 
allows the reader to orient Berdiaev‟s thought within the vast discourse on freedom in the 20th 
century. 
 
§3  JÜRGEN MOLTMANN 
 
Copleston is correct when he writes, “Berdyaev regarded himself as, and indeed he 
was, a Christian philosopher.”77  Although, as have already seen, the term „philosophy‟ 
requires qualification, understanding Berdiaev as a Christian „philosopher‟ is clearly the 
majority opinion regarding Berdiaev and the basic orientation of his thought.  This research 
certainly agrees with this assessment, but also maintains that it is not sufficient merely to 
consider him a „Christian philosopher‟.  As we explore his „philosophy‟ of freedom and his 
overall objectives we will see that Berdiaev‟s thought is much more comprehensible from a 
contemporary theological perspective, rather than a philosophical one.
78
  Consequently, a 
theological framework is required to evaluate his thought and assess what relevance it has for 
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a contemporary audience.  Jürgen Moltmann‟s theology of freedom provides such a 
framework to evaluate and critique Berdiaev‟s thought on freedom. 
Moltmann is one of the best-known German Protestant theologians of the 20
th
 
century.
79
  His work has been widely translated and published throughout the world.  There 
are four reasons why he has been chosen as a theological interlocutor for this research.  First, 
Moltmann‟s understanding of theology is sufficiently broad so that his work can be brought 
into dialogue with Berdiaev‟s, and, equally importantly, Moltmann‟s understanding creates 
the space for us to consider Berdiaev‟s work from a theological perspective.80  As a result of 
this broad understanding Moltmann is one of the few contemporary theologians (outside of 
those in the field of process theology) to actively engage Berdiaev‟s thought.  For example, in 
his argument for passibility, Moltmann relies on Berdiaev to assert „the tragedy of God‟. 
Points of coherence with the views of Berdiaev, as well as critical differences, provide 
a second reason for selecting Moltmann.  We will see in Moltmann‟s thought a recurring 
emphasis on freedom and liberation, which mirrors Berdiaev.  Moltmann‟s political theology, 
“with its face turned to the world,”81 is conscious of the various ways the person and 
community can be enslaved and his theology seeks to address this problem.
82
  We will also 
see important differences between Moltmann‟s thought and Berdiaev‟s, which will be used to 
critique Berdiaev‟s formulations.  It will be shown that Moltmann‟s thought provides a 
stronger footing for particular ideas Berdiaev puts forward regarding freedom and creativity. 
A third reason for choosing Moltmann is that there are important similarities in their 
life histories.  While their adult lives barely overlap and they grew up in different countries, it 
is significant that they both grew up in tumultuous times and experienced first-hand the 
catastrophic events of war and displacement.
83
  Both authors saw the savagery that humans 
can inflict upon one another, both were imprisoned and exiled from their home-land, and both 
clearly understood that suffering is not an abstract concept but a reality that must inform any 
discussion of God and freedom. 
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This shared experience of conflict leads to our final reason.  It is the contention of this 
research that these experiences of conflict and suffering contribute to an overall approach that 
is evident in both writers – an approach that is focused in concrete ways on „ultimate‟ 
questions.
84
  In both writers (to varying degrees) we see a lack of concern for systematic 
presentations and finely detailed arguments.  Rather each will cast a broad net across various 
disciplines in the attempt to search out God‟s truth, wherever it may be found.85  Within the 
writings of both, the reader detects this almost urgent focus at times on searching out an 
„ultimate‟ solution that will bring relief to a suffering world – a solution that will be found in 
God and the kingdom that God will establish. 
 
§4  SUMMARY 
 
Berdiaev lived in a fascinating and tragic period for Russia and Europe.  The reader 
will do well to bear in mind this context as we explore his understanding of freedom and the 
creative act, and then evaluate it in the light of Moltmann‟s theology of freedom.  As we 
move through this research we will follow a line of thinking attempted by Tillich.  In 
addressing Berdiaev‟s conception of „gnosis‟ Tillich observes, “In both respects his ideas 
must be transformed in order to become acceptable for present Protestantism.  But the 
substance of his philosophy of religion must be maintained . . . .”86  While this project is not 
undertaken to „transform‟ Berdiaev‟s thought into a Protestant theology (although as the 
author is a Protestant this bias does exist), our objective is to examine Berdiaev‟s thought in 
the light of the broad Christian tradition he was committed to, and to critique his thought in 
the light of that tradition.  Throughout we will make every effort to maintain the „substance 
of this thought‟, and when we challenge his thought, it will be done to strengthen his overall 
vision. 
Our examination begins at the natural starting point in Berdiaev‟s thought, with his 
„vision‟ of freedom.
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Chapter 2 – A Vision of Freedom 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
. . . [Berdiaev] writes as a man who is deeply committed to the cause of freedom, not 
simply in the political sense but also in the sense that he is sharply opposed to any 
attempt to impose a system of ideas or beliefs, whether of a secular or religious 
nature, on people‟s minds.1 
 
Copleston‟s phrase, “the cause of freedom,” is apt.  For Berdiaev, freedom is essential 
for existence as God intended, and therefore is a „cause‟ that must be consistently defended 
and expounded.  This conviction fuels Berdiaev‟s writings, resulting in an orientation and 
style that at times can range from philosophical and theological discourse to impassioned 
plea.  Thus, in his autobiography Berdiaev writes, 
When my critics accuse me of being a myth-maker or a „prophet‟ who would do well 
with a drop of dullness and a little more precision in the tumultuous sea of his 
arbitrary assertions and intuitions, I can only repeat what I have said on other 
occasions, namely, that my vocation is to proclaim not a doctrine but a vision; that I 
work and desire to work by inspiration, fully conscious of being open to all the 
criticisms systematic philosophers, historians and scholars are likely to make, and in 
fact, have made.
2
 
 
The clause, “not a doctrine but a vision,” accurately summarizes Berdiaev‟s focus and 
approach.  His interests are not philosophical precision or concise doctrine; his principal 
concern is “to proclaim” a vision that will assist the person in her “endeavour to comprehend 
reality.”3  As John Macquarrie observes when considering Berdiaev (and other „philosophers 
of personal being‟), “. . . possibly we should call them „seers‟, men of vision.”4  The term 
„vision‟, as we shall see in this chapter, refers to a specific framework from which Berdiaev 
formulates the key concepts of his thought (e.g., God, the person, freedom, et al.).  In fact, it 
is not a singular vision, but better understood as a mosaic of „visions‟ – a vision of God, of 
the person, of freedom, of creativity, etc. – that comprises his work. 
It is indicative of Berdiaev‟s lack of concern for precise formulation, that his „vision‟ 
of freedom is never concisely stated.  Nevertheless, his prodigious writing career leaves us 
with considerable material from which we can postulate the basic content and shape of this 
vision: Berdiaev‟s vision is that all individuals possess a rudimentary form of freedom.  This 
                                                 
1
 Copleston, Philosophy in Russia, 372. 
2
 DR, 289 (Italics mine). 
3
 DR, 290.  We shall see in what follows that Berdiaev has a specific understanding of „reality.‟ 
4
 John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, 4
th
 ed. (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1988), 207. 
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freedom will either develop through communion with God and others, resulting in 
personhood and creative acts, or it will deteriorate through egocentricity, resulting in 
objectification and slavery. 
This vision of freedom serves two important functions within Berdiaev‟s thought.  
First, throughout his corpus this vision guides and frames his manner of engagement with 
varied interests, be they philosophical, theological, anthropological, historical, or political.  
The vision also serves a second function; it is a base principle by which he critiques all 
investigation, whether philosophical or theological, into the nature of God and the person.  
Wherever he finds a view that opposes this vision of freedom, he judges it to be faulty.  As 
our evaluation of Berdiaev is theological, our critique will focus primarily on the extent to 
which his vision can be defended from a theological perspective. 
As we critically examine this thought, Berdiaev‟s innovation in asserting a clear 
interdependence between freedom and the creative act will be demonstrated.  Also, the 
various philosophical and theological suppositions that support this view of freedom will be 
detailed.  Because this is a vision of freedom, and not a systematic presentation, we will also 
encounter difficulties in trying to carefully analyze exactly what Berdiaev means at each 
juncture.  Although we will attempt to clarify the ambiguous phrase or incomplete idea as it 
occurs, the overall objective is to evaluate the theological relevance of this vision of freedom 
and determine if it can be employed in at least some of the ways Berdiaev intended.  As we 
shall see, Berdiaev‟s approach can be problematic at times.  It will, however, be demonstrated 
that these difficulties do not vitiate the important contributions his thought can make to 
theological reflection. 
Therefore, to allow Berdiaev to speak to a contemporary audience a certain generosity 
of spirit on the reader‟s behalf is essential.  If one evaluates this Christian existentialist on the 
grounds of systematic unity or how concisely he explains each idea (a judgment Berdiaev 
himself would admit to failing) the reader will miss the benefit of what Berdiaev has to say 
regarding the importance of freedom and creativity for the person and for God. 
As we proceed, we shall see that it is important to recognize three characteristics of 
Berdiaev‟s approach and framework that distinguish his thought from many contemporary 
philosophical and theological investigations of freedom.  Chapters 2 through 4 will analyze 
each characteristic in depth. 
i. Mysticism is an important contributor to Berdiaev‟s thought, especially to his 
vision of freedom.  Berdiaev believes he can create an unassailable theodicy, as 
well as a distinctive anthropology, by positing the heterodox view that there is a 
primordial freedom that exists outside of God.  A significant resource for this 
18 
 
assertion comes from select strands of Christian mystical thought.  The various 
degrees of freedom Berdiaev sees in the created order all relate to this 
primordial freedom in some measure.  This position will be analyzed in this 
chapter, under the section, „The Search for the Origins of Freedom‟. 
ii. Freedom is a pivotal element for understanding the nature and character of 
God and humanity.  With regard to anthropology, Berdiaev argues that the 
individual‟s freedom is a core determinant of personhood.  With regard to the 
nature of God, Berdiaev narrowly focuses on theodicy.  He argues that without 
an unequivocal theodicy, understanding the nature of God and how God 
exercises freedom is highly problematic.  These concerns will be addressed in 
chapter 3: „Motivations‟. 
iii. Freedom exists in varying degrees, with each degree representing a specific 
modality.  Whenever Berdiaev uses the term „freedom‟ it always refers to a 
specific type of freedom, which is influenced by variables internal and external 
to the agent.  The various degrees of freedom will be examined in chapter 4: 
„Freedom in the Created Order‟. 
 
These three characteristics are basic to understanding what Berdiaev means by the term 
„freedom‟ and how his concept of freedom is developed. 
This chapter will survey the contours of Berdiaev‟s account of freedom.  We will 
detail the framework he establishes to propound his specific understanding of freedom – 
while giving special attention to his dependence upon certain strands of Christian mysticism 
– and analyze the approach and assumptions he employs in the development of this 
framework.  We will conclude with a summary of the material we have investigated and 
highlight those areas that will become points of engagement with Moltmann‟s theology of 
freedom.  To begin with, we consider one of the more enigmatic aspects of his thought – his 
orientation and style. 
 
1.  Orientation and Style 
 
Berdiaev‟s style (i.e. how he communicates his thought) has garnered numerous 
comments, and the overwhelming consensus is that his style is problematic.
5
  Berdiaev 
acknowledges this in his autobiography. 
My thought has often been misunderstood and misinterpreted, and for this I am 
probably myself largely to blame: my thinking is antinomic; I incline too much to 
extremes and occasionally jump to conclusions without testing them by the accepted 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, McLachlan, The Desire to Be God,111; Thomas Idinopulos, “Nicolas Berdyaev‟s 
Ontology of Spirit,” The Journal of Religion 49 (1969), 84; Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev, 83; Lowrie, Rebellious 
Prophet, 245; George Seaver, Nicolas Berdyaev: An Introduction to His Thought (London: James Clarke & Co., 
Ltd., 1950), 10; James Wayne Dye, “Nikolai Berdyaev and His Ideas on the Fundamental Nature of All 
Entities,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 2:3 (1979), 112. 
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methods of cautious philosophical enquiry; and I express myself in an extravagantly 
aphoristic manner.
6
 
 
This frank self-assessment, with terms and phrases such as „antinomic‟, „extremes‟, „jump to 
conclusions‟, and „extravagantly aphoristic manner‟, alerts the reader to the difficulties he 
may encounter when exploring Berdiaev‟s thought.  Consequently it is not surprising when 
Poole comments that Berdiaev‟s style would “long irritate some professional philosophers 
(while engaging most other readers) . . . .”7 
Although commentators give us several options for characterizing Berdiaev‟s style 
(e.g., „generous‟, „episodic‟, „repetitive‟, „inconsistent‟, etc.), possibly the most useful term 
for classifying his style is „tentative‟.  By choosing the term „tentative‟ we are not saying that 
Berdiaev‟s thought is somehow hesitant or uncertain.  Rather we are saying, as Berdiaev 
readily admits, he did not always exercise appropriate care when attempting to communicate 
his thought – which results in certain sections of his thought not being fully developed or 
integrated. 
Yet despite the fact that Berdiaev‟s work can be difficult due to his tentative style, as 
we shall see, his vision of freedom is constructed upon certain themes – which center on the 
relationship between freedom, the person, and God – that ground his thought.  George Seaver 
observes that “. . . once the reader has grasped his [Berdiaev‟s] central thought he will 
perceive that these are merely verbal inconsistencies.  Logical inconsistencies are much  
rarer . . . .”8  So, even though he communicates in a tentative style, his thought is still 
organized on markedly discernible and interrelated ideas.  Because of this Miroslav Volf can 
rightfully observe, “. . . one can clearly see how Berdiaev‟s thought, which strikes one as 
disjointed, in fact does display a basic „goodness of fit.‟”9 
Although Berdiaev admits that his style suffers from a lack of development, he is not 
willing to attribute the difficulties in style solely to his authorial tentativeness.  In his 
introductory comments to Slavery and Freedom he argues that his problematic style is also a 
result of his orientation.  That is, the subject matter he is exploring requires an „antinomic‟ or 
„contradictory‟ approach.  He offers the following explanation:   
My thought has always belonged to the existential type of philosophy.  The 
inconsistencies and contradictions which are to be found in my thought are 
                                                 
6
 DR, 101. 
7
 Poole, Problems of Idealism, 50. 
8
 Seaver, 10. 
9
 Miroslav Volf, review of The Eighth Day of Creation, by Ivan Devcic, Books & Culture 10:1 
(January/February 2004): 24. 
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expressions of spiritual conflict, of contradictions which lie at the very heart of 
existence itself, and are not to be disguised by a façade of logical unity.
10
 
 
Berdiaev believes that because his orientation is focused on the „spiritual conflict‟ that lies at 
the „very heart of existence‟ – the dilemma of freedom for God and the person – his own 
conflicted style is the inevitable result. 
He goes on to assert that not only does his orientation result in a contradictory style, 
but also that all research into similar areas must eschew methodologies that are primarily 
logical or systematic in nature.
11
  He is convinced that all queries into the essential questions 
of existence (e.g., God, freedom, personhood) cannot be examined through methods based on 
systematic unity.  “Existence is synonymous with becoming.  There may be a logical system 
behind it, but a system of existence is inconceivable.”12  Berdiaev is committed to the idea 
that any philosophy or theology that is established on strictly logical or systematic unity 
could not truly investigate the issues concerning freedom for the person or God. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 SF, 8.  Berdiaev‟s orientation and style is certainly not without precedent; it is possible to see other 
authors who follow a similar line.  For example, consider Søren Kierkegaard‟s Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, where he devotes a section to the impossibility of an existential system.  He writes, “An existential 
system cannot be formulated. . . . Reality itself is a system – for God; but it cannot be a system for any existing 
spirit.” Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 107.  Vallon is partially correct when he states that Berdiaev “derives 
his primary insights into philosophy and religion mainly from Boehme, Khomyakov, and Dostoyevsky instead 
of Kierkegaard,” Vallon, An Apostle of Freedom, 292.  Especially since Berdiaev himself states that he did not 
read Kierkegaard “until late in life,” and that Kierkegaard did not have “any particular influence” on his thought.  
DR, 103.  Yet, Berdiaev will associate his thought with Kierkegaard‟s, stating that he “took up the position of 
Kierkegaard” (DR, 95) and that he is “at one with Kierkegaard,” with regards to „personality‟.  DR, 93.  Hence 
we see that while Berdiaev may not have been „influenced‟ by Kierkegaard, he did see similarities with his own 
thought. 
11
 Berdiaev‟s repeated aversion to any approach that claims a „logical unity‟ or „systematic coherence‟ 
is based on the supposition that life is antinomic in character, i.e. human existence does not possess a logical 
unity.  Berdiaev argues that to base existential reflection upon logical or systematic coherence is to place form 
(i.e. logical unity) over content.  Berdiaev is convinced that a logically unified argument, or an emphasis on 
systemization, will necessitate the attempted resolutions of antinomies that cannot be resolved.  See also SF, 8; 
DT, 18-19.  This problematic position that views logic as a „closed‟ system detracts from his overall premise.  It 
is accepted that there are certain problems that appear to defy logical solutions (e.g. theodicy); however, a 
logically constructed argument, which is systematically presented, can also recognize antinomic problems in 
human existence. 
12
 SS, 54 (Italics mine).  Copleston notes, “The Christian dogmas express spiritual life.  It is theology, 
according to Berdyaev, which has given them a „rationalistic character.‟” Copleston, Philosophy in Russia, 375.  
Berdiaev‟s aversion to any line of thought that displays a „rationalistic character‟ is true to his 
intellectual/religious context, which is especially influenced by Khomiakov‟s epistemological assumptions. 
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2.  Intuition 
 
Berdiaev‟s admitted anti-systematic bias does not mean that he is opposed to reason.  
In discussing several writers of the Silver Age, amongst whom Berdiaev is included, 
Copleston writes, “It would be more appropriate to describe them as „anti-rationalists‟, if by 
rationalism we mean belief in the omnicompetence of reason in regard to knowledge of 
reality.”13  Although reason is important to Berdiaev‟s thought (as can be seen in the inner 
consistency of his work), at no point does reason assume a determinative status.
14
  By treating 
reason as part of a larger cognitive matrix and not regarding reason as absolute, Berdiaev 
utilizes other forms of comprehension.  Chief among these is intuition. 
The reliance on intuition is congruous with Berdiaev‟s intellectual context.15  
Copleston writes, 
We have seen that a prominent feature of religiously oriented philosophical thought in 
Russia was criticism of „western rationalism‟.  It was not a question of refusing to 
admit that reasoning has any role to play in human life.  It was a question of rejecting 
the claim that in regard to the acquisition of knowledge reason is omnicompetent and 
of maintaining that other factors can be and are involved, especially intuition.
16
 
 
For Berdiaev, who describes himself as a “. . . thinker exclusively of the intuitive-
synthetic type,”17 intuition is a governing principle that does not negate reason, but he views 
reason as subordinate to intuition.  Reason is used to formulate what is known intuitively to 
be true – formulations are based on intuition.  This questionable stance, of intuition assuming 
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 Copleston, Philosophy in Russia, 390.  It is accepted that Copleston‟s definition of „rationalism‟ – 
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 For a helpful discussion on the importance of intuition in the Silver Age see Catherine Evtuhov, “On 
Neo-Romanticism and Christianity: „Spots of Time‟ in the Russian Silver Age,” Russian History 20: 1-4 (1993): 
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 Copleston, Philosophy in Russia, 389 (Italics mine). 
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a priority over reason, is a hallmark of Berdiaev‟s approach, as it was for many Silver Age 
writers.
18
 
When Berdiaev discusses the foundations of his thought he frequently turns to a 
vague conceptualization of intuition.  He writes, “Intuition is the sine qua non of philosophy.  
Every true philosopher has an original intuition of his own.”19  Although he does not provide 
a precise definition for intuition, as a starting point for our examination at the very least we 
can say that, for Berdiaev, intuition is an insight into the nature of the phenomenal or 
noumenal realms, which is particular to the agent and not dependent upon rational 
processes.
20
  Lowrie describes Berdiaev‟s view of intuition as “a sort of psychological virgin 
birth.”21 
We can make the following observations regarding Berdiaev‟s understanding of 
intuition: 
i. Intuition is essential for philosophy, and, therefore is essential in the search for 
truth.  “Philosophical intuition cannot be deduced from anything else; it is 
primary, and secretes in itself the light which will illuminate every act of 
knowledge.  Neither religious nor scientific truths are adequate substitutes for 
intuition.”22 
ii. Intuition does not negate reason, intuition does not overturn „objective‟ 
knowledge (knowledge that can be deduced through rational processes), but, 
reason is never allowed to supersede what the agent intuitively knows to be 
true. 
iii. Intuition occurs when the agent interacts with the natural world (phenomenal 
realm) and with deeper realities (noumenal realm).  Thus, even though intuition 
is particular to the agent, there are two external variables – human experience 
(which, as we shall see, incorporates a vast range of engagements) and the 
interaction with God – that modulate intuition. 
 
Hence Berdiaev‟s understanding of intuition is a multi-layered concept, which 
integrates different factors.  Intuition is not only a particular insight, but an insight that is 
influenced by the agent‟s experience.  As the agent participates in various experiences, and as 
those experiences are assimilated into the person‟s existence, there is potential for intuition.  
“Philosophical knowledge depends on the range of experience, and it also supposes an 
essentially tragic experience of all the contradictions of human existence.  Philosophy is 
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therefore based upon the maximum experience of human existence.”23  Intuition, then, is 
dependent on the agent‟s ability to integrate a variety of external experiences into his own 
unique perspective.
24
 
Even though Berdiaev emphasizes intuition as an act particular to the agent, he also 
recognizes that there are multiple factors (from experience to scholarship to culture) that 
modulate the person‟s intuition.25  Consequently, we can further clarify Berdiaev‟s 
understanding of intuition as an insight into the nature of the phenomenal or noumenal 
realms that is particular to the agent, is not solely dependent upon rational processes, and is 
modulated by internal and external variables.
26
 
 
3.  „Spiritual‟ Experience 
 
Scanlan observes that Berdiaev sought “to „confirm‟ his mystical conditions 
metaphysically,”27 i.e., to apply reason to his intuitions.  Scanlan‟s comment brings to light 
one of the reasons Berdiaev‟s concept of intuition is opaque – the most valued experience for 
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 SS, 17 (Italics author). 
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 Berdiaev‟s view of intuition as integrating a variety of experiences bears similarity to conceptions of 
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intuition is a „spiritual‟ experience, of which mysticism is a critical element.  „Spiritual 
experience‟, for Berdiaev, is the person‟s experience of noumenal (spiritual) reality.  He 
writes, “Philosophy is the science concerning the spirit . . . .  In this sense philosophy of the 
self is not objective.  It is based upon spiritual experience.”28  Without spiritual experience, 
philosophy would be impossible for Berdiaev, since his thought is “born of spiritual 
experience, rather than deduced from ascertained and assured premises.  Indeed, I cannot 
even begin to think philosophically in the absence of that inner, spiritual experience.”29 
Berdiaev believed that the elements central to his thought: freedom, the Triune God, 
the person, the Basileia, et al., are „subjective‟,30 i.e. they can only be truly known through 
the subject‟s spiritual experience.  Any attempt to establish objective truths (i.e. knowledge or 
truth that is formulated solely through rational processes) concerning these elements will only 
obfuscate the truth about them.
31
 
Our examination of Berdiaev‟s freedom begins where our discussion of his 
orientation and style ends – his focus on the spiritual.  It is from this focus that Berdiaev 
argues for an origination of freedom. 
 
§2  THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINS OF FREEDOM 
 
McLachlan observes that “The major component of Berdiaev‟s thought is his 
insistence on the metaphysical priority of freedom.”32  He states that the „metaphysical 
priority of freedom‟ is Berdiaev‟s fundamental insight in which  
. . . freedom is primarily, ultimately real, and as such its essence lies outside any kind 
of external determination.  It cannot be derived from any more fundamental kind of 
reality.  It cannot be subordinated to Being qua Being, because freedom refuses all 
determination.
33
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Berdiaev believes that the only recourse to support this radical claim (freedom „cannot 
be derived from any more fundamental kind of reality‟, i.e. freedom is a primordial reality 
that is non-determined) is to argue for an origination of freedom independent of God.  In 
essence, Berdiaev is proposing that freedom be considered as a primary reality; a reality that 
is not attributable to God.  To assert this heterodox proposition, which he intuitively believes 
to be true, he relies on particular streams of thought within the tradition of Christian 
mysticism.   
Despite the difficulty of supporting Reinhold Niebuhr‟s observation that Berdiaev is 
“the most brilliant modern exponent of Greek Orthodox mysticism . . .,”34 it does at least 
indicate the prominence of mysticism within Berdiaev‟s thought.  Spinka observes that it is 
with the publication of Sub specie æternitatis (a 1907 collection of previously published 
articles) that Berdiaev “turned from idealism to what he called „mystical realism.‟”35  This 
concept, for Berdiaev, is understood as a framework where priority is given to mystically 
apprehended intuition, and it reflects a decisive stage in his thought. 
Mystical realism is the position that the mystical experience of the agent reveals a 
reality greater than the reality of the phenomenal realm.  Referring to Russian iconography, 
Zenkovsky captures well the basic understanding of mystical realism. 
Here one grasps intuitively what may be expressed discursively as follows: All 
material things serve as means for expressing a higher truth, a higher beauty.  In 
philosophic terms, this is a mystical realism, which recognizes empirical reality, but 
sees behind it another reality; both spheres of being are real, but they are of 
hierarchically different value; empirical being is sustained only through 
„participation‟ in a mystical reality.  The theocratic idea of Christianity amounts to 
asserting the need to illuminate all that is visible, all that is empirical, by relating it to 
a mystical sphere; the whole of history, the whole life of the individual, must be 
sanctified through the transforming activity of divine power in the empirical sphere.
36
 
 
Mystical realism does not deny the reality of the phenomenal realm, but claims that there is a 
reality more significant than the phenomenal, a reality which „sustains‟ the phenomenal. 
Berdiaev fully utilizes this concept as he comes to believe that existent matter always 
impinges upon freedom.  Mystical realism allows him to „see‟ beyond the „empirical‟ (to use 
Zenkovsky‟s terms) to investigate freedom from a perspective that is purportedly beyond the 
limitations of human existence – the perspective of a „mystical reality‟.  Berdiaev believes 
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that mystical realism provides a position from which he can proclaim a basic tenet of his 
vision: freedom in its primal form is non-determined. 
Since Berdiaev believes „existence‟ impinges upon freedom, he seeks to establish a 
theory of freedom that is independent of „existence‟.  The development of this thought 
coincides with the development of his Christian faith; a faith wherein he discovers a long-
standing tradition (i.e. mysticism) that becomes a vital resource for his vision of freedom.   
Thus, Christian mysticism is an important element for Berdiaev as he seeks to give an 
account of freedom‟s origination and nature. 
 
1.  The Mystical Approach 
 
Berdiaev‟s conception of mysticism is unequivocally situated in the Russian milieu in 
which he is located.
37
  Solov‟ev, considered one of the “four giants” who preceded the Silver 
Age
38
 and an important influence on Berdiaev, was schooled in German idealism and the 
German mystics.
39
  Louis Shein observes, “According to Solov‟ev, the only principle which 
can give us true knowledge is mystical intuition.”40  Considering the impress of Solov‟ev‟s 
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thought upon the Russian intelligentsia and Berdiaev, it is not surprising that Berdiaev 
classifies himself as a „homo mysticus‟ over against a „homo religiosus‟ – a person who 
places greater emphasis on mysticism than on religion.  When Berdiaev uses the term 
„mysticism‟ he is frequently referring to an experience where there is an “immediate 
communion with God, the contemplation of God and union with Him.”41  It is important to 
note that even though Berdiaev classifies himself as a „homo mysticus‟ and thereby 
understands himself as a „mystic‟ philosopher, he does not consider himself to be a mystic.  
He understands himself as a philosopher who engages mystical thought and practice.  Hence 
the function of mysticism within Berdiaev‟s thought is a methodological one, as he attempts 
to utilize specific mystical concepts (e.g. Boehme‟s Ungrund), along with certain 
characteristics paradigmatic of mysticism (i.e. the mystical experience as a cognitive 
apparatus) to expound what he believes to be a philosophic vision of freedom.  Berdiaev‟s 
use of mysticism can be understood as a tool that serves his vision, as opposed to an attempt 
to establish either a mystical doctrine or himself as a mystic.  As we shall see when 
examining German mysticism, Berdiaev does have certain parameters when considering 
mysticism, but overall his understanding is quite broad. 
Mystical experience as cognition is pivotal to Berdiaev‟s thought as he argues that 
mysticism provides a way of experiencing fundamental reality, the noumenal.  In the mystical 
experience, union with God results in a state where the „objective‟ realities of the 
phenomenal realm are no longer primary.  This is because within the mystical experience the 
“intellectual, affective, and volitional life”42 of the person is being expanded – the person has 
a greater sense of reality as a result of his noumenal experience. 
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Within this context, mystical experience is a “mode of knowledge rather than a 
finished product . . .,” 43 and due to its open-ended nature (i.e. it yields a non-finished 
product) precise explanations as to either how the mystical experience functions as a 
cognitive process, or, the truths that are made known within the experience, are not possible.  
“Where mysticism begins, dogmatic precision and valid generalizations end.”44 
Berdiaev regards the person‟s knowledge of God gained through mystical experience 
as superior to the capacity to know God through discursive thought.  His position here has a 
strong affinity with the following statement by Gregory of Nyssa, a theologian Berdiaev held 
in high regard.  Gregory: “Every concept formed by the intellect in an attempt to comprehend 
and circumscribe the divine nature can succeed only in fashioning an idol, not in making God 
known.”45 
This elevation of mystically acquired knowledge, which is greater than discursive 
thought, is an important step for Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom.  This step results from 
Berdiaev grounding his vision of freedom on the concept of „non-determination‟.  In order to 
understand freedom as „non-determination‟, according to Berdiaev, one must comprehend 
freedom as being „non-created‟, and, he believes, a mystical approach is the only means to 
propound such an assertion. 
Clearly, anything that is non-created (even if it is to be considered „no-thing‟, as he 
will classify non-created freedom) intimates God-like status.  For a Christian philosopher, 
such as Berdiaev, a method of discourse must be engaged that can maintain the core beliefs 
of Christianity (e.g., there is only one Triune God) while providing the latitude to argue for 
such an unorthodox position.  Berdiaev believes that his use of mystical realism enables this 
necessary latitude, a latitude he does not think exists within theological paradigms. 
As mystical realism opens unique insights into the noumenal realm, it is the mystic 
philosopher and not the theologian, Berdiaev propounds, who is equipped to understand the 
relationship between God and freedom.  “Official theology, strong by reason of its social 
sanction, regarded its dogma as objective truth which must be opposed to the subjective 
statements of mysticism.”46  „Objective truth‟ (i.e. truth deduced through rational processes) 
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limits the theologian in understanding existential truths, and therefore, theology is always 
secondary to philosophy. 
So, when Andrew Louth asks, “Can there, indeed, be such a thing as Christian 
mystical theology?”47 Berdiaev would most likely reply in the negative to Louth‟s question.  
The reason there cannot be a Christian mystical theology is due to the „objective‟ nature of 
theology, which cannot incorporate the experiential knowledge gained through the mystical 
experience.
48
  Consequently, within a theological paradigm, investigation of „non-created‟ 
freedom is not possible. 
Seaver explains why Berdiaev‟s thought is so suspicious of theology, “The difference 
between philosophical mysticism and rationalistic theology is this: that the former is based 
upon spiritual experience, the latter on the discursive reason.”49  Despite the fact that this 
narrow view of theology is highly contestable, Seaver does accurately represent Berdiaev‟s 
view of „rationalistic theology‟, a theology Berdiaev viewed as impotent when “confronted 
with the mystery of Divine-human relations as revealed in mystical experience.”50 
His reliance on mystical experience as a form of cognition, combined with the 
influence of Khomiakov and Solov‟ev, lead Berdiaev to argue that the „knowledge‟ of God, 
freedom, and existence must be „integral‟ knowledge. 
 
2.  Integral knowledge 
 
Berdiaev‟s incorporation of „spiritual‟ experience as a form of cognition superior to 
reason raises the epistemological concern of how the agent comes to „know‟.  Shein observes 
that Solov‟ev was cognizant of this dilemma, “It should be pointed out that Solov‟ev was 
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fully aware of the difficulties inherent in this principle, since it [mystical intuition] must 
satisfy objective conditions if it is to be of universal value.”51 
Space forbids a detailed examination of Berdiaev‟s highly speculative understanding 
of cognition.  At the heart of his understanding, and what is essential for our present 
discussion, is his conception of „integral knowledge‟.52  Integral knowledge is the means by 
which a person is able to „know‟ truths that originate in the spiritual (noumenal) realm.53 
The proponents of integral knowledge rely on an alternative paradigm wherein 
rational thought is not considered to be „omnicompetent‟ (Copleston) but becomes part of a 
larger cognitive framework.  Berdiaev argues, “We must not seek the criteria of truth in 
reason or the intellect, but rather in the integral spirit.  The heart and the conscience remain 
the supreme agents of value as well as of knowledge.”54  Cognition that uses an „integral‟ 
approach, as Berdiaev uses the term, is a type of knowing that incorporates the experience of 
the person‟s intellectual, affective,55 volitional, and spiritual life. Berdiaev: 
Purely intellectual discursive knowledge constructs an objectified world out of touch 
with [noumenal] reality.  What is decisively important in knowledge is not the logical 
process of thought, which ranks as an instrument, and which takes control only in the 
centre of the path, but the emotional and volitional tension is attributable to the spirit 
as a whole.
56
 
 
The importance of integral knowledge, for Berdiaev, is based on the premise that 
integral knowledge is the only means by which the agent may apprehend knowledge of the 
„spiritual‟, which is „Truth‟.57  Since „spiritual‟ knowledge is knowledge of the „noumenal‟, it 
is an experientially based knowledge.  As such, knowledge of the spiritual realm requires a 
method that allows for cognition beyond discursive thought, a method that integrates all of 
the cognitive capabilities of the person.  Integral knowledge, which seeks to incorporate the 
varied capabilities of the person, including experience, into the cognitive process and thereby 
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makes knowledge of the „spiritual‟ possible, is therefore the highest form of cognition for 
Berdiaev.
58
 
Where knowledge is not „integral‟, Berdiaev believes reason becomes the sole 
element in cognition; the understanding of „Truth‟ is no longer possible and the result is 
„ratiocination‟.59 
To summarize this section thus far, we have found: 
i. Berdiaev began his career as a philosopher in a context where mysticism was 
considered a valid and important means of cognition.   
ii. As Berdiaev turns away from neo-idealism and towards Christianity – while at 
the same time still holding onto certain central tenets of neo-idealism (just as he 
did in his turn from Marxism towards neo-idealism) – he incorporates a 
mystical approach into his own work, what he terms „mystical realism‟. 
iii. Mystical realism is, for Berdiaev, built around the belief that „behind‟ the 
reality of the phenomenal (material) world there is the deeper, or truer, reality 
of the noumenal (spiritual) world. 
iv. By de-emphasizing reason and valuing other forms of cognition (e.g. mystical 
apprehension), Berdiaev employs the concept of „integral knowledge‟, which is 
the means for comprehending his vision of freedom. 
 
3.  Symbolism 
 
The problem then arises: how does one communicate integral knowledge, since it 
relies on data that has been apprehended through spiritual experience?  Since integral 
knowledge is experientially based on a spiritual encounter, Berdiaev argues, it cannot be 
expressed objectively, i.e., it cannot be communicated by discursive methods.  Thus, within 
Berdiaev‟s thought the use of symbol and „myth‟ will become the primary means of 
communicating „Truth‟.  McLachlan observes, “The mystical experience that Berdyaev 
describes does give its subject knowledge.  But it is a pure experience that can be expressed 
only in the form of symbols.”60  Berdiaev: 
Etymologically speaking the word “symbol” conveys the sense of something 
intermediary which has the function of a sign, and at the same time it suggests a 
relationship between the sign and the thing signified.  Symbols presuppose the 
existence of two worlds and two orders of being and they would not exist were there 
only one order.  A symbol shows us that the meaning of one world is to be found in 
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another, and that this meaning itself is revealed to us in the latter.  Plotinus understood 
by a symbol the union of two things in one.  A symbol constitutes a bridge which 
links together two worlds.
61
 
 
Berdiaev uses symbol and myth as the central means to communicate his mystically 
based vision of freedom.  Within this thought, „symbol‟ functions as the „intermediary which 
has the function of a sign‟.  „Myth‟ is the representation of what the symbol directs our 
attention towards; myth is the only way to speak of noumenal realities.  Berdiaev: “The 
foundation of mystical and symbolic knowledge is not formal philosophical statement but 
mythological representation.  Concepts are the basis of philosophical statement, while 
symbols give rise to mythological representation.”62  Evgueny Lampert describes Berdiaev‟s 
conception of myth as that which “represents within this world the realities which transcend 
the world; it brings two worlds together in images and symbols.”63 
The use of symbolism and mythology to express truth does not in any way, for 
Berdiaev, vitiate the truth being communicated. “Myth is a reality immeasurably greater than 
concept.  It is high time we stopped identifying myth with invention, with the illusions of 
primitive mentality, and with anything, in fact, which is essentially opposed to reality.”64  
Because the truth expressed cannot be rationally explained or objectively verified does not 
mean that it is any less true.  The use of symbolism does not negate the truth being detailed.  
Actually the opposite is the case; symbols preserve the truthfulness of the claim by 
differentiating between spiritual and natural realities.  McLachlan explains why symbols are 
essential to Berdiaev‟s thought: 
The key to reading Berdyaev is to see that he, like Schelling, regards the phenomenal 
world as real, but symbolically so.  Objectification is to see the symbol not as a 
symbol but as the ultimate reality, reifying the symbol.  The phenomenal world is a 
symbol of a spiritual reality that is deeper than objectification.  The problem comes 
when human beings see the phenomenal world as the only reality.
65
 
 
McLachlan‟s observation is apt; the symbol must not be mistaken for a „final‟ reality.  
As Berdiaev writes, “When the mere symbol is taken for the final reality the spiritual world is 
subordinated to the natural.”66  To avoid this subordination, symbolism is the necessary 
device for disclosing the truth that has been apprehended through integral knowledge of 
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noumenal reality.  Symbol and mythology are the only forms Berdiaev will acknowledge as 
being valid means for communicating noumenal truth.  As N. O. Lossky writes, 
This interpretation of the symbolism of religious truths must not be confounded with 
modernism according to which symbols are merely subjective expressions of the 
inmost reality.  In Berdyaev‟s view symbols are the actual natural reality taken in 
connection with its supernatural significance.  Therefore, the birth of the God-man 
from the Virgin Mary, His life in Palestine and His death on the cross are actual 
historical facts, and at the same time they are symbols.  Thus, Berdyaev‟s symbolism 
is not Docetism; it does not lead to iconoclasm or undermine Christianity.  It is a real 
symbolism.
67
 
 
Lossky‟s comments point to a further instance of how Berdiaev uses symbol and 
myth; not only are they essential for expressing the mystically apprehended knowledge of the 
agent, they are also the means by which individuals can understand the collected truths of 
Christianity.  As such, Christian dogma provides an example of how symbol and myth 
operate within Berdiaev‟s thought. 
Berdiaev understands Christian dogma as an exemplary form of symbol and myth.  
He explains, “. . . dogma is not doctrine but symbol and myth giving expression to events in 
the spiritual world of absolute and fundamental importance.  Dogma symbolises [sic] 
spiritual experience and life by mythological representations and not by concepts.”68  Hence, 
dogmas “express the principle which underlies the spiritual life.”69  According to Berdiaev, 
the „symbol‟ of the Trinity gives rise to the mythological representation, as those who have 
encountered the Triune God attempt to communicate that experience to others.  “Dogmas are 
not theological doctrines, but mystical facts belonging to spiritual life and experience which 
refer to real religious contacts with the divine world.”70 
For Berdiaev, the symbolic character of the dogma concerning the Trinity does not 
negate the historical actuality of the Incarnation or the reality of the Triune God.  He is 
unusually direct on this point: 
What is essential to me for my own resurrection to eternal life is not the doctrine of 
Christ‟s Resurrection, but rather the fact that this event has actually taken place.  I 
cannot be indifferent as to whether this mystical fact did or did not occur, whereas I 
can be quite indifferent with regard to the theological or metaphysical doctrine of the 
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Resurrection.  The denial of the mystical fact of Christ‟s Resurrection is for me a 
denial of eternal life, and that is not something which I can calmly admit.
71
  
 
This reliance on integral knowledge, and its expression through symbolism and myth, leads 
to an approach where the „knowing subject‟ plays an important role in evaluating truth and 
establishing meaning.  For Berdiaev, the person‟s spiritual experiences reveal what is true, 
and while theology may point to ontic truths, it is only by „experiencing‟ them in communion 
with God through the Spirit that they can be existentially validated. 
Berdiaev recognizes that operating from this position – the understanding of truth 
originating within the person‟s mystical experience – may result in the person being led 
astray.  Hence, “Mysticism is deeper and more fundamental than theology, though it 
obviously has it dangers.”72  Berdiaev accepts that the mystical path can be „illusory‟.  He 
writes, “There is, moreover, a danger which besets every attempt to follow the mystical way.  
Phantasy in this sphere of life may easily be mistaken for reality.  Eastern mysticism has 
recognized and described this condition of being „charmed‟.”73 
Dangers notwithstanding, Berdiaev is convinced that the only way to understand the 
“mystery” of freedom is through a Christian mystical perspective.  In responding to the 
uncertainty that this mystical approach presents he writes, 
But it must be remembered that the spiritual life, generally speaking, is full of danger, 
for the absence of any spiritual life is in itself a source of security; an ordinary 
existence and a religion which is merely traditional and external offers the maximum 
of peace and quietness.
74
 
 
We have considered Berdiaev‟s approach to mysticism and integral knowledge in 
broad terms.  We see that he considers „spiritual‟ knowledge to be of a higher value than 
„objective‟ knowledge and that „symbols‟ and „myth‟ are essential in communicating 
„spiritual‟ knowledge.  As our investigation of Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom proceeds, we 
now consider the specific branch of German mysticism that became foundational to his vision 
of freedom. 
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4.  German mysticism
75
 
 
It is the German mystics, Berdiaev contends, where the best of the Eastern and 
Western Christian mystic traditions reach unparalleled synthesis.  “German mysticism is one 
of the greatest manifestations of spiritual history.”76  German mysticism, for Berdiaev, is best 
exemplified in the writing of Meister Eckhardt (1260-1327/8), Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), 
and Angelus Silesius (1624-1677).  Space forbids a detailed analysis of Eckhardt and Silesius 
and their influence upon Berdiaev.  As it is the work of Boehme that plays the most 
significant role in Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom, we will concentrate our attention on his 
thought. 
While the details of Boehme‟s personal history are lacking, his influence on European 
thought, and Berdiaev in particular, is significant and indisputable.
77
  Berdiaev discovers in 
Boehme‟s voluntaristic writings a mystical paradigm by which he can take his Kantian 
influenced notion of freedom and locate it within a myth that expresses “a fundamental truth 
about existence that is incapable of being expressed in an objective conceptual 
arrangement.”78  The myth that addresses this „fundamental truth‟ is the myth of the 
Ungrund.  Berdiaev: 
I am thinking of Boehme, who is not only a great German mystic, but also one of the 
greatest mystics of all time; and particularly of his The Dark Nature of God.  
Boehme‟s doctrine is closely connected to what I have been saying, and offers a 
concrete illustration of the fundamental hypothesis of the metaphysics of history.  In 
fact, I believe it to be one of the most important discoveries of the German spirit. . . . 
Somewhere, in immeasurably greater depths, there exists a state which may be called 
Ungrund or „groundlessness‟ to which neither human words nor the categories of 
good and evil nor those of being or non-being are applicable.
79
 
 
The reason Berdiaev finds Boehme‟s mystical theory so compelling is that Berdiaev 
believes that in order to demonstrate a non-determined freedom, the origination of freedom 
must be established and it must be proved to originate outside of Being. 
This questionable position (freedom originating outside of Being) is based on the idea 
that “if freedom is real and if its essence lies in the absence of external determination, it 
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cannot be derivative from any more fundamental kind of reality, as any such derivation 
would be a form of determination.”80  Berdiaev is convinced that Boehme‟s Ungrund 
provides the necessary context to be able to argue for a freedom that can avoid external 
determination.  Consequently, Boehme‟s mysticism, in particular his concept of the Ungrund, 
becomes a central component in Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom. 
 
§3  THE UNGRUND 
 
Boehme‟s Ungrund permeates Berdiaev‟s work.  Spinka writes, “Henceforth, this 
doctrine became fundamental to all his later thinking, and he expounded it repeatedly and 
almost ad nauseam in his later writings.”81  The premise is that before existence, before God, 
there is an abyss, or void, from which all existence, including God, proceeds.
82
  Berdiaev 
interprets the Ungrund as “. . . nothingness, the groundless eye of eternity; and at the same 
time it is will, not grounded upon anything, bottomless, indeterminate will.  But this is a 
nothingness which is „Ein Hunger zum Etwas‟.  At the same time, the Ungrund is freedom.”83 
This speculative thought immediately confronts the reader with anomalies that make 
comprehending this concept problematic.  Berdiaev acknowledges this when he writes, 
“There is no rational, conceptional way of interpreting Eckhart‟s Gottheit or Boehme‟s 
Ungrund; their inherent mystery can only be stated in terms of a definitive concept.”84  The 
ambiguity is evident in Boehme‟s original formulation.  McLachlan states that in Boehme‟s 
writing, “The Ungrund itself is envisioned as the undifferentiated abyss of non-being and 
Being, the primordial realm of origination.  It is the no-thing that is also everything, 
potentiality without form.”85 
Although Berdiaev will deviate from Boehme‟s formulation in several key areas, he 
retains most of the basic tenets of Boehme‟s theory, and therefore also retains the 
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obfuscations.  Berdiaev attempts to explain the Ungrund by writing: “We should probably be 
right in thinking of Ungrund as the primal pre-existential freedom.  For freedom precedes 
being.  Freedom is not created.  That is the definition I personally should propose.”86  
Berdiaev‟s „definition‟, however, does not address the basic questions needed to understand 
what the Ungrund is and how it can be, for Berdiaev, a „myth‟ for a primordial freedom. 
In attempting to delineate the essential contours of the Ungrund, three basic concepts 
need clarification: „nothingness‟, „Being‟, and „non-being‟.  „Nothingness,‟ also referred to as 
groundlessness, has no recognizable form or structure by which it may be described; 
„nothingness‟ is the Ungrund.  As Lossky writes, “That „nothing‟ is not emptiness; it is a 
primary principle prior to God and the world, containing no differentiation, i.e., no division 
into a number of definite elements.”87 
Boehme postulated, and Berdiaev accepted, that this „nothingness‟ is primordial 
freedom, which is an „irrational‟88 potentiality.  Primordial freedom is not created by God, 
but, like God, „existed‟ before all creation.  „Nothingness‟ (Ungrund) is a „void‟ or „abyss‟ 
through which God has brought all „Being‟ into existence, it is the potential for both „Being‟ 
and „non-being‟. 
Berdiaev understands „Being‟ as anything that exists.  „Being‟ is the potential within 
the abyss that responds to God‟s intention, and becomes existent.  Therefore, God is the 
source and sustainer of all „Being‟.  Even though God is the source and sustainer, God is not 
regarded as „Being‟. “God is spirit, not Being,”89 which is greater than „Being‟.90  Because 
the Ungrund contains only the potential for „Being‟ it is not considered „Being‟, i.e. it is not 
existent, and therefore is classified as „no-thing‟ („nothingness‟).   
„Non-being‟ is that which arises from the Ungrund and does not respond to God‟s call 
to be created into „Being‟.91  „Non-being‟ is the genesis of evil; „non-being‟ exists in rebellion 
against God.  It impacts the created order, but it is not part of the created order.  “Thus evil 
has no basis in anything; it is determined by no possible being and has no ontological 
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origin.”92  By rejecting God‟s intention the potentiality within „nothingness‟ deteriorates into 
„non-Being‟, which gives rise to evil. 
The Ungrund, then, is a primordial freedom that precedes „Being‟.  “Being springs 
from freedom and not freedom from being.”93  Since the Ungrund is not derived from 
„Being‟, it is considered to be „no-thing‟ while also being primordial freedom.  In Boehme‟s 
original vision, McLachlan writes, “Boehme‟s dialectical voluntarism is based on the image 
of groundlessness which is the beginning of the development of Being.  The Ungrund 
contains within it all of the antimonies, but they are unrealized and only potential: Boehme 
calls the Ungrund the „eternal silence.‟”94  Consequently, the Ungrund is “the primary basis 
of existence;”95 “it is both prior to and the basic datum of existence.”96  Because primordial 
freedom (Ungrund) is prior to existence and thus non-created, Berdiaev believes that this 
freedom can be considered non-determined.  Simply put, since it has no creator and needs no 
sustainer it can suffer no impingement. 
Therefore, as non-determined primordial freedom, „nothingness‟ (Ungrund) can only 
be viewed as potentiality.  To consider the Ungrund as anything else would be to ascribe to it 
some quality of Being.  Philip Hefner writes: “The Ungrund is pure potentiality, and God 
creates the world by bringing possibility into actuality. . . .”97  This thought immediately 
presents the paradox of how „nothing‟, which is typically defined as having no existence, 
substance, or quantitative value, can be understood to contain potentiality.  Dye poses the 
question: 
A traditional metaphysician might object that it is not possible to conceive anything 
more ultimate than being, since anything must first be in order to have any other 
attributes, attributes being „substantive-hungry,‟ necessarily inhering in some being or 
substance (ούσία).98 
 
Berdiaev would respond that „nothingness‟ cannot be known through rational thought and 
may only be understood through „spiritual‟ experience, and cannot be analyzed within the 
context of discursive thought.
99
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Even though this controversial position appears to exclude rational enquiry, thereby 
encouraging a charge of incoherence, Berdiaev would not alter his position.  Rational enquiry 
cannot penetrate „Truth‟; Truth may only be understood through myth and the Ungrund is a 
myth.  Spinka writes, “But it must be reiterated that the Ungrund cannot be grasped 
conceptually, for it transcends all human concepts – it is a myth, a symbol.”100  Vallon 
concurs: 
It [the Ungrund] is an original intuition – a vision.  More specifically, it is Berdyaev‟s 
own vision which cannot be clearly understood unless one has gained a similar 
experience.  In his [Berdiaev‟s] words, it “can only express itself in terms of spiritual 
life and experience and not in the categories of a rigid ontology.  As rigid ontology 
this truth can easily degenerate into a heresy.”101 
 
To propose a primal void suggests the problematic position of postulating an entity 
that is of equal standing to God.  Berdiaev acknowledges this difficulty by stating: 
My Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant critics have fiercely attacked the idea 
of uncreated freedom, which conjured up in their minds a spectre of un-Christian 
dualism and gnosticism and of a presumptuous limitation of divine omnipotence.  I 
admit that my manner of thinking, in this as in many other respects, contributed to the 
panic.  I have already tried to explain that I am as much opposed to ontological 
dualism as to ontological monism, and that I regard both as rationalizations.
102
 
 
To defend his thought Berdiaev writes that the Ungrund “is neither Creator nor 
creature and is not a reality co-existent with the reality of God.”103  He is not postulating a 
form that is greater than or equal to God. 
The irrational mystery of freedom independent of Divine creation and determination 
does not imply the existence of another being claiming equality with Divine Being, it 
does not in the least imply an ontological dualism.  A dualism of this sort would 
involve rationalization.
104
 
 
Consequently, Berdiaev believes that by arguing that the Ungrund is beyond rational 
investigation and that the void is in no way comparable to the Deity (since it is „no-thing‟), 
the charge of “un-Christian dualism and gnosticism” is unsustainable. 
Berdiaev‟s appropriation of Boehme is not an acceptance of Boehme‟s theory in toto.  
Berdiaev modifies Boehme in several key aspects.  In the first instance Berdiaev alters a 
central tenet of Boehme‟s theory regarding the „location‟ of the Ungrund.  Berdiaev writes, 
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“According to Boehme this freedom is in God105; it is the inmost mysterious principle of 
divine life; whereas I conceived it to be outside God. . . .”106 
With this modification Berdiaev emphasizes the Ungrund as „meonic‟ freedom, which 
is a second instance of deviation from Boehme.
107
  By describing the Ungrund as „meonic‟ 
freedom he is placing greater emphasis on the Ungrund as primordial freedom rather than 
will.  “There is nothing more sad and barren than that which the Greeks expressed by the 
phrase ούκ őν, which is real nothingness.  The words μή őν [meon] conceal a potentiality, and 
this therefore is only half being or being which is not realized.”108  The Ungrund as „meonic‟ 
freedom is the primal abyss outside God from which both „Being‟ and „non-being‟ arise.  
Even though it is God‟s intent to bring forth „Being‟ from the Ungrund there is no ultimate 
control over the final result, as God cannot control „meonic‟ freedom.   
As the Ungrund is the potential for both good and evil Berdiaev refers to it as the 
“irrational109 mystery of freedom.”110  Since the Ungrund is not considered to possess rational 
qualities – there is no way to control or understand what will come forth („Being‟ or „non-
being‟), hence Berdiaev classifies the Ungrund as irrational.111   
The source of evil cannot be in God, yet apart from God there is no source of being or 
life. . . . Evil being absolutely irrational, it is therefore incapable of being grasped by 
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reason and remains inexplicable. . . . Evil is non-being  and has its roots in non-
existence.  But non-being can have no meaning, for meaning is always ontological.
112
 
 
This understanding of evil, then, is a third way in which Berdiaev deviates from 
Boehme.  Boehme considers evil to be “immature good.”113  It is this understanding of evil 
that informs Boehme‟s „dark side‟ of God.  Evil, for Berdiaev, has destructive consequences 
and must be separated from God.  A recurring theme throughout Berdiaev‟s corpus is that 
God can in no way be associated with evil; this theme, it will be argued later, is one of the 
main motivations behind his thought.  
The last instance of how Berdiaev‟s thought differs from Boehme‟s can be regarded 
as an expansion of how Boehme understands the Deity and the person.  McLachlan: 
“Berdyaev expands Boehme‟s image of the genesis of God from the absolute to include not 
only the development of God but of humanity and the cosmos as well.”114  The Ungrund, for 
Berdiaev, is conceived as being integral not only to the development of God, but to all 
existence.  It is Berdiaev‟s contention that the life of God and the life of the cosmos are 
inextricably linked to the primal abyss. 
Thus, Berdiaev differs from Boehme in the following ways: 
i. Berdiaev re-conceives the Ungrund as being „outside‟ God 
ii. He places the emphasis on the Ungrund as meonic freedom 
iii. He rejects the conception of evil as merely „immature good‟ 
iv. He envisages the Ungrund as integral to all existence 
 
The modification of Boehme‟s thought results in a view where the created order is 
dependent upon the Creator and „meonic‟ freedom.  Since out of the primal void God creates, 
„meonic‟ freedom becomes a latent element within the created order.  All that is created has 
meonic freedom as part of its constitution.  Berdiaev does not reject creation ex nihilo; rather 
he seeks to transform the meaning of „nothing‟.  He believes that God creates out of 
„nothing‟, but this „nothingness‟ is freedom.115 
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This highly imaginative and heterodox thought, then, grounds the experience of 
freedom in relation to God since it is God who brings all „Being‟ into existence.  The 
experience of freedom cannot find its source in religion, philosophy, politics, or the person, it 
can only be found in relation to God, as well as in meonic freedom.  Berdiaev:  
The source of human freedom cannot be found in the natural man, for he is not an 
absolute self-sufficient being possessing in himself the source of life.  The source of 
all life goes back to the original fount of being, that is, to God.  Thus we reach the 
conclusion that the origin of man‟s freedom is in God, man‟s freedom having the 
same source as his life.  By separation from God, that is to say, from the original 
source of life, man loses his freedom too.
116
 
 
Therefore, even though meonic freedom is latent within creation, human freedom only 
„exists‟ by God‟s creational design.  It is God who brings freedom from „no-thing‟ into 
something; without God, „Being‟ degenerates into „non-being‟.  “All rebellion against God is 
a return to non-being which assumes the form of false, illusory being, and is a victory of non-
being over the divine light.”117 
We will examine in a later section how relationship with God sustains freedom; at this 
juncture what must be noted is that the Ungrund is the potential for both good and evil.  This 
is possible because of the Ungrund‟s independence from God; it is not part of the Deity, nor 
is it created by God.  It is potential; to use Lossky‟s words, “a potency which is independent 
of God. . . .”118  So even though God creates through the Ungrund, God does not control the 
Ungrund.  That is, God uses the potentiality of the void, in essence uses primordial freedom 
to bring „Being‟ into existence, while at the same time not being able to prevent rebellion 
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against creational design.  This means that the Ungrund cannot be differentiated by 
valuations of good and evil. „Non-being‟ is evil only after it has rejected God‟s call; 
beforehand it is only „nothing‟. 
The possibility of evil is latent in that mysterious principle of being in which every 
sort of possibility lies concealed.  The void (the Ungrund of Boehme) is not evil, it is 
the source of every kind of life and every actualization of being.  It conceals within 
itself the possibility of both evil and of good.
119
 
 
Berdiaev claims that although his „myth‟ of the Ungrund is a “frontier line idea”120 
(and it is in tension with established orthodoxy), it is not heresy, but rather the means to 
understand the relationship between God, freedom and the person.  Despite the fact that the 
Ungrund and his mystically realist philosophy challenge established orthodox doctrine, he 
believes that his position can enhance the ways in which the individual and the community 
understand the nature of God and the person. 
To summarize this unorthodox view of freedom‟s origination: the Ungrund is a 
primordial freedom that is a void or „nothingness‟.  From this void God brings „Being‟ into 
existence, and „non-being‟ is that which rebels against God‟s creational design and results in 
evil.  Therefore, all created matter has within itself meonic freedom, which will develop or 
deteriorate, depending on the subject‟s relationship to God and others. 
 
§4  SUMMARY 
 
Berdiaev‟s concept of freedom is best seen as a „vision‟ of freedom.  In this „vision‟ 
his mystical realism places a high value on the intuitive capabilities of the agent to discover 
the noumenal reality of freedom.  This reality is that freedom, in its primal sense, is non-
determined.  He uses a mystical approach to re-prioritize the value of reason where it 
becomes part of a complex cognitive framework that has „integral knowledge‟ as its goal.  
This approach is not only methodological; mysticism allows for foundational symbols and 
myths (e.g. Boehme‟s Ungrund) that Berdiaev uses to proclaim a freedom that exists outside 
of God and through which God creates. 
Our challenge to Berdiaev‟s vision will concentrate on his mystical approach as a 
means of cognition and on his reliance on the Ungrund as a myth to describe and ground 
freedom.  We will compare Berdiaev‟s picture of the origination of freedom with Moltmann‟s 
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attribution of freedom to the Triune God, where instead of freedom originating in a mystical 
abyss, freedom comes from a God who experiences the abyss of the cross.  It will be 
demonstrated that Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom is sufficiently plastic so that the Ungrund can 
be refuted while the core substance of his vision remains intact.  This is possible since 
Berdiaev, like Moltmann, ultimately sees the person‟s freedom as being made possible 
through the suffering and love of God through Christ, which is empowered by the Spirit. 
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Chapter 3 – Motivations 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
At the core of Berdiaev‟s work are certain concepts that challenge the boundaries of 
theology and philosophy.  Although Berdiaev‟s thought continuously evolved throughout his 
career, the understanding of these core concepts (e.g., meonic freedom, the „person‟, etc.) 
remained basically constant.  This resoluteness is noteworthy considering that his 
commitment to these ideas resulted in significant tension with colleagues and the Church 
throughout his career. 
Berdiaev‟s commitment to these ideas is based on two primary concerns that are 
evident throughout his oeuvre.  These concerns, which become principal motivations for his 
work, are: (1) the issue of theodicy, what he calls the „justification1 of God‟, and (2) the 
„justification of humanity‟, which is the attempt to define the nature of the person so that the 
agent‟s vocation and destiny can be made known.2  In both concerns Berdiaev believes that 
the key for a cogent justification will be found in his concept of the Ungrund.  Ignoring or 
bypassing these motivations creates the risk of impeding the reader‟s ability to comprehend, 
either theologically or philosophically, Berdiaev‟s thought.3 
In this chapter we will examine these motivations, beginning with the „justification‟ 
of God.  We will pay particular attention to the influence of Dostoevsky‟s Legend of the 
Grand Inquisitor on Berdiaev‟s position.  Following Dostoevsky‟s influence we consider 
Berdiaev‟s attempt to construct what he believes to be an unassailable theodicy that will 
justify God in the light of evil.  From theodicy we move to an examination of Berdiaev‟s 
„justification‟ of the person, in which we will survey why he believes meonic freedom is 
necessary in order to justify the person.  In this section Berdiaev‟s particular conception of 
„personality‟ will be highlighted along with an analysis of Berdiaev‟s proposition that 
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freedom is essential to personhood.  We will conclude with a summary of the material we 
have investigated and highlight those areas that will become points of engagement with 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom. 
 
§2  THE JUSTIFICATION OF GOD 
 
Max Weber argues that the metaphysical conception of God creates an “ineradicable 
demand for a theodicy.”4  Likewise, Augustine writes that the question of evil‟s origination 
worried him from an early age, “a question that wore me out, drove me into the company of 
heretics, and knocked me flat on my face.”5  Because of this, Chappell notes, “It was only 
when he [Augustine] had a satisfactory answer to it [evil‟s origination], in Christian Platonist 
terms, that Augustine returned to the Catholic Church.”6  The torment of Augustine‟s 
experience and Weber‟s insight intersect in Berdiaev‟s thought.  Berdiaev, like Augustine, is 
deeply concerned with evil‟s origination, and, like Weber, believes that a Christian theistic 
position must address the issue of evil and suffering.  He termed this task the „justification of 
God‟.7 
Regarding the problem of evil, Spinka comments, “. . . Russian thinkers have 
agonized over it, have been tortured by it, more cruelly than others.  Dostoevsky in particular 
was almost morbidly fascinated by it.”8  Regardless of the veracity of Spinka‟s observation, 
his comments illuminate how theodicy became a priority for Berdiaev.  The importance of 
Dostoevsky has already been noted; however, we return to his work, specifically the Legend 
of the Grand Inquisitor, to understand why Berdiaev considers meonic freedom to be 
essential for addressing theodicy and investigating the nature of God. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1970), 275. 
5
 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1993), Book 1, 3. 
6
 Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine, 122. 
7
 By employing the term „justification‟ he is not implying that a person can alter the nature of God.  He 
is not using the word „justification‟ as it is commonly used in theological discourse; the person does not alter 
God‟s nature.  “God does not need to be sanctified by man; He is holy in Himself alone.”  FMW, 109.  
„Justification‟ is used in the sense of explaining the good in the face of evil.  “Theodicy should seek to justify 
God by accounting for the origin of the distinction between good and evil.”  DM, 56 (Italics mine). 
8
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1.  The Legend 
 
“I feel utterly one with Ivan Karamazov, who was driven mad by the tears of a single 
little child,”9 Berdiaev writes.  His affinity with Dostoevsky‟s narrative results in the 
examination of God‟s nature through a Dostoevsky-influenced perspective.  Lowrie 
comments on the importance of Dostoevsky‟s Legend for Berdiaev: 
Time and again in books on various topics and at different periods of his life he 
returned to the Legend, as inspiration, starting point, or clincher for an argument.  
Almost unique in modern literature is this permanent inspiration Berdyaev received 
from one small section of a chapter in one of a great novelist‟s books.10 
 
Lowrie‟s observation is apt.  Berdiaev was firmly convinced that Dostoevsky reveals 
a crucial issue for humanity and God when he writes The Brothers Karamazov in which the 
character, Ivan, tells the story of the Legend.  The central issue, for Berdiaev, is how God 
responds to the existence of evil while not negating the freedom of the person or society.  It is 
Ivan‟s focus on the tears of a child and his story of the Legend that inspires and directs 
Berdiaev‟s thought.  
Wernham explains how Dostoevsky‟s narrative influences Berdiaev,  
. . . in Berdyaev‟s view, Ivan‟s was the atheism which brings liberation from an 
unworthy conception of God.  As such and thus far it was entirely valid.  But it 
needed to be transcended, and it could be transcended only by a theism based firmly 
upon the recognition of God‟s humanity, by making explicit of what was already 
implicit in it.
11
 
 
Berdiaev believed that Ivan was correct – if God can be seen as ignoring evil, allowing it to 
happen, or equally tragic, overcoming evil by negating the freedom of the person – then 
atheism would be conclusive.  Berdiaev rejects Ivan‟s argument, however, on the basis that 
Ivan‟s charge against God is not really against God, but against a false conception of God. 
The false conception is a God of „progress‟, 12 a God who values the „happiness‟ of 
individuals higher than freedom; and, according to Berdiaev, it is this false conception that 
results in Ivan‟s atheism.13 
The way to overcome this distortion and apprehend a God who overcomes evil, while 
also preserving freedom, is by recognizing God‟s „humanity‟.  Berdiaev writes, “I believe 
                                                 
9
 DR, 57. 
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 Lowrie, Rebellious Prophet, 257.  See also Vallon, Apostle of Freedom, 47-48; Wernham, Two 
Russian Thinkers, 12-20. 
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 Wernham, Two Russian Thinkers, 14 (Italics mine). 
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 See MH, 193-194. 
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 See RI, 78. 
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that the greatest revolution brought about by Christianity is the revelation of the humanity of 
God.”14  Wernham‟s analysis here is most helpful.  Berdiaev‟s „humane‟ God is drawn 
directly from the Legend.  “The essential point, in short, is that the term „humanity‟, as he 
[Berdiaev] used it, is a comprehensive one connoting not the characteristics common to 
humans but the characteristics of the Christ of the Legend.”15  To understand Berdiaev‟s 
conception of a „humane‟ God one must begin with Dostoevsky‟s Christ figure. 
The Christ of the Legend offers no resistance or response to the Grand Inquisitor, 
refusing to determine or dominate.
16
  Dostoevsky‟s portrayal of Christ is of one who 
confronts evil while holding in tension the value of freedom.  Therefore, to overcome evil, 
Christ is willing to suffer so that the potential of freedom can be preserved.  Through this 
action Christ demonstrates, according to Berdiaev, two characteristics of God: God‟s love for 
the person and God‟s valuing of freedom – these characteristics are vital to Berdiaev‟s 
thought, and become the cornerstone of his discussion in delineating God‟s nature.17  
Berdiaev‟s view of God, like Dostoevsky‟s, focuses on the centrality of love and freedom.  
Therefore, we can say that it is Dostoevsky‟s image of Christ that becomes Berdiaev‟s 
hermeneutical key for considering God‟s nature.  Berdiaev: 
His [Dostoevsky‟s] Christ is a shadowy figure who says nothing all the time: 
efficacious religion does not explain itself, the principle of freedom cannot be 
expressed in words; but the principle of compulsion puts its case very freely 
indeed. . . . Two universal principles, then, confront one in the Legend: freedom and 
compulsion, belief in the meaning of life and disbelief, divine love and humanitarian 
pity, Christ and Antichrist.
 18
 
 
For Berdiaev, Dostoevsky‟s Legend reveals the truth about God and how God 
responds to evil.  God is love and would rather suffer than exercise dominion over the person 
in order to overcome evil.  Antipodal to Christ is the Grand Inquisitor who “wishes to relieve 
men of the burden of freedom, so that they may all be happy.”19 
From this interpretation of Dostoevsky, Berdiaev sees „humanity‟ as “the chief 
property of God, not almightiness, not omniscience, and the rest, but humanity, freedom, 
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love, sacrifice.”20  This position, which stresses God‟s humanity, is what Berdiaev terms 
“divine anthropomorphism.”21  Berdiaev observes anthropomorphic ideas in theology but it is 
not an anthropomorphism that is „divine‟.22  By ignoring „divine anthropomorphism‟, 
„rationalistic theology‟ has an element of cruelty, which is counter to a God who is love.  
“What has been wrong with anthropomorphism is not that it ascribed to God the traits of 
humanity, or sympathy, or that it sees in Him a need for responsive love, but rather that it 
ascribes to Him traits of inhumanity, cruelty and love of power.”23  Berdiaev claims 
„rationalistic theology‟ to be a system that is willing to ascribe to God attributes of ultimate 
power that impede an understanding of God‟s ultimate love.  Thus, as Wernham observes, 
Berdiaev felt justified “to reject any God who is less than humane. . . .”24 
Divine anthropomorphism leads Berdiaev to claim that certain theological 
formulations (e.g. sovereignty, omnipotence, impassibility) ignore the interrelationship 
between the Divine and the human.
25
  He believes that the view of God derived from these 
theological formulations validates Ivan Karamazov‟s charge – if God is impassible, 
omnipotent, and sovereign in an absolute sense, then God is responsible for evil; hence a 
response to theodicy cannot be made.  His alternative to this view, which incorporates 
Boehme‟s thought, proposes a unique understanding of God‟s nature. 
 
2.  The Justification of God 
 
In Berdiaev‟s view of God‟s nature, God is sovereign over all that exists.  This view 
of sovereignty, however, is given a distinctive treatment.  So, Berdiaev can write that 
sovereignty “does not belong to the people or to the proletariat but to God, to Truth  
himself . . .,”26 while at the same time insisting that God is only sovereign over „Being‟ 
(existence).
27
  “God the creator is all-powerful over being, over the created world, but He has 
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no power over non-being, over the uncreated freedom which is impenetrable to Him.”28  This 
controversial position thus clearly separates itself from more traditional views of sovereignty.  
For Berdiaev, God is not sovereign over „nothingness‟ (the Ungrund), which contains “within 
it both good and evil. . . .”29 
Therefore, as God has no power over the Ungrund, God cannot dictate the outcome of 
meonic freedom as it enters the created order.
30
  Since God is not sovereign over the 
Ungrund, Berdiaev can state, “We may not think of being as outside of God, but we may thus 
think of non-being.  This is the only way to understand evil without making God responsible 
for it.”31  
 Berdiaev believes that this view provides a clear contradistinction between a God of 
love and the God of „rationalistic theology‟.  He believes this view also supports his twin 
concerns of demonstrating that evil does not originate with God and that freedom is an 
integral element of existence.  As Lossky comments, “he is led to that conclusion by his 
conviction that freedom cannot be created and that if it were, God would be responsible for 
evil.  A theodicy would then be impossible, Berdyaev thinks.”32  By stating that meonic 
freedom (which exists outside God‟s control) is responsible for evil, Berdiaev believes that 
God is separated from any association with evil, and thus God is justified.  According to 
Berdiaev, 
The dwelling place of freedom is the abyss of darkness and nothingness, and yet apart 
from freedom everything is without meaning.  It is the source of evil as well as of 
good. . . . God is All-powerful in relation to being but not in to relation to nothingness 
and freedom; and that is why evil exists.
33
 
 
Berdiaev is convinced that the alternative to this view –freedom originating in God – 
will imply that evil can in some way be attributed to the Deity.
34
  This is the position, he 
claims, of „rationalistic theology‟, whereby a paradigm is created in which God allows evil to 
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occur.
35
  Consequently, not only can evil be attributed to God, but the logical extrapolation 
from this alternative perspective is a God who is impassible; a God who is an absolute 
sovereign granting freedom and then allowing evil to occur.  He rejects this position, writing, 
“Self-satisfaction, self-sufficiency, stony immobility, pride, the demand for continual 
submission are qualities which the Christian religion considers vicious and sinful, though it 
calmly ascribes them to God.”36 
In opposition to this view of how God interacts with the world, Berdiaev proposes a 
novel understanding of God‟s nature, which takes into account a created order where meonic 
freedom is latent.  In this view, God creates and sustains all that exists, yet God cannot negate 
freedom.  Thus even though God is the Creator, the existence of meonic freedom means that 
“. . . God is not world providence,” Berdiaev asserts, “that is to say not a ruler and sovereign 
of the universe, not pantokrator.  God is freedom and meaning, love and sacrifice; He is 
struggle against the objectivized world order.”37 
Berdiaev‟s conception of God‟s power obviously runs counter to certain strands of 
Christian scripture and tradition.  Where scripture and tradition contradict his view Berdiaev 
makes the bold claim that they are wrong.  He is committed to the position that his view of 
God‟s nature is true to the „spirit‟ of the Gospels.  He believes that traditional formulations of 
God as a Sovereign are based on ancient societal standards and therefore should not be 
considered normative.
38
  With regards to scripture, he is convinced that where scripture 
describes a God who controls all things, such that evil can be attributed in some way to God, 
it is a result of „un-Christian‟ influences within the text.39 
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Berdiaev is convinced that by separating God from the attributes of „rationalistic 
theology‟ it is possible to see that not only is God not responsible for evil, but a fuller 
understanding of God‟s perfection is achievable.  God is perfect not because he is 
omnipotent, immutable, or unmoved by the cosmos and the creatures that inhabit it; God‟s 
perfection is revealed in God‟s eternal love and yearning for relationship with all that exists.  
“The fact that God longs for His other self, for the free response to His love, shows not that 
there is any insufficiency or absence of fullness in the Divine Being, but precisely the 
superabundance of His plenitude and perfection.”40 
If God‟s perfection, however, rests on concepts such as omnipotence, immutability, 
impassibility, etc., then Berdiaev believes a perception of God as tyrant is inevitable, since 
this type of God would be unmoved by what occurs in the created order.
41
  By basing God‟s 
perfection on love and freedom (freedom for both God and creation) the perception of a 
tyrannical God is nullified.  God is not a tyrant or despot as can be seen in the fact that God is 
engaged with the created order – to such an extent that in seeking to restore freedom to the 
created order and to overcome the consequences of sin, God‟s own Son is crucified.42 
By enduring the torment of Crucifixion, Berdiaev believes God clearly shows that evil 
can only be defeated through suffering, if freedom is to be preserved.  By suffering on the 
Cross and thereby preserving freedom, God creates the potential for relationship between the 
Deity and the created order.  “But the religion of truth crucified is the religion of the freedom 
of the spirit.  Truth crucified possesses no logical nor juridical power of compulsion and it 
made its appearance in the world as infinite love, and love does not compel; rather it makes 
man infinitely free.”43 
In summary, Berdiaev recognizes that this view of freedom and God‟s relation to it is 
contrary to certain Christian understandings of God‟s nature (particularly God‟s sovereignty 
and omnipotence).  Yet he propounds that his view is essential for one to understand a God 
who is love in a world of suffering.  “Without freedom there can be no theodicy and the 
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whole world-process becomes nonsense.”44  He believes there is no alternative, since to deny 
primordial freedom is to create a link between God and evil, which will justify Ivan 
Karamazov‟s argument.  The root of evil cannot be found in God – its source is in freedom, 
as “all tragedy is connected with freedom.”45  Therefore, the Ungrund is inextricably 
connected to the Dostoevsky-influenced theodicy Berdiaev maintains is essential for 
understanding God, “Who is a God of love, of sacrifice and of suffering.”46 
 
§3  THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE PERSON 
 
One of the axial themes within Berdiaev‟s thought is the person – who she is, why she 
exists, and what her destiny is.  Tillich observes that “. . . not only in Berdyaev but in all 
those who dealt with the same problem in a similar situation, was the question of the nature 
and existence of man.  The doctrine of history drove us – I include myself in this group – to 
the doctrine of man.”47  As Berdiaev writes, “The fundamental problem of philosophy is the 
problem of the human being.”48 
For Berdiaev, the „problem of man‟ is the problem of how to understand the person as 
being the „image and likeness of God‟ and being a „natural being‟ as well.  The individual is 
“the point of intersection of two worlds, he reflects in himself the higher world and also the 
lower world.”49  Berdiaev understands this „problem‟ to be how the individual, who is the 
intersecting point of these two „worlds‟, can understand herself and therefore fulfill her 
vocation and destiny.  The attempt to answer this question is what he terms the „justification‟ 
of the person. 
The term „justification‟ here can be seen as Berdiaev‟s interpretation of the Russian 
notion of anthropodicy.  In Russian thought, anthropodicy is often viewed as the justification 
of the person in the light of evil.
50
  Berdiaev reconfigures this as he seeks to justify (i.e. to 
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explain) the person in the light of freedom, positing that freedom must be considered if we 
are to understand the person.
51
 
Berdiaev‟s concern to justify the person is a primary motivation within his 
existentialist approach.  His commitment to the person developed early in his career and as 
Spinka observes, “This conviction [the importance of the person] runs like a red thread 
through all his works.”52  Berdiaev writes, “Man is the dominating idea of my life – man‟s 
image, his creative freedom and his creative predestination.”53  His thought on the person is 
developed through his concept of „personality‟. 
 
1.  Personality 
 
Berdiaev‟s existentialism is grounded in the belief that the agent can never be a 
„means‟ to something greater, but is always an „end‟.54  The person‟s intrinsic value should 
never be subsumed under a great good.  His existentialism operates on the premise that 
although the person possesses intrinsic value by virtue of being created in God‟s image, it is a 
value that must be actualized and developed through the free activity of the agent.  “Man is a 
person only if he is a free spirit reflecting the supreme Being.”55  This assertion, then, seeks 
to define the terms „individual‟ and „person‟ in unique ways while also making a clear 
distinction between the two concepts.  MacKay, commenting on this difference between an 
„individual‟ and a „person‟, writes, 
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As individual, he is part of nature, a member of society, a number on a National 
Registration Card, a name on a voter‟s list, a unit in a factory organization, a means to 
an end.  He is an object, the product of his environment, a slave to tradition and 
custom, capable of communication with other individuals but incapable of 
communion with them as persons. 
     As person he is subject, free, not part of anything, unique, a creative being, 
indestructible: not an aggregate, or a unit in a mass, but a primary whole, a 
microcosm, reflecting, potentially at least, in himself the whole universe.
56
 
 
 What enables the individual to become a person, Berdiaev posits, is „personality‟ – 
personality is the basis of personhood.
57
  Personality is not simply the qualities that 
differentiate one individual from another; personality is the means by which a human 
becomes a person as opposed to remaining an individual.  Personality “is the highest value in 
the world.”58  Berdiaev:  
Personality is the image and likeness of God in man and this is why it rises above the 
natural life. . . . Personality is spiritual and presupposes the existence of a spiritual 
world.  The value of personality is the highest hierarchical value in the world, a value 
of the spiritual order.
59
  
 
This raises the question: how can personality be “the image and likeness of God in 
man” (i.e. the imago Dei) and yet not be evident in all people (for in this view not all 
individuals are persons)?  Berdiaev attempts to overcome this difficulty by re-conceiving the 
imago Dei as a divine-human event.  Philippe Sabant addresses this when he writes, “The 
very possibility for man to become a personality . . . presupposes freedom.”60  Sabant 
correctly interprets Berdiaev‟s position: personality is both gift (imago Dei) and achievement 
– an achievement that relies on the agent‟s freedom.61  Hence, within Berdiaev‟s thought, 
personality is a potential created by God that is instilled in all individuals, and must be 
actively received and developed by each human for it to be realized – “personality is a task to 
be achieved.”62 
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With his assertion that personality is based on the imago Dei and requires the 
actualization of each individual, we see Berdiaev‟s commitment to existentialism coinciding 
with the development of his Christian faith.
63
  “I became a Christian,” Berdiaev writes, 
“because I was seeking for a deeper and truer foundation for belief in man.”64  Copleston 
points to the interconnection between Christianity and „personality‟ in Berdiaev when he 
observes, “Personality is a religious category.  That is to say, the human being is a person 
only as related to God.”65 
Berdiaev‟s context – a Russian Orthodox perspective modulated by the Silver Age – 
plays a significant part in how he envisages the interconnectedness between his view of 
Christianity and personality.  So, when Berdiaev writes, “The biblical and Christian doctrine 
alone deals with the whole man, with his origin and destination,”66 it is consistent with his 
religious-intellectual context that he goes on to say, “But biblical anthropology is incomplete 
and insufficient, it is built upon the Old Testament and does not take into account the fact of 
the Incarnation.”67 
 
2.  Personality, Incarnation, and Theandric Existence 
 
The Incarnation is a pivotal concept for Berdiaev‟s thought on personality, as he 
interprets it as an affirmation of humanity‟s divine-human potential.  “The second Face of 
Divinity is manifested as the human face, and by this very fact man finds himself at the centre 
of being. . . .”68  Consistent with his context, Berdiaev integrates the doctrine of the 
Incarnation, theosis, and the Russian concept of „God-manhood‟69 to propose his unique 
conception of personality.  This integration of thought allows Berdiaev to interpret the 
significance of Jesus as God-man to mean that the individual is not entirely defined by the 
parameters of the natural world.  Personality, in an ultimate sense, is grounded and sustained 
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by God.  Berdiaev believes when Christ assumed the form of humanity, God revealed the 
divine possibilities for what it means to be human. 
The divine-human status of Jesus, then, has a direct bearing as to the development of 
the individual.  As heirs with Christ
70
 and created with the imago Dei, the maturation of 
personality can lead to a divine-human person.
71
  Therefore, this development of personhood 
can only be comprehensively realized within the Christian faith, since it is grounded upon a 
trinitarian understanding of God.  Because of this, Berdiaev claims that Christianity is a 
religion of personality.
72
  Spinka accurately summarizes the importance of personality for 
Berdiaev: “Mature personality is to be regarded as the realization of God‟s idea for the 
particular human being, the supremacy of the image of God in man over his physical nature.  
In this respect, personality surpasses the other component parts of human nature, as well as 
the world of matter.”73 
We can thus make the following observations regarding personality: 
i. It is a gift from God in the form of the imago Dei and relationship with Christ 
ii. It is the development of the image and likeness of God within the individual 
iii. It is a spiritual category (i.e. it derives its existence from God and cannot be 
derived from the natural world) 
iv. It is the highest value the person can achieve74 
 
Berdiaev is aware that by arguing for personality as a „divine-human potential‟ he 
may be obscuring the distinction between God and human.  His particular understandings, 
however, of theosis and the concept of God-manhood means that a precise differentiation 
between the divine and human is not necessary.  Berdiaev minimizes differentiation because 
he believes God‟s intention for the person is a divine-human interrelationship. 
Human personality is theandric existence.  Theologians will reply in alarm that Jesus 
Christ alone was God-man, and that man is a created being and cannot be God-man.  
But this way of arguing remains within the confines of theological rationalism.  
Granted man is not God-man in the sense in which Christ is God-man, the Unique 
One; yet there is a divine element in man.  There are so to speak, two natures in him.  
There is within him the intersection of two worlds.  He bears within himself the image 
which is both the image of man and the image of God and is the image of man in so 
far as the image of God is actualized. . . . That man bears within himself the image of 
God and in virtue of that becomes man, is a symbol.  One cannot work out an 
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intellectual concept about it.  Divine-humanity is a contradiction for the line of 
thought which inclines towards monism or dualism.
75
 
 
Personality as „theandric existence‟ means that it is an activity in which the agent 
participates in union with God to develop his God-given personality.  The individual must 
actively seek to „transcend‟76 and develop this gift.77  To accomplish this demands the effort 
of the entire person, therefore, personality “is totalitarian, for it integrates the spirit, soul and 
the body.”78 
This „totalitarian‟ effort requires freedom, so despite the fact that Robert Osborn 
oversimplifies when he writes that, for Berdiaev, personality is the telos of freedom,
79
 he is 
correct in establishing a linkage between personality and freedom.  To work towards the 
development of personality, the person must have some form of freedom.  Berdiaev:  “A 
personality is created by the Divine Idea and human freedom.  The life of personality is not 
self-preservation as that of the individual but self-development and self-determination.”80 
The importance of freedom for the development of personality is related directly to 
meonic freedom.  This is because Berdiaev holds the highly questionable belief that „self-
determination‟ is only possible if the person‟s freedom is derived from a non-determined 
source, i.e. the Ungrund.  We will address this issue in depth in the next chapter (as well as 
critically challenging it in chapter 7), but at this juncture what is important to recognize is 
that Berdiaev believes that if freedom is derived from God, freedom would be in some form 
„determined‟.  If freedom is determined, the person cannot act in self-determined ways, which 
puts the development of personality in jeopardy. 
Thus meonic freedom becomes an integral concept in Berdiaev‟s justification of the 
person.  If personality solely resulted from God‟s grace, if the Deity created the human with 
an established personality, or if God was the sole source of the individual‟s freedom then the 
person would be “merely a good automaton.”81  There would be no “capacity to feel sorrow 
and joy,”82 and therefore no capacity to enter into communion with God and others.83  As the 
person is not an automaton, but has the ability for free actions, he is able to respond to God‟s 
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call.
84
  The person‟s free response is a struggle that has consequences, as Spinka observes, for 
personality “. . . is a duty, a moral obligation.  Whether or not a man achieves personality 
during his lifetime is not a matter of indifference.”85 
This struggle is evident in that there are individuals who would prefer to ignore their 
duty rather than engage in the task.  “The Ego‟s purpose is to realize its personality, and this 
involves it in an incessant struggle.  The consciousness of personality and the endeavour to 
realize it are fraught with pain.  Many would rather renounce their suffering which its 
realization involves.”86  Without freedom the subject cannot undertake this duty – 
development of personality can only occur on the level of the agent.  God creates the 
potential for personality and graciously grants it to the individual.  God, however, cannot 
instill personality.  Berdiaev‟s justification of the person, then, is his assertion that for the 
individual to become a person, freedom is necessary and must be highly valued. 
 
§4  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter we have examined the twin concerns that are the motivations for Berdiaev‟s 
vision of freedom – justifying God in the light of evil, and justifying the person in the light of 
meonic freedom.  In both concerns Berdiaev believes that freedom is essential to adequately 
explain the existence of evil as well as the nature of the person.  Berdiaev‟s Dostoevsky-
influenced perspective emphasizes the „humanity‟ of God and God preserving freedom by 
overcoming evil through suffering (as demonstrated in the crucified Christ).  Berdiaev 
reconfigures the term „personality‟ to indicate how the person moves from being an 
individual to a person; and contends that meonic freedom, which makes self-determination 
possible, must play an essential role in this development.  In conjunction with this, the 
Incarnation is a highly valued concept as it reveals the divine destiny of the person as well as 
demonstrating true personhood.  Thus freedom is not only the objective for the person, but 
also the key for understanding both God and person. 
Our critique of Berdiaev‟s position will center on whether Berdiaev‟s justification of 
God truly overcomes certain challenges of theodicy.  We will consider Moltmann‟s approach 
to theodicy, which emphasizes God‟s experience of suffering as a response to evil through 
the cross of Christ, as opposed to Berdiaev‟s explanation of evil as arising from meonic 
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freedom.  Following this line of thought we will also question whether Berdiaev‟s 
justification of the person is substantive enough to meet its objective (i.e., a differentiated 
person whose freedom and personality are fulfilled in union with God), or whether there 
needs to be further development to understand who the person is in light of the freedom the 
Triune God grants. 
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Chapter 4 – Freedom within the Created Order 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As a student of history and current events, Berdiaev was cognizant that freedom and 
“the heroic love of freedom”1 he was proclaiming were difficult to detect within the created 
order.  Instead, what was plainly evident was an “objectivized world order”2 where necessity, 
not freedom, rules.
3
  Berdiaev‟s belief in freedom originating in a mystical void where there 
are no determinations is the other side of the coin, so to speak, of his view of the material 
world‟s deterministic character.  In describing his position he writes, “My attitude to life, so 
far from being romantic, has, in fact, always been very realistic; it is my attitude to what 
transcends life and is accessible solely to vision that was romantic.”4  Berdiaev‟s „realistic‟ 
outlook accepts the tragedy of the Fall and acknowledges the dilemma of freedom within an 
alienated cosmos.  His „romantic‟ perspective, however, is unwilling to accept that an 
alienated cosmos is the ultimate statement as to what freedom is and how it may be 
experienced. 
In this chapter we will examine Berdiaev‟s conception of how a non-created freedom 
can exist in a created world.  We will begin by looking at the foundations for Berdiaev‟s 
understanding of freedom, followed by an analysis of the four modes of freedom within the 
created order, giving special attention to the consequences of the Fall.  We will then turn our 
attention to what makes the highest form of freedom possible – the God-Man – and the 
concepts that Berdiaev emphasizes as necessary for this type of freedom.  Following this we 
will consider how Berdiaev understands „spirit‟ and the relationship between spirit and 
freedom.  We will close with a summary of the material we have surveyed and highlight 
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4
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those areas that will be examined through Moltmann‟s own understanding of freedom, the 
Trinity, and the person. 
 
§2  FREEDOM 
 
At the base of Berdiaev‟s understanding of freedom is a negative perspective – 
freedom from external determination.  Giving specific emphasis to freedom‟s autonomous 
nature, he writes, 
There is a classic definition of freedom which remains indisputably true in spite of its 
inability to give us a positive clue to its mystery.  According to this freedom is self-
determination in the inmost depths of being and is opposed to every kind of external 
determination which constitutes a compulsion in itself.
5
 
 
The idea of freedom as self-determination is a frequent motif in contemporary 
Western culture; however, it is not a strictly modern phenomenon.  In Western thought this 
position can be found in Augustine.  Chappell writes, 
These conditions [voluntary actions not being compelled or done in ignorance] are 
evident, for example, at dDA 14 [de Duabus Animabus], which gives us one of 
Augustine‟s most adequate formulations of the definition of voluntary action: . . . 
„Voluntary action is a movement of the soul, without any compulsion, towards 
something either not to be lost or to be attained.‟6 
 
Berdiaev, like Augustine, places great stress on freedom as self-determination.  At the 
same time Berdiaev, also like Augustine, rejects any notion that self-determination is the sole 
factor by which freedom should be understood.  The significance of this point cannot be 
overstated.  Berdiaev is not arguing that the person is wholly capable as an individual of 
being self-determined or that self-determination is the goal of freedom.  Freedom is a „cause‟ 
(Copleston) for Berdiaev, it is what the person must strive for; self-determination is a 
necessary part of freedom but it is not the sole characteristic. 
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If freedom is narrowly defined as self-determination (autonomy), one can conclude 
that the individual is the apex of existence, which is „individualism‟.  Berdiaev strongly 
opposes this view; he asserts that a self-determined individual cannot be considered an 
ultimate goal.
7
  Individualism is false and can only lead to alienation, division, and slavery. 
Berdiaev recognizes the problem of advocating self-determination while also rejecting 
individualism and attempts to work through this dilemma by proposing a relational freedom 
with autonomous characteristics.  He is committed to this idea of freedom, believing self-
determined freedom is what God expects from the person.  “Man must know himself 
religiously not as the slave of God but as a free participant in the divine process.”8  This 
„freedom of the spirit‟ is “limitless” and, he believes, “pervades the Gospels and Epistles.”9 
Berdiaev is propounding self-determination as a basic concept for freedom and 
holding it in tension with his belief that, for the person to be whom they were created to be, 
freedom must be for something, i.e., for responding to the Divine Call and fulfilling God‟s 
creational design.  While there are certainly similarities between modernist (and post-
modernist) views and Berdiaev‟s of the importance of self-determination, his view operates 
on a different trajectory.   Berdiaev conceives of self-determination (autonomous freedom) as 
a point on a spectrum of freedom, in which self-determination (freedom „from‟) can develop 
into a positive view of freedom (freedom „for‟).10  Yet the positive view of freedom is still 
qualified by the negative understanding. 
An examination of freedom‟s latency within the person, which enables a free response 
from the person, will be addressed in the following section; the point to be emphasized here 
is that God expects (Berdiaev will also use words such as „desire‟, „require‟, and even 
„demand‟) “freedom from” the person.11 
God expects freedom from man; He waits for his free response to the divine call.  
True liberty is that which God demands from us and not that which we demand from 
God.  It is upon this deep foundation that man‟s freedom is based; it is latent in the 
deepest recesses of his spirit.
12
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The purpose of freedom is for answering God‟s call to humanity through Christ and Spirit.  
The person must approach God through freedom.  God cannot force a person into a 
relationship with God‟s self, or as Berdiaev writes, “It is impossible to build the Kingdom of 
God by force; it can only be created in freedom.”13 
Consequently, for Berdiaev, self-determination is a component of freedom; however, 
it is not the apex of freedom.  The highest form of freedom is „theandric‟ freedom, which is a 
freedom based on communion with God and others.
14
  So Berdiaev‟s conception of freedom, 
in its ultimate sense, can be described by two seemingly paradoxical theses: 
i. freedom is self-determination  
ii. freedom is dependent upon relationship with God and others 
 
As we shall see in what follows, Berdiaev attempts to resolve these seemingly 
paradoxical statements – freedom is both self-determined and relationally dependent – by 
proposing a multi-layered view of freedom, which attempts to explain how freedom is 
experienced within the created order. 
 
1.  Embodied Freedom 
 
This research contends that within Berdiaev‟s thought freedom experienced in the 
created order cannot be considered meonic, as it is now within the realm of „Being‟, made 
possible by God‟s creative act.  Even though meonic freedom is a latent part of all that exists, 
within the realm of „Being‟, this experienced freedom is categorically different.  The 
difference is not only due to the constraints of „Being‟; because of the Fall, freedom is 
fractured into differing but related elements.  I will refer to this freedom within the created 
order as „embodied‟ freedom.15 
Berdiaev gives a rich
16
 description of embodied freedom, understanding freedom as 
being integral to existence.
17
  This complex proposal attempts to establish a framework 
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 A rich description is a view of freedom in which the person is not only free from physical constraint, 
but is also free for the development of personhood, what John Macquarrie would define as the freedom for 
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wherein the centrality of freedom to the individual‟s development and ability to relate to God, 
self, and others can be understood.  Within embodied freedom we can distinguish four modes 
of freedom, in which three of the four modes represent discordant and inadequate expressions 
of freedom.   This can be delineated as a spectrum wherein the individual‟s 
progression/regression in relation to freedom is traced: 
 
Slavery          Heteronomy          Autonomy          Theandric Freedom18 
 
The individual exists within one of these four modes.  His existence within, and 
movement between, each mode is directly connected with his relation to God, self, and 
others.  The spectrum moves from slavery (representing the lowest mode of existence where 
freedom is negligible, but still exists in minimal form), to theandric freedom (the highest 
form of freedom and, therefore, existence). 
It is important to note that although „embodied‟ freedom is distinct from „meonic‟ 
freedom, they are still related.  As we have seen, Berdiaev‟s conception of creation is that 
God creates through the Ungrund („nothingness‟).  In essence, this means that the individual 
is both a child of God and of meonic freedom.
19
  This highly provocative thought, then, 
presupposes that since God creates the individual through the Ungrund there always remains 
a latency of meonic freedom within the individual – no matter what mode of embodied 
freedom the individual exists within. 
Operating from a position that considers meonic freedom to be non-determination, 
Berdiaev maintains that the individual always has the ability to act in ways that are distinctive 
of that particular agent.  This is because there is always some form of non-determined 
freedom within the agent.  Thus the latency of meonic freedom (non-determined freedom) 
means that there always exists the possibility for self-determined acts.  As we shall see, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
„outward realization‟.  See John Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and Philosophical Approach 
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19
 DM, 39. 
66 
 
ability to engage in a self-determined act, which depends upon latent meonic freedom, will 
vary greatly depending upon the mode of embodied freedom one experiences, but the 
potential is ever present.
20
 
For Berdiaev, self-determination is the ability to act in a „personal‟ manner – acting 
without coercion, or manipulation, or under force.  In contemporary contexts this could be 
identified as acting autonomously, but, not surprisingly, we cannot adopt this terminology 
because, as we shall see, „autonomy‟, for Berdiaev, has a specialized meaning.21  In the 
attempt to clarify Berdiaev‟s thought and distinguish between autonomy and the latency of 
meonic freedom that enables self-determined acts, I will use the phrase „existential liberty‟ to 
refer to the latent form of meonic freedom within the individual.
22
  Hence, within embodied 
freedom, existential liberty is a primary factor in the individual‟s potential to progress or 
regress along the spectrum. 
For some individuals there is little to no movement between modalities, their 
existence is static.
23
  This is most evident in the occurrence of individualism.  As already 
discussed, an „individual‟ is an agent who, for various reasons, has not attained personhood.  
This would be represented as someone who is confined by slavery, or heteronomous freedom 
(or to certain degree, autonomous freedom also).  An agent, Berdiaev asserts, who is able to 
exist in union with God and others, is able to overcome stasis and participate in the dynamic 
of freedom.
24
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161.  The world as dynamic is directly related to Berdiaev‟s formulation of freedom preceding Being, since 
freedom always involves potentialities, movement, the possibility of development.  Although Berdiaev breaks 
with Hegel on the idea of logical progress and teleology, he clearly follows Hegel with regards to the idea of 
becoming.  Berdiaev: “But Hegel‟s discovery remains true, that becoming, development, the appearance of what 
is new, are  impossible and inexplicable if we remain within the confines of being and fail to introduce non-
being [meonic freedom] into our dialectic.” BE, 162. 
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Embodied freedom, then, incorporates a broad picture of what it means to be free.  It 
recognizes the reality of determining forces, while also maintaining that determination does 
not completely negate freedom.  Berdiaev proposes that a person who is not in relation with 
God and others is a person who suffers from determination – although the agent has an 
existential liberty this non-relational freedom is an „empty freedom‟.25  Yet Berdiaev‟s 
commitment to overcoming determination and asserting the reality of an existential liberty 
that makes possible self-determined acts does not mean that self-determination is the ultimate 
goal for Berdiaev.  Self-determination and the overcoming of determining forces are 
necessary elements in an intricate process, they are never final solutions. 
The paradox holds true that man reveals and affirms himself only when he submits 
himself to a supernatural principle which becomes the content of his life.  His 
repudiation of it, on the other hand, only leads to his perdition, for he is unable to 
discover a world other than his own human and confined world.
26
 
 
Embodied freedom is conceived of as a process in which the person‟s experience of 
freedom is dependent upon God, the person‟s maturation, and the community in which the 
person exists.  “Apart from Christianity there is no freedom, and determinism is always 
supreme.”27  Hence, freedom is not understood in a binary sense where the individual is 
either free or determined, but expanded to include various stages of freedom, which are 
dependent upon multiple variables. 
To understand further how this speculative view of freedom operates we begin by 
addressing Berdiaev‟s interpretation of the Fall.  In this section we will examine the modes of 
autonomy, heteronomy, and slavery.  We will address theandric freedom when we explore 
Berdiaev‟s view of the God-Man. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Even though Berdiaev distinguishes God from Being (God is spirit, a separate category), the same 
principle of dynamism applies also to God.  This is due to the fact that although God‟s freedom is infinitely 
more expansive than the freedom within Being, it nonetheless has the basic property of „potential‟.  See DM, 37; 
SF, 84; DH, 43. 
Berdiaev‟s conception of the dynamic nature of God is a resource for Moltmann‟s thought.  Moltmann 
relies exclusively on Berdiaev‟s concept of movement within the Godhead to examine “the tragedy of God” in 
The Trinity and the Kingdom.  Moltmann: “Anyone who denies movement in the divine nature also denies the 
divine Trinity.  And to deny this is really to deny the whole Christian faith.  For according to Berdiaev, the 
secret of Christianity is the perception of God‟s triune nature, the perception of the movement in the divine 
nature which that implies, and the perception of the history of God‟s passion which springs from this.” TKG, 45.  
E. J. Tinsley follows an identical line of thought when he writes, “Traditional theology, as Berdyaev hints, has 
of course been afraid to ascribe change and mobility to God because these were regarded as imperfections.  But 
this is to beg the question whether the traditional immutability and impassibility of God might not have their 
own deficiencies.”  E. J. Tinsley, “The Incarnation, Art, and the Communication of the Gospel,” in Art and 
Religion as Communication, James Waddell and F. W. Dillistone, eds. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974), 58. 
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 MH, 178.  Berdiaev‟s position that the individual still possesses a truncated form of freedom is 
addressed on pp. 76-77. 
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 MH, 180. 
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2.  The Fall 
 
The salient concepts for Berdiaev‟s specific understanding of the Fall are as follows: 
i. The Genesis account is a divine „myth‟, which expresses an eternal reality, 
ii. the Fall occurred before time,28 
iii. Berdiaev understands the soul as pre-existent,29 
iv. there is human development within the Fall, 
v. what occurs before time has real and significant consequences in time. 
 
In Berdiaev‟s view, the actions of Adam and Eve resulted in alienation and 
diminishment for the human race.  Yet, contrary to certain strands of theology (especially 
within Protestantism),
30
 Berdiaev believes that although sin jeopardizes the person‟s 
existence and dims the imago Dei, the person retains remnants of what God proclaimed as 
“very good.”31  The person still has capacity for limited reason and limited freedom.  “The 
higher nature of man as a free spirit could not have been destroyed and uprooted through 
original sin; the work of the Creator could not have been finally wiped out.”32  Paul 
Evdokimov concurs when he writes, “No evil will ever be able to erase the initial mystery of 
man, for there is nothing that can destroy in him the indelible imprint of God.”33  Thus even 
though Berdiaev believes that “the Fall is slavery, determinism, in which everything is 
decided from without, and enmity, hatred and violence.  That is the impress which the Fall 
has stamped upon human life,”34  he holds to his Orthodox roots – sin cannot completely 
wipe out God‟s creation and God‟s image within the person.35 
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 Spinka observes, “Berdyaev‟s belief in the preexistence of souls exhibits some really astonishing 
features, for although he is perhaps alone among the religious thinkers of our day to hold the tenet, he makes no 
particular effort to establish it.  He merely assumes it.”  Spinka, “Berdyaev and Origen,” 10 (Italics mine).  See 
also FS, 326; DM, 48.  The imprint of Origen‟s thought is evident at this juncture. 
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 For example, John Calvin: “Therefore let us hold this as an undoubted truth which no siege engines 
can shake: the mind of man has been so completely estranged from God‟s righteousness that it conceives, 
desires, and undertakes, only that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure, and infamous.  The heart is so 
steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out nothing but a loathsome stench.  But if some men 
occasionally make a show of good, their minds nevertheless ever remain enveloped in hypocrisy and deceitful 
craft, and their hearts bound by inner perversity.”  John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. 
McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (London: SCM, 1961), Book 2, 340.  Berdiaev‟s strong rejection of total 
depravity is consonant with his Orthodox context and the Patristic writing that influenced his thought.  For 
Augustine‟s argument on why a nature cannot be totally corrupt, see Augustine, On Free Choice, Book 3, 96. 
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 Genesis 1: 31. 
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 BM, 78.  See also Seaver, Nicolas Berdyaev, 21. 
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 Paul Evdokimov, The Sacrament of Love: The Nuptial Mystery in the Light of the Orthodox 
Tradition, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel and Victoria Steadman (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir‟s Seminary Press, 
1985), 61. 
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 BE, 214. 
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 In DM Berdiaev gives his interpretation of how the three branches of Christianity interpret the Fall.  
He writes of Orthodoxy, “The Orthodox view of man has been but little worked out, but the central point in it is 
the doctrine of the Divine image and likeness in man – the doctrine, i.e. that man has been created as a spiritual 
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A.  Autonomy
36
 
Post-Fall, humanity‟s existence is contrary to God‟s original design.  Instead of living 
in a state of theandric freedom, the person lives in an objectified world.  Alienated from God, 
the person‟s highest attainment of freedom humanly possible is the mode of freedom called 
„autonomy‟.  In certain ways autonomy mirrors theandric freedom in that both involve the 
subject acting in self-determined ways.  Where they differ is that in the autonomous mode, 
freedom operates primarily within a negative context, i.e. the potential for the person‟s 
existential liberty can only be developed to the point of rejecting or resisting deterministic 
forces.  Even though autonomous freedom is necessary in the maturation of a freedom, it 
remains a limited mode of freedom since it has no relational context. 
There is no formal autonomy in the inmost depths of spiritual freedom, for there is no 
distinction between autonomy and “theonomy.”  A free theonomy transcends both 
autonomy and heteronomy. . . . Autonomy and heteronomy are juridical and not 
spiritual categories depending upon the requirements of a divided world in which 
coercion is a dominating principle.
37
 
 
Autonomy is a freedom that enables rejection; the individual can reject external forces but the 
individual cannot attain to anything positive – autonomous freedom cannot be „for‟ 
something greater than the person. 
The problem, as Berdiaev understands it, is that even though the individual is created 
in the imago Dei with unique abilities, the post-Fall individual does not possess a freedom 
that can transcend the limiting realities of the natural world.  No matter how dedicated or how 
enlightened an individual may be, her existence can never move past autonomy.  “Human 
freedom as such is powerless to turn man to God, to conquer sin, to vanquish its own abysmal 
darkness and rise above its own destiny.”38  Hence, sin will eventually cause the autonomous 
status to degenerate and regression will be unavoidable, leading to heteronomy and, if not 
checked, enslavement.  Berdiaev: 
                                                                                                                                                        
being.  The Godlike and spiritual life of man is not destroyed but merely damaged by the Fall, and the image of 
God in man is dimmed.”  He goes on to refer to this Orthodox view as a divine human anthropology. DM, 61.  
See also Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy, 237. 
36
 Berdiaev‟s understanding of autonomy must always be held in light of his commitment to 
sobornost‟. 
37
 FS, 147 (Italics mine).  The difference between a „juridical‟ and „spiritual‟ category is important for 
Berdiaev.  He regards autonomy and heteronomy as juridical freedoms because they are concerned with 
choosing between values that are externally determined.  This can be illustrated by the choice whether to obey 
the law or be punished, follow a social custom or risk estrangement from a social group, etc.  Within a spiritual 
category (theandric) the person is internally determined through union with God and others.  This union, which 
is based on love, means that the person acts on what she knows (which is discerned in a relational context) to be 
true as opposed to actions being externally imposed.  These positions will be developed in the following 
sections. 
38
 DM, 46.  See also Aubrey, Philosophy of Nicolai Berdyaev, 528. 
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Autonomy is thus not only opposed to heteronomy and rightly so, but it is also in 
conflict with theonomy; and here it is at fault.  A more profound and positive truth is 
to be found in the fact that none of us can live solely according to our individual 
principles, nor can our freedom remain negative, formal, and without an object, but it 
is, rather, essential to that response which God demands from us and to our 
conversions to the divine life.  The freedom of the Old Adam, of the natural man, is 
purposeless and infantile, a mere desire to escape our swaddling-clothes.  The 
freedom of the New Adam, that is, of the spiritual man, is, on the other hand, a 
freedom which possesses a definite content; it is inward and positive, a desire to live 
for God and in God.
39
 
 
Autonomous freedom may be a limited form of freedom but it is still is a necessary 
element for the individual‟s development within a post-Fall created order.  If the individual, 
who is alienated from God and others, is to respond to God‟s invitation he must possess 
autonomous freedom.
40
  Without autonomous freedom the person is incapable of opening 
himself to God‟s grace and Spirit, which makes theandric freedom viable.  Consequently, 
autonomous freedom enables differentiation between person and God.  If there is no real 
autonomous freedom, according to Berdiaev, and God‟s sovereignty and will are absolute, 
the person is absorbed into God – God becomes the determining factor in all things.  God as 
the determining factor in all things is what Berdiaev refers to as a „monistic‟ perspective, 
which, he maintains, denies the trinitarian reality of God. 
The importance of autonomy is found in its potential to be „illuminated‟ by union with 
God and thereby develop into theandric freedom; i.e., the autonomous nature of the person is 
completed in theandric freedom.  Autonomy, important as it is, is always a „means‟ and never 
an „end‟. If this reality is forgotten or ignored, and the person fails to move beyond 
autonomy, the continued rejection of external influences will result in a vacuum in which 
objectification (sin) is able to exert ever greater influence.  “Autonomy is a misconception 
and is by no means the same thing as freedom.”41 
Berdiaev‟s view of autonomy is closely related to the concept of „free will‟ yet stands 
in stark contrast to Martin Luther‟s classic treatise on freedom, De Servo Arbitrio.42  Luther 
argues that autonomous freedom – what he terms liberum arbitrium – can only be attributed 
to God.  A person who is not in relation to God only possesses inconsequential freedom.  
Luther grants that the person has some freedom for “eating, begetting, ruling,” but in the end 
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 How autonomy, which is a negative form of freedom, can respond to God‟s call, which is a positive 
act, will be addressed in the following section concerning Berdiaev‟s Christology. 
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 DM, 7. 
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 Berdiaev consistently maintained, however, that there needed to be clear separation between his 
concept of freedom and what he perceived to be the theological understanding of free will. 
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“man apart from the grace of God remains nonetheless under the general omnipotence of 
God, who does, moves, and carries along all things in a necessary and infallible course, but 
that what man does as he is thus carried along is nothing, in the sense that it is worth nothing 
in the sight of God, and is not reckoned as anything but sin.”43  For Luther, there is no real 
autonomy outside the following of basic survival instincts.  From this position Luther 
emphatically states that if one posits free choice then he is denying Christ,
44
 because if free 
choice “is true, it follows that by the powers of his nature man can bring about his own 
salvation.”45 
Berdiaev considers the concept of free will, especially as it is conceived in the debates 
of Erasmus and Luther, to be destructive.
46
  This is because under the concept of free will 
“man is enslaved by the necessity to choose between that which is forced upon him and 
carrying out the law under fear of penalties.  He proves to be least free in that which is 
connected with his „free will.‟”47  Berdiaev wants to maintain a clear distinction between his 
view of freedom and the concept of free will (as he interprets it).
48
  “The religious and 
spiritual problem of freedom must not be confused with the question of free-will.”49  
Berdiaev contends that free will is a „juridical‟ view of freedom – the choice either to follow 
God or to be punished.  Thus he claims the concept to be “pedagogic and utilitarian,”50 
reducing freedom, and salvation, to a specific event in the agent‟s life.51 
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Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), 286-287. 
44
 Luther, “De Servo Arbitrio,” 321. 
45
 Martin Luther, Luther‟s Works, Vol. 1, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, trans. George V. Schick (Saint Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1958), 61. 
46
 DM, 102-103. 
47
 DM, 25-26. 
48
 FS, 120.  
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 DM, 102.  In contrast to this view, Berdiaev believes, theandric freedom, which is based on meonic 
freedom, has a more expansive scope.  “True freedom is not revealed in the moment when a man must choose, 
but when he has already made his choice.”  RSRC, 105.  Theandric freedom is focused on union with God and 
others, and the maturation of the agent from an individual into a free person.  In this paradigm, salvation is not 
limited to a „heaven or hell‟ dichotomy, rather he is attempting to take the understanding of salvation as eternal 
bliss and reconfigure it with a present day immediacy.  Salvation, Berdiaev vigorously asserts, has implications 
beyond the absolution of sin. 
Regarding what he perceives to be the traditional understanding of salvation, he opines, “From the 
tragic problem of Christianity there can be only one way out: the religious acceptance of the truth that the 
religious meaning of life and being is not wholly a matter of redemption from sin, that life and being have 
positive creative purposes. . . . Salvation from sin, from perdition, is not the final purpose of religious life: 
salvation is always from something and life should be for something. . . .Man‟s chief end is not to be saved but 
to mount up, creatively.  For this creative upsurge salvation from sin and evil is necessary.”  MCA, 105. 
Consequently, he treats the concept of salvation under the same rubric as freedom – salvation cannot be 
a status of only being saved from sin, salvation must be for something.  MCA, 95.  For Berdiaev, to be redeemed 
is not only to be free, it means that the Christian is called to create.  This position will be addressed in chapter 5. 
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Up to this point Berdiaev‟s understanding of the Fall – the alienation between God 
and created order in which the human still retains certain capabilities – is well situated within 
Russian Orthodox thought.  A more distinctive approach is evident in his treatment of the 
doctrine of sin. 
Berdiaev argues that the origination of evil is not to be found in the Genesis account.  
The actions of Adam and Eve result in alienation and corruption, but their rebellion did not 
bring about evil.  “Evil cannot, indeed, be interpreted conceptionally [sic], but only 
mythologically and symbolically.”  Berdiaev writes, “Evil and suffering exist because 
freedom exists; but freedom has no foundation of existence, it is a frontier.”52  The „frontier‟ 
of freedom, the Ungrund, then, is the source and explanation of evil; evil is not a result of 
eating a forbidden fruit.  Niebuhr echoes a similar thought when he writes, “Where there is 
history at all there is freedom; and where there is freedom there is sin.”53 
Berdiaev understands original sin as egocentricity, “Ego-centricity is, indeed, the 
Original Sin.”54  It is the turning away from union with God, the assertion of self opposed to 
relationship with God and others.  Original sin is not a hereditary characteristic of the 
individual, but a reality of meonic freedom, what Berdiaev refers to as the „irrational‟ element 
of freedom, which is within each person.  Berdiaev would not refute Paul‟s words that “all 
have sinned and fall short of the glory of God,”55 but he argues that this is a result of 
existential liberty within creation combined with a basal rift in the relationship between God 
and human.
56
  Sin is not a hereditary characteristic or disease passed down from generation to 
generation beginning with Adam and Eve. 
Berdiaev is proposing that even though the human “is corrupted and contaminated”57 
by sin, so that sin is a shared characteristic of humanity, sin is not the defining characteristic 
of humanity.  Berdiaev believes he is not underestimating the potency of sin, but seeking to 
reposition the idea of sin within a proper context.  The idea of sin must not be used to 
„humiliate‟ the person; the doctrine of sin must be used to demonstrate the potential of the 
person.  “If man is a fallen creature and if he fell in virtue of freedom inherent in him from 
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the first, it shows that he is a lofty being, a free spirit.  Awareness of original sin both 
humbles and exalts man.”58 
Berdiaev does recognize the dangerous consequences of sin – the reality of sin is 
equated with what he calls „objectification‟.  Because of sin the person and the created order 
become objectified and isolated from God, leading away from a state of communion into a 
state of isolation.  Hence, Berdiaev believes that “Objectification destroys life and being.”59 
Objectification is a recurring theme within Berdiaev‟s work.  He believes 
objectification results in a world suffering from alienation – alienation from God and 
alienation among individuals.  The created order has been turned into a world of objects, and 
as long as the person believes he does not possess a spiritual nature and there is no spiritual 
realm, objectification will continue.
60
  He lists the “marks of objectification” as follows: 
(1) The estrangement of the object from the subject; (2) The absorption of the 
unrepeatably [sic] individual and personal in what is common and impersonally 
universal; (3) The rule of necessity, of determination from without, the crushing of 
freedom and the concealment of it; (4) Adjustment to the grandiose mien of the world 
and of history, to the average man, and the socialization of man and his opinions, 
which destroy distinctive character.
61
 
 
For Berdiaev, the world existing in a fallen state is an objectified world, a world in 
which alienation between God and the created order exists.  This means that instead of the 
subject moving from autonomy to theandric freedom, the agent regresses on the scale to 
heteronomy. 
 
B.  Heteronomy 
Heteronomy is a mode of freedom in which the person yields her freedom to an 
external authority.  It is a deceptive freedom that can be difficult to identify and overcome, 
since it regards the person‟s freedom as ancillary to a greater good.  “The lure of the devil is 
not freedom, as has often been thought, but the rejection of freedom for the sake of bliss 
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mechanically forced upon man.”62  Heteronomy posits that there are things or values higher 
than freedom; according to Berdiaev, this position is dangerous for both the person and the 
community. 
While heteronomy can occur in the agent‟s relation with other individuals, an 
organization, or government, Berdiaev frequently focuses on the problem of it within 
religious (specifically Christian) thought.  He asserts that heteronomy is evidenced within 
Christian thought whenever God is exalted and the person is regarded as corrupt or as a slave.  
“Heteronomy involves the conception of God as an Oriental despot demanding a slavish 
submission from His servants. . . . This idea of God has been deeply impressed upon the 
Christian world and continues to exercise an influence even to-day.”63 
Berdiaev maintains that Christian anthropology has generally not taken the idea of 
freedom and the potential of the person seriously, and traces this tendency back to the early 
Church.
64
  Western theology, he believes, is especially susceptible to heteronomous 
formulations, which lead to the denial of humanity. 
In the most uncompromising forms of Western asceticism, in those which regard man 
and the world as entirely sinful, in Calvinism, for example, with its sentiment of 
Divine power and glory at the expense of man‟s humiliation, in Barthianism, even, 
with its belief that God is everything and man nothing, in all these we can observe an 
almost imperceptible transition from dualism (the transcendental gulf between God 
and man) to a form of monism or pantheism, involving not the deification but the 
humiliation of the world and man.
65
 
 
This is the type of theology Berdiaev believes he is countering in justifying the person.
66
  If 
this denial of humanity (i.e. heteronomy) is not challenged, if the person does not realize that 
he must seek freedom in God and not „slavish submission‟, then life is reduced solely to a 
preparation for heaven, and living a life of obedience takes on a machine-like quality.  “The 
problem consists in knowing whether man is called simply to salvation, or whether he also 
has a mission to create.”67 
Berdiaev makes the unique claim that when heteronomous freedom exists within 
Christian thought it is a form of monophysitism.  The Monophysite heresy, as Berdiaev re-
interprets it, pertains not only to the humanity of Christ, but all humanity.  Just as 
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monophysitism failed to acknowledge, and therefore value, the humanity of Jesus, so too any 
time the humanity of the agent is devalued, heresy results.  Consequently, he proposes that if 
the value of Jesus‟ humanity is to be maintained, then the overall value of humanity must also 
be maintained – to value the humanity of Christ is to value the person.  “For truly the God-
man is a revelation not only of divine but of human greatness and predicates faith not only in 
God but in man as well.”68 
Within this view Berdiaev is not disputing that Jesus is unique – Jesus is “the Unique 
One,” the God-Man.  His divinity, however, does not alter his humanness – as Chalcedon 
affirmed, he is fully human.  So, the humanity of Jesus links Jesus to all humans, with the 
result that if humanity in general is devalued so also is the humanity of Jesus.
69
 
There are countless ways in which humanity can be devalued, although for Berdiaev, 
this devaluing is most pronounced when the freedom of the person is not held in the highest 
regard.  When a philosophical, theological, or political construct maintains that either the 
person is not free, should not be free, or that her freedom is a secondary concern, then, that 
construct is denying a basic principle of God‟s creational design.  Berdiaev interprets all of 
these positions as attempted devaluations of humanity, and any devaluation of humanity is a 
devaluation of the God-Man (Jesus Christ). 
Whenever God and humanity are not valued, Berdiaev believes that heteronomous 
freedom always results.  If only God is exalted then the person is devalued, i.e., the person is 
viewed as being so utterly corrupted by sin that he has no significance until God chooses him.  
Berdiaev asserts that this „monophysite‟ tendency can only lead to diluted forms of either 
monism or pantheism (this would depend on the bias either towards the transcendence or 
immanence of God).
70
  If only the person is valued, however, and the existence and 
importance of the Triune God is denied, the person is denied the means to overcome the 
limitations of the objectified world.  Thus, by only valuing the person and denying God the 
person ends up not being valued, but on a path towards slavery. 
The danger of heteronomy, then, is that in this state, the devaluing of self in the light 
of a greater good numbs the individual to the potential God has created within her.  If never 
challenged the individual is extremely susceptible to becoming enslaved. 
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C.  Slavery 
Slavery is a mode of freedom where the person is being determined to a high degree 
by forces external to himself.  An individual becomes enslaved when he fails to understand 
who he is – that is, a relational being created in the imago Dei, and thus a divine-human 
creation.  By denying the reality of God and the reality of his spiritual nature, the agent 
forfeits the resources to resist the determination of the objectified world. 
Hence, for Berdiaev, an enslaved individual is an agent who has turned his focus 
inward and has become preoccupied with self (ego-centricity).  This individual only 
recognizes the world he can participate in, i.e. the natural world.  With this denial of the true 
self (which is natural and spiritual) the agent leads an „objectified‟ existence, which leads to 
slavery.  For Berdiaev, an agent who is enslaved is synonymous with an agent who is 
objectified.  We can see, then, that although slavery means being externally determined, 
slavery begins with how the individual understands himself in relation to God and the  
world.
 71
 
Labeling „slavery‟ as a mode of embodied freedom may appear to be self-
contradictory; but this is not true for Berdiaev, due to his interpretation of the Fall.  Even 
though the Fall gives the individual “a false, an enslaving, direction,”72 the agent still 
possesses some form of embodied freedom, which is based on his „existential liberty‟.73  This 
form of freedom may be a vastly truncated freedom as compared to what is possible for the 
agent in other modes of embodied freedom, yet a form of freedom remains. 
Berdiaev‟s concept of slavery is one of the areas where his Orthodox perspective is 
seen to be in sharp contrast to certain Western theological conceptions of freedom and the 
consequences of the Fall.  Since the Fall, according to Berdiaev, does not abolish the imago 
Dei, neither does it utterly vitiate the freedom that is granted with creation.  The significance 
of this is found in his idea that in order for the agent to overcome his enslaved status he must 
use his stunted form of freedom to stop moving away from God and others while recognizing 
God‟s freely offered grace. 
Berdiaev is not proposing that the enslaved agent can save himself or earn God‟s 
grace; however, the individual suffering from slavery must be a willing participant in God‟s 
gracious act of liberation.  The „residue‟ of freedom within the agent is necessary for 
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liberation to occur.  “Human nature preserves its independence which is necessary to the 
divine task in the world.  But the final victory over evil cannot be achieved by the natural 
powers of man in separation from God.”74 
It is acknowledged that this view– an individual who is oppressed by slavery yet still 
able to exercise some form of freedom – divides many over the issues of freedom, grace, and 
human agency.  Berdiaev believes that his Orthodox foundation provides a perspective where 
he can avoid the binary dilemma of stating that it is either God‟s grace or the individual‟s 
actions that liberate.  He is convinced both are necessary, since grace, as we shall see in the 
next section, is a „theandric‟ enterprise. 
Thus far we have considered three modes of embodied freedom (autonomy, 
heteronomy, slavery) under the rubric of the Fall.  To investigate the fourth and highest form 
of freedom, we must turn to what makes this freedom possible – the God-Man. 
 
§3  THE GOD-MAN 
 
The synthesis of philosophy and theology is most evident in Berdiaev‟s view of 
Christ.  Despite the fact that Berdiaev is antagonistic towards much theology, his 
„philosophy‟ is only comprehensible through specific theological constructs – the most 
important being his Christology and his conception of the Trinity.  Lampert goes so far as to 
say, “Christ the God-man is the vital pivot of his thought.”75  And, Oliver Fielding Clarke 
calls Berdiaev one of “the most Christocentric of philosophers.”76  These observations are 
accurate.   Berdiaev‟s „Christocentric‟ focus can be seen in the following: 
Both philosophy and theology should start neither with God nor with man (for there is 
no bridge between these two principles), but rather with the God-Man.  The basic and 
original phenomenon of religious life is the meeting and mutual interaction between 
God and man, the movement of God towards man and of man towards God.
77
 
 
Christ, the God-Man, is the linchpin for his vision of freedom; it is through Christ that 
theandric freedom is made possible.  “The grace of Christ is the inner illumination of freedom 
without any outward restraint or coercion.”78  Here we return, yet again, to the influence of 
Dostoevsky and the importance of Wernham‟s observation – Berdiaev‟s understanding of 
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Christ is the Christ of Dostoevsky‟s Legend.79  Theandric freedom is only possible because of 
who Christ is (the God-Man) and what Christ accomplishes. 
The truth shall make men free, but they must freely accept it and not be brought to it 
by force.  Our Lord gives man the final liberty, but man must first freely have cleaved 
to him: “Thou didst desire man‟s free love, that he should follow thee freely, a willing 
captive” – they are the words of the Grand Inquisitor. . . . The dignity of man and the 
dignity of faith require the recognition of two freedoms, freedom to choose the truth 
and freedom in the truth.
80
 
 
Berdiaev reads Dostoevsky‟s Legend as the affirmation of his conviction that Christ 
desires, first and foremost, the person‟s love.  This love can only be given and received in 
freedom.  The person, however, exists in a fallen world where alienation and objectification 
are predominant, not love, thereby making a free loving response to God problematic.  
Berdiaev attempts to work through this dilemma through a reconfigured view of grace. 
 
1.  Grace 
 
Grace is a distinguishing feature in Berdiaev‟s thought due to his integration of 
Orthodox theology, mysticism, and philosophy.  He looks to these sources in an attempt to 
maintain the distinctiveness of both God and person, while recognizing the problem of a 
corrupted creation.  This results in a multi-layered conception of grace that emphasizes a 
reciprocal relation between God and human. 
When Berdiaev writes, “Sin is conquered with great difficulty and it is only 
conquered  by the power of grace,”81 Vallon correctly observes that this view of grace is quite 
different from the theological formulations of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin.
82
  The 
difference is based on the fact that Berdiaev proposes a twofold conception of grace: grace as 
the action that God takes to liberate humanity and grace as a „divine element‟ God has placed 
within humanity, which is restored and nourished by Christ and the free actions of the person.  
Because of this, he can propose, “Grace proceeds not only from the divine nature of Christ, 
but also from the human, and from His heavenly humanity.”83 
This twofold conception is extrapolated from his interpretation of how the person is 
created and what resulted from the Fall.  Working from his perspective of „divine 
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anthropomorphism‟ Berdiaev believes grace can only be understood from the perspective of 
“„theandric anthropomorphism‟, [which is] a creative and Christian standpoint which 
recognizes the independent existence of the two natures and the reciprocal action of divine 
grace and human freedom.”84  We have already encountered the term „theandric‟ with regards 
to freedom.  Whenever Berdiaev uses the term „theandric‟ he is indicating an action that is 
dependent on God and the agent.  Theandric anthropomorphism, then, involves a view of 
grace where the agent is required to work with God in order for God‟s creation intention to be 
fulfilled within the person. 
The agent‟s ability to freely receive and nourish God‟s grace is made possible by the 
„divine element‟ within the agent.  Berdiaev‟s view of grace is muddled when he labels this 
„divine element‟ as „grace‟ and proposes that the imago Dei should be understood as this 
divine element/grace.  Hence when Berdiaev refers to the grace of the person he is often 
referring to the imago Dei, which results in „grace‟ having a double meaning.  Although these 
concepts are related, they remain distinct. 
For Berdiaev, the imago Dei enables the agent to respond to God‟s grace, thus he 
speaks of God‟s grace to humanity and humanity‟s grace in the ability to respond.  God 
instills grace (the imago Dei) at creation, Christ makes possible the restoration of grace 
through his agency, and the person must freely respond to Christ so that Christ is able to 
enact restoration.  “Where there is liberty, there is the Spirit of God and grace.  Grace acts 
upon liberty and cannot act upon anything else.”85 
The reciprocal nature of this position cannot be overlooked.  God‟s grace comes by 
Christ and the person must freely open herself to God for this grace to be actualized.  These 
acts must occur together.  The grace of humanity cannot liberate the agent, “Spiritual 
liberation is always a turning to a profounder depth than the spiritual principle in man, it is a 
turning to God,”86 and God‟s grace cannot be realized forcefully, without consent, “Man is 
not forced by grace: he receives it or rejects it freely.”87 
Berdiaev believes that by re-configuring grace as a theandric enterprise the tendency 
to view the relationship between grace and freedom as antipodal is overcome.  This is 
because grace is not external to the individual, but rather “grace acts within human freedom, 
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as its interior illumination.”88  From this position he roundly rejects the idea of freedom and 
grace as antagonistic elements, which Berdiaev believes to be the essence of the debates 
between Augustine and Pelagius and Luther and Erasmus.
89
  Berdiaev‟s twofold conception 
of grace is pushed to its limitations at this point.  His claim that grace illuminates freedom 
and that the individual uses freedom to accept or reject grace may appear problematic.  One 
might ask which occurs first, does the agent freely accept grace or does grace first have to 
„illuminate‟ freedom to make the acceptance possible? 
To reconcile this we return to the concept of embodied freedom.  In Berdiaev‟s vision 
of freedom the person is still able to recognize the good, i.e., the individual can use her 
existential liberty either to turn towards or away from God (what Bulgakov refers to as the 
person using the “residuum of his primitive liberty”90).  Berdiaev writes, “To receive the 
freedom of Christ is not only to receive the freedom of God but receive also, by partaking of 
Christ‟s human nature, that freedom which enables man to turn to God.”91  If the individual 
responds to God‟s calling and opens herself to Christ, then Christ, in a free and gracious act, 
is able to illuminate the divine element within the agent. 
The agent‟s free response to God allows God to illuminate the agent‟s freedom; this in 
turn allows a fuller response from the individual.  This reciprocal relationship allows for a 
deepening relationship with God and others, and for fuller expressions of freedom.  So, while 
God‟s grace has the immediate effect of establishing a relationship between the Deity and the 
human, God‟s created intention for the individual is an on-going process.  Grace is the 
required action by God and the person for the restoration of relationship, the maturation of 
personhood, and the growth of freedom. 
Consequently, God‟s given grace is necessary for the attainment of theandric 
freedom, but that attainment is always dependent upon a free response from the person that is 
„illuminated‟ by Christ. Copleston observes, “. . . Berdyaev, insists, if degeneration of 
freedom is to be avoided, the grace of Christ is required, grace which illuminates but does not 
coerce.”92  For Berdiaev, grace is what makes relationship and freedom possible in a 
corrupted world. 
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2.  God-manhood and Theosis 
 
Reinforcing this conception of grace is Berdiaev‟s interpretation of the Russian 
concept of God-manhood, which is foundational to his thought.
93
  Berdiaev‟s vision of 
freedom and the creative act is based upon the view that the individual belongs both to the 
created order and the spiritual order – the individual is both divine and human.  When 
Chalcedon affirmed the divine and human natures of Christ, Berdiaev believes that the truth 
as to what humans can become is revealed.  “In the person of Christ the God-Man man has 
fully come to exist.”94  The humanity of Christ establishes the foundation for what is true 
humanity.  “We belong to the same race as Christ and through His humanity we are 
associated with His human freedom.”95  God-manhood asserts that the person is to be like 
God – the person is to be god-like. 
God-manhood was integral for Solov‟ev‟s work.96  Vallon accurately notes that, for 
Berdiaev, God-manhood is “the encounter and mutual infusion of God and man whereby 
transcendence and immanence are unified.”97  Berdiaev holds this concept as a symbol; it 
expresses a truth that is beyond rational explanation.  “It is very easy to give a rational 
exposition in the spirit of monism of the truth that the image of man is the image of God.  But 
there is a mystery of a union of two in one, of God-manhood, of a double movement.”98  
Clearly this provocative idea relies on a context where the concept of theosis is considered 
normative. 
Berdiaev appropriates the concept of theosis
99
and the doctrine of the Incarnation to 
support the view that Christ, as the God-Man, makes freedom possible not only through his 
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passion, but equally importantly, through his incarnation.  As Spinka observes, “The 
incarnation, accordingly, is a revelation of both the character of God and the nature and 
destiny of man.”100  The incarnation reveals Christ as God-man, and thereby demonstrates the 
divine-human existence (Godmanhood) for which the agent is created. 
Theosis originates with Irenaeus and Athanasius.  The oft-quoted saying of Irenaeus 
establishes the basic premise of the idea, “He became like us that we might become like 
him.”101  Athanasius, in De Incarnatione, writes, “The Word became man that we might 
become divine; he revealed himself through a body that we might receive an idea of the 
invisible Father.”102  These views are intrinsic to the concept.   
Based on this position Berdiaev claims that if the person is to be truly human then 
they must truly be like Christ, the agent must recognize his own divine and human natures – 
the person should be the “intersection of two worlds.”103  If the person does not acknowledge 
a divine element within him, there is no chance to be truly human.  “In order to be completely 
like man it is necessary to be like God.  It is necessary to have the divine image in order to 
have the human image.”104  So, when the author of II Peter states, “Thus he has given us, 
through these things, his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may 
escape from the corruption that is in the world because of lust, and may become participants 
of the divine nature,”105 Berdiaev would interpret this, according to his Orthodox beliefs, in a 
literal sense.  The person can, through the grace of Christ, be a participant „of the divine 
nature‟.  “With Him a new race of human beings begins, the race of Christ, born and 
regenerated in the Spirit.  Christ is in man and man is in Christ.”106 
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This conviction – the person has a divine nature within herself – drives both his vision 
of the person and his vision of freedom.  “In the language of traditional terminology God-
manhood corresponds to the union of grace and freedom.”107  This is what Berdiaev believes 
makes personhood and theandric freedom possible.  Without a divine nature, that is without 
„grace‟, the individual will never truly realize whom she was created to be, nor will she 
realize ultimate freedom. 
Deification implies a distinction between God and man, a dialogical and dramatic 
relationship between them.  If man were already Divine, or if he were entirely sinful 
and separated from God by an absolute gulf, then such deification could not take 
place.  This deification or theosis, which is a fundamental feature of Eastern Christian 
mysticism, is neither a monistic identity with God nor a humiliation of man and the 
created world.  Theosis makes man Divine, while at the same time preserving his 
human nature.  Thus, instead of the human personality being annihilated, it is made in 
the image of God and the Divine Trinity.
108
 
 
As we saw in chapter 3, Berdiaev believes that the concern over whether theosis 
attributes too much to the human and blurs the distinction between God and human is not 
enough to deny the truth Christ reveals.  The divinization of the human reveals the destiny of 
each person – humanity is created for activity in concert with God.  He writes, “The Son of 
God became a man and not an angel, and man is called to a royal and creative role in the 
world to the continuation of creation.”109 
He believes the idea in which humanity holds an exalted status within the created 
order to be uniquely Christian.
110
  In his view, an authentic Christianity is one that seeks to 
exalt both God and person while maintaining a distinction between the two.  Berdiaev is 
convinced that if theosis and God-manhood are ignored, if the divine nature of the person is 
denied, then Christianity will not possess the vision of what humanity is called to become. 
Having considered Berdiaev‟s view of grace, God-manhood, and theosis we are now 
prepared to investigate how Berdiaev formulates the ultimate expression of embodied 
freedom – theandric freedom. 
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3.  Theandric Freedom 
 
Theandric freedom is the highest form of freedom.  It is freedom exercised in union 
with God and others and is “discovered and revealed in the experience of the spiritual life.”111  
It is what God desires and requires of the person, as well as being the freedom necessary for 
an agent to mature from being an individual to a person.
112
  Berdiaev envisages a 
theandrically free person as the following: 
In a state of freedom man is not determined from without under the compulsion of a 
nature alien to himself, but he is self-determined in the depths of his spiritual life and 
out of his own spiritual energies; he finds himself in his own spiritual world.
113
 
 
To understand how Berdiaev arrives at this conception of theandric freedom the 
following four points will be addressed: (a) the interrelatedness of theandric freedom, grace, 
and the imago Dei, (b) the necessity of autonomy, (c) love, and (d) sobornost‟ 
 
A.  Interrelatedness 
In Berdiaev‟s thought the term „theandric freedom‟ is so closely related to the terms 
„grace‟ and „imago Dei‟ that at times they seem to be interchangeable.  This is the result of 
Berdiaev‟s proposition that freedom is necessary to actualize the divine element (grace) 
within the person, which, in turn, is the imago Dei.  Each concept (theandric freedom, grace, 
imago Dei) is so intertwined with the others that differentiation becomes ambiguous.  For 
example, Berdiaev writes, 
Clarifying grace is indeed the highest freedom.  God acts in freedom and through 
freedom, and outside freedom there is no grace.  The traditional antithesis between 
freedom and grace in theological literature is superficial and does not get down to the 
root of the matter.  When man is entirely free then he is in grace.  This is the 
awakening of the divine element in man.  If he is without freedom the reception of 
grace is impossible [as] there is no organ for the purpose, and without grace there is 
no decisive emancipation of man from necessity, slavery and fate.
114
 
 
Equating „clarifying grace‟ with theandric freedom is a consistent stance for 
Berdiaev.
115
  As we have discussed, Berdiaev‟s idea of grace refers not only to God‟s 
liberating action for the created order, but also to the „divine element‟ (i.e. the imago Dei) 
                                                 
111
 FS, 117. 
112
 FS, 126.  See also MCA, 100. 
113
 FS, 122. 
114
 TR, 70. 
115
 Although the adjective „clarifying‟ is obscure, Berdiaev is intimating the grace that is found in union 
with God.  Since theandric freedom is dependent on God‟s action (grace) and the imago Dei (grace), theandric 
freedom is equated with „grace‟.  This speculation will be challenged in chapter 7. 
85 
 
that the person is blessed with.  The person‟s ability to respond to God‟s grace is 
accomplished through the „grace‟ (i.e. the imago Dei or divine element) within him.  “Man is 
not free if he is merely a manifestation of God, a part of the Deity; he is not free if he has 
been endowed with freedom by God the Creator, but has nothing divine in himself. . . .”116 
Operating from this perspective, Berdiaev believes that a person who is theandrically 
free is a person who exists in an intimate union with God and others.  The divine element of 
the person is so attuned to God that it is possible to say that the person‟s grace has reached its 
most redeemed state as a result of God‟s grace.  This person‟s vision of the world becomes 
God‟s vision, his actions are God‟s actions, his freedom is a „grace-full‟ freedom that has no 
corollary to any type of freedom society could bestow.  Consequently, he seems to equate 
theandric freedom with grace and the imago Dei; and grace and the imago Dei, in their most 
mature forms, are equated with theandric freedom. 
 
B.  The Necessity of Autonomy 
The autonomous mode of freedom is necessary for the person to achieve theandric 
freedom.  Although theandric freedom is only possible in a union between God and person, 
autonomy is required because the union is based on God‟s call and the free response of the 
person.  Thus, even though the goal is a union between God and the agent, this union does 
not negate the autonomous nature of the person. 
Despite the necessity of autonomy, Berdiaev also recognizes its limited nature.  
Autonomy is a factor in theandric freedom but without God, theandric freedom is not 
possible.  For all his „intemperate‟ and idealistic language regarding human potential, 
Berdiaev is quite clear as to the limits of human agency. 
So far from diminishing, forcing or destroying freedom, grace seeks to increase it and 
raise it to a higher level. . . . Human freedom as such is powerless to turn man to God, 
to conquer sin, to vanquish its own abysmal darkness and rise above its own destiny.  
Pelagius failed to understand this. . . .The impotence of human freedom and the 
superhuman nature of grace create an insoluble paradox.  The answer to it is 
contained in the mystery of Christ the God-Man, but that mystery cannot be 
rationalized.
117
 
 
Since permanence in the union between God and person is not possible, theandric 
freedom is a fluid state – for while God is constant the person is not. Accordingly, autonomy 
not only plays an important part in making theandric freedom possible, it also makes possible 
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the diminishment of theandric freedom.  If the person turns her focus from God and others to 
solely self (egocentricity), theandric freedom is then nullified.  This loss of union, with the 
resultant loss of theandric freedom, can be seen, for example, in the narratives of Abraham,
118
 
Elijah,
119
 David,
120
 and Peter.
121
 
 
C.  Love 
The union within theandric freedom is a union based on love – God‟s love for the 
person and the person‟s love for God.122  Berdiaev believes that love is the key for 
communion and is the reason creation exists.  Creation is founded on God‟s love, according 
to Berdiaev, a love that longs for the other.  “Spiritual experience also shows us that God 
longs for man and that He yearns for the birth of man who shall reflect His image. . . . Infinite 
love cannot exist without a loving subject and a loved object.”123 
God‟s desire is for relationship with persons, a maturing relationship of love between 
God and person, which requires freedom.  As Spinka writes, “A free man is necessary to 
God.  Since God is love, and love cannot exist in a vacuum but must go out to an object and 
must be reciprocated, He desired a being capable of such a free response.”124  As love can 
only be freely reciprocated, Berdiaev asserts that union with God or others in which theandric 
freedom is experienced is not initiated because of a command or coercion; it is the result of 
love.
125
 
This is a highly significant point for Berdiaev‟s thought.  The ultimate expression of 
freedom is attained through union in love.  “Truth crucified possesses no logical nor juridical 
power of compulsion and it made its appearance in the world as infinite love, and love does 
not compel, rather it makes man infinitely free.”126  Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom, then, has 
as its goal a freedom that results in a „turning outwards‟ – a freedom that can only be 
manifested in a concern and love for others and God.  This stands in sharp contrast to popular 
Western images of freedom that over-privilege concepts such as self-sufficiency and 
individualism. 
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Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom based on union and love depend not only his mystical 
understanding of how God and the person interrelate, but also on his interpretation of the 
Russian principle of sobornost‟. 
 
D.  Sobornost‟ 
Sobornost‟ (соборность) is a Russian word that has no equivalent in the English 
language.  R. M. French states that it “is the despair of all translators from Russian.  
„Altogetherness‟ would come near to its meaning.  It is the dynamic life of the collective 
body.”127  Berdiaev states, “The word sobornost is untranslatable into other languages.  The 
spirit of sobornost is inherent in Orthodoxy and the idea of sobornost, of spiritual 
community, is a Russian idea.”128  The word can be traced back to frequent use in the Old 
Church Slavonic,
 129
 but it is Khomiakov who develops and invests it with its unique 
meaning.  Berdiaev credits Khomiakov with being the person who develops the linkage 
between sobornost‟ and freedom.  “At the basis of his theological thought Khomyakov put 
the idea of freedom – of sobornost, the organic union of freedom and love, community.”130 
The concept of sobornost‟ is vitally important to Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom in 
which a modified self-determination is highly valued.  Even though self-determination may 
seem to lead to individualism, Berdiaev is not arguing for an individualist conception of 
freedom.  Individualism, for Berdiaev, is the negation of freedom.
131
  Berdiaev uses 
sobornost‟ to counter individualism, with its false promise of autonomous freedom being the 
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highest form of freedom, and proposes that the highest freedom is found in unity with God 
and others. 
. . . sobornost‟ signifies a quality of life which affirms the reality of freedom by 
widening the scope of freedom and by revealing its transcendent, universal 
dimension.  The recognition of the absolute priority of freedom does not, therefore, 
denote, as some would like to make out, individualistic self-assertion.  Freedom of the 
spirit has in fact nothing in common with individualism: to be free is not to be 
insulated; is not to shut oneself up, but, on the contrary, to break through in a creative 
act to the fullness and universality of existence.
132
 
 
The importance of sobornost‟ for Berdiaev is fairly obvious when we see how 
Khomiakov understands the term.  Sobornost‟ is a context in which the individual, 
empowered by the Holy Spirit, is bound to others by love and exercises his freedom in that 
love.  Since the state of sobornost‟ is a Spirit-dependent community that focuses on love, 
Khomiakov believes any type of external authority to be antithetical to this principle. 
Although Khomiakov is focused on sobornost‟ within an Orthodox context, for 
Berdiaev, it quickly translates into a broader concern.  Berdiaev agrees with Khomiakov that 
the Orthodox Church should be a „soborny‟ community, yet Berdiaev‟s focus is to establish 
this relationship on a larger scale, for all Christians, regardless of their church allegiance. 
Berdiaev admits that this concept may be difficult to grasp for a number of reasons.  
First, for people in the West it may be difficult since it opposes both “Catholic 
authoritarianism” and “Protestant individualism”133 and has no clear definition.  “This 
sobornost can have no rational juridical expression.  Each must take upon himself 
responsibility for all.  No one may separate himself from the world whole, although at the 
same time he ought not to regard himself as part of a whole.”134  Second, it may be 
considered overly idealistic, as Berdiaev acknowledges Khomiakov has “in view an ideal 
Orthodoxy of a kind that ought to have existed according to his ideas. . . . ”135  And third, 
granted that there may be cultural differences that impede understanding, there is also the fact 
that within Russia this was not a universally accepted concept.  Berdiaev: 
Orthodox circles of the right who considered themselves especially orthodox, even 
asserted that sobornost was an invention of Khomyakov‟s, that Orthodox freedom in 
Khomyakov bears the impress of the teaching of Kant and German idealism about 
autonomy.  There was some measure of truth in this, but it only means that 
Khomyakov‟s theology endeavoured creatively to give meaning to the whole spiritual 
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experience of the unfolding history of his time.  In a certain sense it is possible to call 
Khomyakov an Orthodox modernist.
136
 
 
Nonetheless, while acknowledging these difficulties, Berdiaev maintains that one cannot 
understand and experience theandric freedom apart from sobornost‟. 
If a person seeks authentic freedom but cannot „live outwards‟ (i.e. look beyond 
himself to God and the world around him) he has not moved past autonomy.  If he remains in 
this state he is susceptible to ego-centricity and enslavement.  The person who opens herself 
to God and others has the potential to experience true (theandric) freedom.  Communion with 
others is not antithetical to freedom, it is a necessary prerequisite.
137
  Because of this soborny 
perspective the person whose goal is freedom should not seek I-Thou relationships, but rather 
relationships that are constituted by I-We-Thou.
138
  For true freedom is only found when the 
person exists in a bond of love with others and God. 
Therefore, we can see that Berdiaev‟s Christocentric conception of theandric freedom 
is dependent on a reconfigured view of grace, requires the autonomy of the individual if it is 
to be achieved, is experienced in love, and requires sobornost‟ – a community of others who 
are bound in love to one another and to God.  Theandric freedom, then, is a mode of freedom 
where the person is „self-determined‟ through union with God and others.  The person does 
not act based on external determinations, but rather his actions are derived from what he 
„knows‟ to be authentic to who he is in union with God and others.  This, in turn, means that 
his actions will be creative.  Although the manifestations of theandric freedom will be 
investigated in the next chapter, it is important to note the time in history when Berdiaev 
believes that theandric freedom was clearly evident – the early Renaissance. 
Berdiaev broadly interprets this era as a great flourishing of creative activity in 
conjunction with Christian spirituality.  “In medieval Christianity there was a theocratic, 
hierocratic culture, in which all creative life was a self-subordination to a religious 
principle. . . .”139  Also, during this period, the seeds of humanism were sown and began to 
flourish.  People began to understand the potential with which they were created.  Berdiaev 
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contends that this creative activity was derived from theandric freedom, for the manifestation 
of theandric freedom, according to Berdiaev, is always creative acts.
140
 
As this period progressed, however, a rebellion occurred and humanism began to 
replace God with the individual – resulting in the situation where “man has unmanned 
himself.”141  With the individual as the focus, rather than God, creativity eventually began to 
stagnate and give rise to revolution and discord.  Humanity lost its true center.  Instead of 
living in relationship with God and others, humanism gave birth to modernistic concepts of 
freedom, leading to isolation and solitude.  In Berdiaev‟s view, theandric freedom was lost 
when the person was elevated over God, as opposed to the person being elevated with God. 
We have seen that Berdiaev grounds his idea of theandric freedom in his particular 
Christological beliefs.  It is the God-Man who makes possible the experience of freedom 
within the created order.  Through the work of Christ the individual has the potential to 
develop and mature into what God intends.  Theandric freedom enables the individual to 
become a person (i.e. to be god-like) and exist in sobornost‟ (i.e. communion with God and 
others).  It is, however, not only the work of Christ that makes this freedom and maturation 
possible, it is also the work of the Holy Spirit and the person‟s attention to the spiritual life.  
Thus we turn our attention to Berdiaev‟s understanding of „spirit‟. 
 
§4  SPIRIT 
 
Berdiaev‟s proposition that theandric freedom is self-determination “in the depths of 
his spiritual life”142 indicates not only the scope of freedom, but also the significance of the 
„spiritual‟ in relation to this freedom.  Theandric freedom depends on the „spirit‟.  
Consequently, the spiritual realm (the noumenal) is an ultimate concern for Berdiaev.
143
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Without an understanding of the spiritual nature of the person, the spiritual realm, and the 
work of the Spirit Berdiaev could not envisage the possibility of theandric freedom.  Thus, 
„spirit‟ is an axial concern for his thought on freedom.  He addresses the subject of „spirit‟ 
throughout his corpus, with two of his more significant works being devoted to the subject, 
Freedom and the Spirit (1927-1928) and Spirit and Reality (1937). 
As is the case with all Berdiaev‟s core concepts (e.g., freedom, creativity, grace, etc.) 
he operates with the conviction that „spirit‟ cannot be defined.  “A rationalistic definition of 
spirit would not only be presumptuous but also a hopeless undertaking.  Such a definition 
would kill spirit or transmute it into object.  Spirit defies conceptual interpretation. . . .”144  
Berdiaev‟s fear that defining „spirit‟ will result in objectification, along with his „tentative‟ 
style, raises a serious challenge for the reader who attempts to discern what Berdiaev means 
by the term „spirit‟. The task, however, is not impossible.  His willingness to list the attributes 
of spirit, as well as his repeated engagement with the subject, allow a general outline to be 
identified with regard to his vision of freedom.  Although „spirit‟ fulfils different functions 
within his thought, there are two distinct, yet related ways „spirit‟ is referenced.  They are: 
„spirit‟ as a sphere of existence, and „Spirit‟ as an active agent, the Holy Spirit. 
In the former, when „spirit‟ refers to a sphere of existence, it denotes the context 
where the Deity and the human, who is a „spiritual being‟,145 interact.  The spiritual life 
(spirituality) is the context for experiencing a reality that is deeper than the phenomenal – a 
reality that is the foundation of the phenomenal or natural realm.  Here we return to 
Berdiaev‟s emphasis on the „mystical‟ experience.  It is in the mystical union that the person 
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is able to experience and understand what is truly real.  As McLachlan observes, “The 
phenomenal world is a symbol of a spiritual reality that is deeper than objectification.”146  
“Spirit is not an objective reality,”147 spirit is the ultimate reality. 
When the term „spirit‟ is referenced in this sense, it is the ground for his vision of 
freedom, for it is in the spiritual realm that Berdiaev understands the agent to exist in his 
closest union with God.  Therefore, the experience of „spirit‟ is „freedom‟, „divine‟, 
„creative‟, „non-determined‟, and a „Divine infusion‟.148  The sphere of the „spiritual‟ is 
where the person interacts with the Holy Spirit, and where theandric freedom is developed. 
Spirit is freedom unconstrained by the outward and the objective, where what is deep 
and inward determines all.  To be in the spirit is to be in oneself.  So far as the spirit is 
concerned the constraint of the natural world is only the reflection of inward 
processes.  The religious pathos of freedom is the pathos of spirituality; to win true 
freedom is to enter into the spiritual world. . . . Freedom must be discovered and 
revealed in the experience of the spiritual life, for it is impossible to demonstrate it or 
deduce its existence from the nature of things.
149
 
 
It is the person who experiences union with God through the Spirit, who seeks 
theandric freedom.  This person experiences and interacts with the natural world with a new 
perspective and a new liberty.  Berdiaev: “This does not mean that the transient and the 
relative are devoid of all reality, but their reality is secondary, not primary.”150  The person, 
who experiences and knows his existence is attributed to something greater than the 
phenomenal world, can envisage a world beyond necessity.
151
 
Idinopulos, however, recognizes the problematical nature of this thought: “. . . it 
becomes increasingly unclear to the reader what Berdyaev understood to be actual and 
concrete and not merely ideal or mystically significant about the divine-human spirit in the 
world of time, matter, and history.”152  If spirit is the apex of the human existence but the 
human lives within the natural world, Idinopulos rightly questions what value the natural 
realm has within Berdiaev‟s thought.  Zenkovsky is more pointed when he charges Berdiaev 
with a “constant readiness to repudiate reality.”153   
Berdiaev counters this type of criticism by arguing that the alienation between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal is a reality due to the Fall – it is not a speculative concept 
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within his thought.   He does not dispute the reality of the phenomenal realm, but it is a realm 
within a larger reality.  The agent‟s existence within it is consequential, even though 
“Spiritual life is lived outside time, space, and matter. . . .”154  Berdiaev: 
It is a mistake to separate this world and the other altogether.  It is in fact precisely the 
concrete life in this fallen objective world, the concrete life of men and women, 
animals, plants, of the earth with its mountains and fields, its rivers and seas, of the 
stars and expanses of sky, which contains the noumenal core in it; a noumenal core 
which is not to be found in the abstractly common, in the hypostatized hierarchy of 
universals.
155
 
 
Despite the reality of a rift between the two realms, Berdiaev believes the human 
should seek the integration of the spiritual and the material realms.  “Spirituality is not 
opposed to body or material but implies its transfiguration, the realization of the highest 
quality of the whole man – his personality.”156  The existence of two realms is the result of 
rebellion and therefore not part of God‟s intention for creation.  It is the responsibility of the 
human, whose soul is “the interplay of freedom and necessity, the spiritual and the natural 
world,”157 to work with God towards the reunification of these realms.  Berdiaev: 
This is where the new spirituality must strive to be effective, by combining 
contemplation and activity, spiritual concentration and the will to struggle.  It is 
completely wrong to base the spiritual life on the old antithesis of spirit and flesh.  St. 
Paul interpreted this as an antithesis between the old and the new man.  The new man, 
the spiritual man, does not repudiate the flesh, if by that we mean more than simply 
sin; on the contrary he endeavours to master the flesh, in order to illumine and 
transfigure it into spiritual flesh.
158
 
 
Berdiaev is convinced that any hope of overcoming the disintegrated world will come 
from humans understanding and striving to exist in the spiritual and natural realm.  The 
person‟s existence within the spiritual realm is made possible by the liberating work of Christ 
and, equally importantly, by the presence of the Holy Spirit.  Thus we come to the second 
reference of „spirit‟ within Berdiaev‟s thought, the „Spirit‟ as the Holy Spirit. 
At this juncture we once again find Berdiaev‟s reluctance to offer precise 
explanations.  He does recognize the importance of distinguishing between „spirit‟ and 
„Spirit‟: “. . . the problem of the Holy Spirit and of His relation to spirit is of fundamental 
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importance to Christian thought.  Christianity is pneuma-centric.  The pneuma or spirit is the 
bearer and source of prophetic inspiration in Christianity.”159  Yet, regrettably, when he 
attempts to differentiate he retreats to, “the distinction between the Holy Spirit and spirit is a 
purely doctrinal one.”160  Commenting on Berdiaev‟s view, David Richardson writes, “Spirit 
is not Holy Spirit, yet they differ only in degree and are really the same reality.”161 
Despite Berdiaev‟s reluctance to provide a definition, the „Spirit‟ (Holy Spirit) is 
central to his thought.  Seaver observes that Berdiaev invests the doctrine of the Trinity with 
a mystical significance in which the Holy Spirit is considered to be the bond between person, 
Christ, and God the Creator.
162
  This is true, and yet, for Berdiaev, the Spirit is more than a 
bond – it is God‟s active presence manifested within the created order. “Spirituality in 
religious phraseology is the revelation of the Holy Spirit in the world and in man.”163 
God‟s active presence means the “Spirit is, as it were, a Divine breath, penetrating 
human existence and endowing it with the highest dignity, with the highest quality of 
existence, with an inner independence and unity.”164  Hence, as the Spirit unites the person to 
God through Christ, this is not solely for the experience of ek-stasis, but for the realization of 
freedom and the potential of transfiguration.  “The stress must always be laid upon 
enlightenment and transfiguration.”165 
Berdiaev‟s writings on the „spirit‟ and the „Spirit‟ provide the initial response to the 
charge that he is not interested in the material world.  In a certain respect, it is possible to say 
that Berdiaev is not interested in the material realm, but this must be qualified.  His primary 
concern is to look „beyond‟ the material to the spiritual realm, which is the foundation of the 
material.
166
  The material realm never defines, for Berdiaev, what is truly real; reality can 
only be defined by the spiritual.  Hence Berdiaev‟s focus is the transfigured reality of God‟s 
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Basileia, which will reunite the spiritual and the material realms.
167
  For, “God is not a reality 
in the same sense and of the same kind as the reality of the natural world.  God is spirit, not 
being.”168  As Spinka observes, “For him [Berdiaev], Christianity is the religion of the future, 
of the end, of the aeon of the Holy Spirit.”169  Berdiaev is interested in the world; his interest, 
however, is in a world that is restored by God through the Spirit, a world yet to be fulfilled. 
 
§5  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter we have examined the complex framework Berdiaev constructs to 
delineate the existence of freedom within the created order.  I have proposed that the freedom 
within creation, in Berdiaev‟s vision, should be classified as an embodied freedom that has 
four distinct modes: slavery, heteronomy, autonomy, and theandric.  These four modes 
constitute a spectrum of freedom that is based on Berdiaev‟s interpretation of select 
theological concepts (e.g. grace, Christology, the Fall, the Holy Spirit, etc.).  Embodied 
freedom for Berdiaev is a seemingly paradoxical state in which the agent must exercise self-
determination while also being relationally dependent.  To summarize the major points of our 
discussion: 
i. Although meonic freedom cannot exist within Being, there remains a latency of 
meonic freedom within each individual.  I have described this latency as 
„existential liberty‟.  Due to the presence of existential liberty the individual 
always has the potential for self-determined acts in some form. 
ii. The Fall results in alienation of the created order from God and the fracturing 
of freedom into multiple modes of existence.  These modes exist under the 
rubric of „embodied freedom‟. The individual is able to progress or regress 
between these modes based on her existential liberty and her relation to God, 
others, and self. 
iii. God reveals what is true humanity in the Incarnation.  Relying on a novel re-
interpretation of grace, combined with the concept of God-manhood and 
theosis, Berdiaev maintains that the revelation of the Son not only offers 
redemption from sin, but also reveals the destiny of the individual to be a 
divine-human being. 
iv. It is within the intimate union of God and person, Berdiaev proposes, that 
theandric freedom, the highest form of freedom, is experienced.  This union is 
based on the love between God and person, maintained in the Spirit and 
nurtured in sobornost‟. 
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v. We have observed a distinction between „spirit‟ and „Spirit‟ in Berdiaev‟s 
work.  The former is used to denote the context where the spiritual life of the 
individual engages with God.  The latter designates the Holy Spirit.  The 
emphasis on „spirit‟ derives from Berdiaev‟s understanding of a bifurcated 
world and his emphasis on the mystical experience.  Theandric freedom is 
possible because of the person‟s ability to live a „spiritual‟ life. 
vi. Berdiaev‟s conception of freedom within the created order is a multi-layered 
view that acknowledges the reality of deterministic forces and various 
expressions of freedom.  As the person‟s freedom develops, Berdiaev believes 
that the individual becomes more self-determined while also becoming more 
relationally dependent. 
 
Our critique of Berdiaev‟s vision of embodied freedom through the work of 
Moltmann will focus on Berdiaev‟s premise that self-determination is a divine element within 
the person.  Using Moltmann, I will challenge the basic assumptions Berdiaev employs to 
support this view: his re-configured view of grace, the bifurcated understanding of reality, the 
notion that the creation and giving of freedom cannot be attributed to God, and his conception 
of the Spirit.  Moltmann‟s view of freedom will also be used to support Berdiaev‟s 
understanding of freedom being self-determined and relationally dependent – a freedom that 
enables growth towards God and also, tragically, makes possible the alienation from God. 
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Chapter 5 – The Creative Act 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
“God calls man to perform the creative act and realize his vocation, and He is 
expecting an answer to his call.”1  The „creative act‟ Berdiaev believes God expects from 
humanity can be described, in the broadest possible sense, as an „act‟ undertaken by a „free‟ 
person that results in something „new‟ that has „value‟.  To clarify this description, we will 
explore Berdiaev‟s complex thought on creativity in order to understand how he envisages 
creativity taking place and its significance for the person and for God.  
Creativity, like freedom, is a core element to Berdiaev‟s thought.  He writes in his 
autobiography, 
The matter of creativity and of the creative vocation of man is not only a facet or one 
of the facets of my outlook, reached as a result of philosophical reasoning, but a 
source of my whole thinking and living – an initial inner experience and illumination.2 
 
Hence Osborn is correct when he observes that no concept, other than freedom, “is dearer to 
Berdyaev‟s heart than creativity.”3 
The centrality of creativity to Berdiaev‟s thought is based on his premise that the 
highest forms of freedom depend on creativity.  “Creativeness is the way of liberation.  
Liberation cannot result in inner emptiness – it is not merely liberation from something but 
also liberation for the sake of something.  And this „for the sake of‟ is creativeness.”4  Thus 
an understanding of the creative act becomes central to comprehend how a free person 
interacts with the created order.  From this position Berdiaev can assert that “the human is 
called to be a creator and co-participant in the act of God‟s creation.  This is God‟s call 
directed to the person, which the person should freely answer.”5  Creativity, for Berdiaev, is 
the other side of the coin, so to speak, of freedom – one cannot exist without the other.  To 
understand what Berdiaev means by freedom for the person one must also engage his unique 
formulation of the creative act. 
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As creativity is directly linked to freedom, it is not surprising that his approach to the 
topic of creativity mirrors in many ways his approach to the topic of freedom.  For example, 
his approach is existential, he is not concerned with established methodologies or orthodox 
precepts, he asserts that creativity (like freedom) is relationally dependent, and he uses 
creativity to paint an exalted picture of the person.  As with his work on freedom there will be 
specialized terms that will need elucidation (e.g. „the creative act‟, „geniality‟, etc.) and we 
will encounter ideas that are not presented in complete or systematic ways.  These 
difficulties, however, do not diminish the important contribution Berdiaev‟s thought on 
creativity brings to the theologian‟s discussion of freedom and what freedom means for the 
person. 
In this chapter we will begin by outlining the beginning stages of creativity.  From 
there we will then examine the three primary foundations of the creative act (meonic 
freedom, the imago Dei, and the „silent expectation‟) and we will then assess Berdiaev‟s 
conception of how creativity is given shape through the inner and outer creative acts.  We 
will then consider what Berdiaev believes to be a notable example of creativity (the 
Renaissance), discuss his proposition that creativeness is an ethical mandate, and examine the 
interrelatedness between „freedom‟ and „creativity‟. We conclude by summarizing the 
material we have covered and also by highlighting those points that will be critiqued through 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom. 
Berdiaev is reluctant to define the creative act, “What creativeness is, is 
inexplicable.”6  He believes that any attempt to define would only result in „objectification‟.  
The fear of objectification is not the only reason he does not define; he is convinced that a 
definition, or „justification‟, is not required.  “Creativity stands in no need of justification 
from the religious or any other point of view: it is its own justification in virtue of the very 
existence of man. . . .”7 
Combining these initial convictions with his orientation and style, we find that 
Berdiaev‟s thought on creativity is even less detailed than his vision of freedom.  Hence I 
propose that his work should be considered as a sketch of creativity.  Even though he will not 
define or justify creativity, his work on the subject from multiple perspectives enables us to 
outline a general framework of this sketch.  Our outline begins by establishing the broadest 
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possible parameters of his thought, the elements that I believe form the beginning stages of 
Berdiaev‟s view of creativity. 
 
§2  THE BEGINNING STAGES OF CREATIVITY 
 
The beginning stages of creativity involve self-will,
8
 newness, and freedom.  Even 
though “creativeness is a complex fact”9 and Berdiaev will propose a wide set of variables for 
the highest forms of creativity, these three elements form the basic parameters for creativity. 
A creative act for Berdiaev will always be a self-willed act by a person that produces 
some form (whether material, conceptual, or spiritual) of newness, and is dependent on the 
person‟s freedom.  It is important to note that these three elements do not constitute a creative 
act; rather, when taken as a whole they form what I will call a „novel act‟, which is the 
beginning stage of creativity.  Since, as we shall see, his complex conception of creativity is a 
hierarchical view that depends on a number of variables, there needs to be some type of 
distinction between the beginning stages of creativity and the creative act in its realization.  
Although Berdiaev does not make this distinction, it is an essential one. 
The term „self-will‟ describes an action that the person takes which is attributable to 
himself.  For Berdiaev, this is a critical distinction.  The creative act is the self-willed act and 
activity of a specific agent.  He writes, “Man is called to creative activity, he is not merely a 
spectator – even though it be of divine beauty.  Creativeness is action.”10  Creation cannot 
result from emanation, evolution, or even a Bergsonian “creative evolution.”11  In essence 
what Berdiaev wants to assert is that creativity must begin with an action that is not solely 
determined by variables external to the person or „natural‟ processes.  If the creator cannot act 
in a self-willed way then the action takes on the character of an evolutionary process, and this 
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evolutionary character Berdiaev soundly rejects, “. . . evolution is essentially conservative on 
principle and takes no cognizance of what is in actual fact new, that is, of the creative.”12 
From this quote we see not only that creativity must be self-willed but also that it 
must result in newness.  Creativity, as Berdiaev conceives it, will always result in a product 
which hitherto has not yet existed within the sphere of the agent.  From this position he 
contends that the creative act is an addition to the created order.  “In every creative act there 
is absolute gain, something added.  The creative quality of being, the growth which takes 
place in being, the achievement of gain without loss – all this speaks of a creator and of 
creativity.”13 
Berdiaev‟s insistence on newness has a resonance with contemporary views of 
creativity from other disciplines.  For instance, Robert Weisberg writes, “The primary 
criterion for calling some product creative is that it be novel, at least for the individual 
producing it.”14  Rob Pope‟s survey of creativity also concludes that „novelty‟ or newness is 
an important essential for creativeness.
15
  Even though these writers would disagree with 
Berdiaev‟s view of creativity on a number of fronts, their agreement at this point is 
noteworthy. 
Berdiaev believes newness is possible based on two suppositions.  His first 
supposition regards the status of creation – he believes creation to be ongoing.16  The created 
world is not complete; not only is it not complete but it is also inadequate since it exists in a 
post-Fall order.
17
  The creation looks for restoration, to overcome its objectified nature, but 
this will only happen if the human assumes her role and exercises creativity.
18
 
The second supposition for newness is also our third beginning element of 
creativeness – freedom.  We can make two observations as to how freedom relates to the 
beginning stages of creativity.  First, with regard to our discussion of newness – when 
Berdiaev asserts that all creative acts originate out of freedom, he is envisioning creativity 
originating from „nothing‟ (i.e., non-determined, or meonic, freedom).  This formulation of 
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creativity arising from „nothing‟ (freedom) allows him to state that because creativity arises 
from „nothing‟, whatever takes form will have an element of newness to it, since it did not 
exist before. 
Creation is the greatest mystery of life, the mystery of the appearance of something 
new that had never existed before and is not deduced from, or generated by, anything.  
Creativeness presupposes non-being, μή όν (not ούκ όν) which is the source of the 
primeval, pre-cosmic, pre-existent freedom in man.  The mystery of creativeness is 
the mystery of freedom. . . . Out of being, out of something that exists, it is impossible 
to create that which is completely new; there can only be emanation, generation, 
redistribution.
19
 
 
It is important to note that Berdiaev does not want to suggest that creativity, which 
depends on freedom („nothing‟), has no input from other external variables.  Within his idea 
of freedom and newness he also wants to value „tradition‟ – that is the creative achievements 
and accomplishments of past generations and cultures.  He considers tradition to be “the 
creative life of the spirit,”20 and its importance is realized in that it demonstrates how 
creativity was previously expressed.  Tradition can be that which helps guide the creator in 
her endeavors. 
. . . tradition is by no means just another name for the conservative spirit which is 
actually prejudicial to creative development: it is rather the inner connection with the 
creation of the past and its cultural values.
21
 
 
The importance of tradition is tempered with the view that although tradition is a 
resource for creative acts, tradition should not be a rule or template that creative acts must 
adhere to.  Berdiaev maintains that tradition becomes problematic when it either becomes 
objectified, so that it is an authority external to the person, or when people believe that the 
past, where the tradition originated, must somehow be re-created.  In this latter deviation 
tradition becomes nostalgia; Berdiaev considers nostalgia to be a sentimental form of 
tradition that can lead the person away from creativity.
22
 
Our second observation concerning freedom focuses on Berdiaev‟s resolute stance 
that freedom is the precursor to creativity.  He insists that creativity always presupposes 
freedom.  The creative act cannot be the result of the person being forced, coerced, or 
manipulated into acting.  The creative act is the result of the person freely engaging with the 
world and responding based on his freedom.  This concept requires much clarification, but at 
                                                 
19
 DM, 163. 
20
 FS, 331. 
21
 TNE, 83.  See also FS, 234 and BE, 228 where he gives special emphasis to the traditions passed 
down through the Church. 
22
 TNE, 23. 
102 
 
this point what the reader must bear in mind is that Berdiaev‟s conception of creativity is 
dependent upon his idea of the person being able to act with some measure of freedom within 
the created order.  Freedom provides a platform for the person acting in ways that are 
distinctive to the creator‟s unique status as a human. 
As was previously stated, these three elements (self-will, newness, freedom) 
constitute what I am referring to as a „novel act‟, which is the beginning stage of creativity.  
A novel act may not always be a creative act, but a creative act will always contain this 
particular type of novelty.  To understand how a novel act can become a creative act we need 
to consider various factors that are external to the person and foundational for creativity. 
 
§3  THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CREATIVE ACT 
 
As with his vision of freedom, Berdiaev‟s view of creativity places a strong emphasis 
on the person, while at the same time asserting the need for other „resources‟ that exist 
outside of the person.  Hence, like his vision of freedom, we find a view of creativity that is 
dependent upon factors external to the person – specifically God, others, and meonic freedom 
– that are the foundation of creativity. 
The following statement by Berdiaev forms the framework for our analysis of this 
foundation.  “It [creativeness] presupposes, first, man‟s primary, meonic, uncreated freedom; 
secondly, the gifts bestowed upon man the creator by God the Creator, and, thirdly, the world 
as the field for his activity.”23  Thus we begin our exposition of what makes the creative act 
possible with Berdiaev‟s first supposition – meonic freedom.  From freedom we will go on to 
examine God‟s gift of the imago Dei and then consider God‟s desire for human creativity, 
what Berdiaev calls the „silent expectation‟. 
 
1.  Meonic freedom 
 
Meonic freedom as the first supposition for creativity is consistent with Berdiaev‟s 
overall view of freedom and how the person experiences freedom.  We have already 
examined Berdiaev‟s conception of meonic freedom and the resultant „embodied‟ freedom 
with its four modes; however, we need to return to Berdiaev‟s view of meonic freedom to 
delineate how freedom is foundational for creativity. 
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As was outlined in chapter 4, Berdiaev‟s „embodied‟ freedom is predicated on 
„existential liberty‟.  „Existential liberty‟ designates Berdiaev‟s premise that the agent always 
has some capacity for self-determined actions, which can then be said to be distinctly 
personal.  So, Berdiaev‟s paradigm of freedom is a multi-phase view of freedom that values 
both relationality and self-determination.  This proposition relates to the creative act in two 
significant ways. 
First, the creative act, for Berdiaev, must be an action that can always be attributable 
to the agent in some way.  An action that a person undertakes because they are directed, 
manipulated, or forced, cannot be creative.  Here we highlight again the importance of self-
will.  The creative act must originate in some way with the person.  If the agent‟s actions are 
predetermined, i.e., if the agent is directed how to think, produce, relate, etc., there is no 
newness, ergo no creativeness.  Now since Berdiaev‟s conception of freedom is relationally 
based this does not rule out the fact that the agent may be influenced by any number of 
variables, but these variables, if the act is to be considered creative, will never force the agent 
to act in a determined way. 
Consequently, existential liberty, as the non-determined element within freedom, 
means that the person has the potential for distinctly self-determined actions, which may then 
lead to creativity.  Based on this premise Berdiaev can state: “Creativity is inseparable from 
freedom.  Only he who is free creates.”24  Novelty, and ultimately the creative act, will 
always be the positive expression of an agent‟s freedom. 
The second way existential liberty relates to creativity is found in the idea that 
creativity is the essential mode of action in theandric freedom.  This second point will be 
addressed at the end of the chapter, once we have explicated Berdiaev‟s conception of 
creativity within the material world.  At this juncture we can note that creativity, for 
Berdiaev, is dependent on freedom.  As we shall see, the relationship is reciprocal, for 
freedom is also dependent on the person being able to act in creative ways. 
 
2.  Imago Dei 
 
E. J. Tinsley writes, 
Certainly it is true that human creativity always contains, perhaps more than 
anywhere else, the most powerful stimulus to hybris, to Prometheanism.  Creativity is, 
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at one and the same time, the possibility of man‟s humiliation and sin, and also of his 
exaltation and glory.
 25
 
 
Tinsley‟s observation is relevant when considering Berdiaev‟s approach.  Arguing for the 
creative abilities of the human could be seen as a Promethean argument.  Yet in Berdiaev‟s 
thought on the imago Dei we see that his view of creativity is not trying to supplant the 
Creator, nor does the imago Dei signify mastery or dominion over creation.  The imago Dei, 
for Berdiaev, means that humanity has the potential to create. 
So sublime and so beautiful is the divine idea of man that creative freedom, the free 
power to reveal himself in creative action, is placed within man as a seal and sign of 
his likeness to God, as a mark of the Creator‟s image.26 
 
Consequently, one characteristic of the imago Dei is the capacity within the person to 
create.
27
  Although this conception of the imago Dei is equivocal, Berdiaev interprets the 
imago to be the person‟s capacity and predisposition for creativity. 
The divine-human religion predicates man‟s activity.  If God created man in his own 
image and likeness, and if the Son of God is absolute Man, this means that man as a 
son of God is predestined to be a free creator, like his Father-Creator.  Christ, the Son 
of God, Saviour and Redeemer, restores man‟s creative powers, which had been 
undermined and weakened.
28
 
 
Hence a distinctive property of what it means to be human, according to Berdiaev, is to 
create.  This is reflected in the original Genesis „myth‟, where the human is not only created 
by God, but is created in God‟s image, i.e., the image of the Creator.29   
Based on this understanding, Berdiaev refers to the imago Dei as the „genius‟ within 
the person. 
Creativeness by its very nature implies genius.  In his creative aspect man is endowed 
with genius; it is the image of God the Creator in him.  This does not mean that every 
man has an outstanding talent for painting pictures, writing poems, novels or 
philosophical books, ruling the state, or making inventions and discoveries.  The 
presence of genius in man has to do with his inner creativeness and not with the 
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external realization of it.  It is a characteristic of human personality as a whole and not 
a specific gift, and it indicates that man is capable of breaking through to the primary 
source of his life and that his spiritual activity is truly original and not determined by 
social influences.
30
 
 
Berdiaev‟s use of the word „genius‟ is problematic.  This is due to the fact that the 
word „genius‟ is often understood as denoting a distinctive and unique talent or ability.  
Berdiaev‟s application of the word diffuses this meaning; if everyone is blessed with „genius‟ 
(as all humans have the imago Dei) then there is nothing exceptional. 
Berdiaev seeks to overcome this difficulty by claiming that genius is first and 
foremost an inner potential.  „Inner‟ in this sense connotes the person‟s spiritual abilities.  
Thus, each individual possesses an „inner genius‟.  To distinguish „inner genius‟ from a more 
traditional understanding of the term „genius‟ (what he refers to as „outer genius‟) he factors 
in the specific talents or skills of the individual.  Thus „inner‟ genius plus talent “makes a 
man a genius in the usual sense of the term.”31  This concept will become modified as his 
thought develops.  In a later publication he alters the term, proposing the term „geniality‟ as 
opposed to „genius‟.32 
Equating the imago Dei with geniality reflects a tendency already noted in Berdiaev‟s 
thought, the blurring of terminology concerning core concepts.  As already discussed, 
Berdiaev equates the imago Dei with grace and theandric freedom.
33
  The imago Dei now not 
only encompasses grace and theandric freedom, it also includes geniality.  It is accepted that 
Berdiaev would have been better served if he had exercised greater discipline in delineating 
these concepts, yet the merit of his thought remains.  Berdiaev is not arguing that these terms 
are interchangeable per se, rather that they are interconnected in such a way that one cannot 
use one concept without referencing the other. 
Because creativity is dependent upon the geniality God has instilled in the person, 
Berdiaev regards true creativity as „divine-human‟.34  In one sense creativity is divine-human 
because it is dependent upon the human actively developing the „divine‟ gifts given by God.  
In a second sense, creativity is divine-human because true creative acts are acts accomplished 
in union with God, what Berdiaev calls „theurgy‟.35  “True creativeness is theurgy, God-
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activity, activity together with God.”36  Consequently, when the person engages in creative 
activity based on theandric freedom, she reveals the divine nature within herself.  This is 
because creativity, in its highest sense, will only occur in relation to God – a relationship that 
requires the person to recognize the divine nature (imago Dei) within her.
37
 
For Berdiaev, the person‟s ability to create is a “gift from God”38 that does not elevate 
the human to equal status with God or replace God with the person as the center of creation 
(the very thing that Berdiaev faults the later Renaissance period as doing).  Rather, the 
person‟s creative ability and actions follow God‟s design for the person and substantiate the 
person‟s status as being made in God‟s image and likeness. 
So, the following observations may be made concerning the imago Dei and the 
person‟s creative ability: 
i. The imago Dei is central in understanding how the person creates. 
ii. The imago Dei is a form of grace, since it is a divine element (an element that 
cannot be attributed to the natural world) bestowed upon the human. 
iii. The imago Dei is not only a form of grace but it also means that the person is 
predisposed to act in certain ways (to create), and in this way the imago Dei can 
be said to be a type of „inner genius‟ or geniality. 
iv. Theandric freedom is central to his thought since the grace that Christ offers 
(which illuminates the dimmed imago Dei) and the actuation of geniality 
(which precipitates creativity) can only occur through the person freely 
responding to God. 
 
We can thus see that Berdiaev is making a theological assertion regarding the creative 
act.  In his thought, the imago Dei is foundational as to how creativity is possible for the 
individual.  This leads to the Orthodox-influenced position that the beginning point of a 
theological anthropology should not be the person‟s fallen nature; rather it should begin with 
the latent qualities of freedom and the imago Dei within the person.
39
  Consequently, an 
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individual who believes he is self-sufficient, recognizing nothing greater than himself, and 
denies the imago Dei, severely impairs his creative ability.
40
 
 
3.  Silent expectation 
 
Although freedom establishes the potential for creativity, and the imago Dei enables 
the person to engage in creative acts, Berdiaev believes that there is an expectation, a 
„calling‟ for creativity from God as well.  “What God expects from man is not servile 
submission, not obedience, not the fear of condemnation, but free creative acts.”41  Hence 
God‟s calling is the third foundation of the creative act, a „silent expectation‟. 
This assertion mirrors the thought in Berdiaev‟s theory of freedom that God expects 
freedom from the person.
42
  As previously stated, there is a necessary relationship between 
freedom and creativity in Berdiaev‟s thought.  Thus, if God expects freedom from the person, 
God must also expect creativity. Because of this expectation we can say that the person is not 
only capable of creativity, creativity has a vocational status.  Sabant writes, “. . . Berdyaev 
perceives another duty for man: the duty of creativeness.”43 
The problem for Berdiaev is that he is proposing an idea – God expects the person to 
create – that has no explicit reference in scripture.  Indeed, the exact opposite can be 
argued.
44
  The lack of scriptural mandate would appear to seriously weaken Berdiaev‟s idea 
that God calls the person to create.  Berdiaev attempts to overcome this difficulty by 
proposing that the call to create within scripture is actually a „hidden‟ call.  “We feel the holy 
authority of the Gospel‟s silence about creativeness.  This absolute silence of Holy Scripture 
about man‟s creative activity is divinely wise.”45 
One must recall his hesitation to define the creative act – any definition would result 
in an objectification of the act.  He applies this same principle to his view of scripture.  The 
call to create is intimated within scripture, but creativity cannot be explicitly stated without 
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objectifying the act itself.
46
  Thus there is “silence” regarding the call to create and that 
silence is “divinely wise.” He writes, “If the ways of creativeness were indicated and justified 
in the Holy Scriptures, then creativeness would be obedience, which is to say that there 
would be no creativeness.”47 
Since God‟s expectation is veiled and the calling to create is not specifically defined, 
how each person responds will be subject-determined as the person exists in union with God 
and others.  This means that the freedom necessary for creativity is not impinged upon and 
the creative act can become the act “that constitutes man‟s relation and response to God.”48 
Berdiaev does not find this view of a silent expectation problematic since, in his 
understanding of scripture, “The solution of many vital and fundamental questions, however, 
is not made obvious in the Gospel, but is, as it were, veiled.”49  He is not only convinced that 
there is a calling to create, but also that failure to understand and recognize this veiled call 
has dire consequences for the person, the Christian community, and the created order.  Sabant 
writes, “In Berdyaev‟s view, the failure of the Church to see the religious meaning of the 
creative urge in man has been at the root of mankind‟s progressive estrangement from 
God.”50 
God expects the person to create (to participate in the “eighth day of creation”51), and 
with God‟s help fulfill what has not been completed, which is the Kingdom of God on 
earth.
52
  Berdiaev recognizes that this idea is in tension with various perspectives within 
theology.  “The official theology which regards itself as orthodox denies that man is a being 
with a capacity to create.  Capacity for creation belongs to the Creator alone who is pure act, 
and the creature is incapable of it.”53  Even though his view of „orthodox‟ theology is 
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equivocal, he accurately asserts that for many theologians the idea that “the person‟s calling 
is to be a creator, a co-participant with God for world-creation and world-arrangement . . .”54 
is highly problematic.  For Berdiaev, this is not an issue, since he is not concerned with an 
adherence to an established orthodoxy; rather, his goal is an outlook in which both God and 
person create, and are therefore exalted.  He is convinced that if theology denies the calling 
for the person to create this will only lead to atheism.  “The idea, so widely spread in 
theology, that the existence of God is incompatible with man‟s creativeness is a source of 
atheism.”55 
To summarize our analysis thus far: creativity begins with a self-willed act that is 
brought about through the person‟s free actions and results in some form of newness within 
the created order.  This beginning stage of creativity I have termed a novel act.  For a novel 
act to develop into a creative act, foundational elements must exist.  The foundations for 
creativity can be found in the following: the existential liberty that exists in all forms of 
embodied freedom, God creating the person with the imago Dei (which means, among other 
things, the capability to create), and God‟s expectation for creative acts from the person.  
From this point we can now begin our examination of how the creative act can occur within 
the „natural‟ world. 
 
§4  THE CREATIVE ACT IN THE MATERIAL WORLD 
 
As with his vision of freedom, one must consider Berdiaev‟s concept of creativity 
from a developmental perspective.  If novelty is to develop into creativity not only must there 
be elements external to the agent in place, the agent himself must engage in certain steps to 
create.  This section will outline these various steps and examine how Berdiaev pictures 
creativity taking shape within the „natural‟ world. 
Berdiaev envisages the development of the creative act taking place in a two-part 
movement: inner creativity and outer creativity.  Each part is comprised of a series of sub-
movements that, while not linearly understood, are required for the creative action to develop 
and maintain its integrity.  Berdiaev: 
Creativeness has two different aspects and we describe differently according to 
whether we dwell upon one or the other.  It has an inner and outer aspect.  There is the 
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primary creative act in which man stands as it were face to face with God, and there is 
the secondary creative act in which he faces other men and the world.
56
 
 
The distinction between „inner‟ and „outer‟ acts is critical to Berdiaev‟s thought on creativity.  
The „inner‟ creative act is also referred to as the „primary‟ act, and the term „primary‟ more 
clearly reveals Berdiaev‟s thought.  As with freedom, Berdiaev‟s fear of objectification leads 
him to assert that any association with the phenomenal world must be considered as 
secondary, or inferior, to the noumenal.  The phenomenal can never achieve what is possible 
in the noumenal.  “In that primary act man stands before God and is not concerned with 
realization. . . . This alone is first-hand knowledge, my real philosophy in which I am face to 
face with the mystery of existence.”57 
The inner creative act is the moment when the person develops a vision and begins to 
imagine what is possible; it is the primary form of creativity.  Everything that follows in the 
creative process represents a „cooling down‟ (objectification) and cannot equal the original 
vision.
58
 
 
1.  Inner Creativity
59
 
 
The creative act, in its highest sense, is a continuation of theandric freedom and is 
therefore predicated on a similar principle – true creativity is first conceived within the 
spiritual (noumenal) realm.  Hence the highest forms of creativity begin in the noumenal.  
This stage of creativity is referred to as „inner creativity‟.  „Inner creativity‟ is when the 
person‟s spiritual experience begins to utilize the necessary disciplines – imagination, 
contemplation, humility – to reach a stage of „outer creativity‟, which is the realization within 
the natural realm. 
Since creativity begins within the spiritual realm, Berdiaev conceives of the spiritual 
life as creative; “It is impossible to conceive of the spiritual life otherwise than as a creative 
life.”60  The reciprocal is also true, i.e., the creative life is always a spiritual life.  “Spirit is 
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creative activity: every creative act is a spiritual act.”61  Based on this view, the Holy Spirit 
can be seen as the initial inspiration for the person to create.
62
  Berdiaev understands this 
process occurring in the following manner: “In creativeness there are two elements: that of 
grace, of inspiration coming to man from on high, of genius and talent possessed by man; and 
that of freedom, having no external cause and determination, but forming the new elements in 
the creative act.”63  The encounter with the Spirit is an encounter with inspiration; thus at that 
moment of encounter the person‟s understanding of what is possible is radically expanded.  
“The very possibility of creation presupposes an infusion of the Spirit into man, and that we 
call inspiration.  And this raises the action of creative power above the world.”64  Through the 
inspiration of the Spirit the person‟s perspective is altered, so that the agent‟s action is based 
on what is possible with God, as opposed to what is allowable within the natural world.  
This moment of inspiration, of being infused with the Spirit, is what leads Berdiaev to 
refer to the creative act as a moment of transcendence.  “The creative signifies an ek-stasis, a 
breaking through to eternity.”65  The Holy Spirit guides the person to new alternatives and 
perspectives; the Spirit enlivens the latent potentialities God placed within the person.  
“Creative experience is a special kind of experience and a special kind of way: the creative 
ecstasy shatters the whole of man‟s being – it is an out-breaking into another world.”66 
Creativity is a „special kind of experience‟ for Berdiaev, because he believes 
creativity to be the intersection between the phenomenon and the noumenon.
67
  For the 
person who is drawn into union with God, creativity is his mode of action.  Creativity allows 
the person to freely respond to God‟s call and move towards a reality greater than his current 
experience. 
Although the Spirit and „ek-stasis‟ are the initial precursors for creativity as Berdiaev 
envisions it, in order for the creative act to take shape a specific response is required from the 
person.  The creative act does not naturally emanate from a person who has a creative vision.  
The complexity of creativity, combined with the power of the phenomenal world to delude 
individuals into thinking that all that exists is the natural world, means certain practices, or 
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disciplines, are required.
68
  These disciplines for „inner‟ creativity are imagination, 
contemplation, and humility. 
 
A.  Imagination 
Since Berdiaev maintains that the source of creativeness is in God and in freedom, he 
overstates his claim when he writes, “The faculty of imagination is the source of all 
creativeness.”69  This overstatement, however, does not diminish the importance of 
imagination within his thought.  The exercise of imagination is an integral step in the process 
of creation.  A person devoid of imagination is incapable of creative activity.
70
  Berdiaev 
writes that “Without imagination there can be no creative activity.”71  As the person engages 
with the Spirit, her imagination is necessary for the germination of new ideas and concepts.  
“Productive imagination is a metaphysical force which wages war against the objective and 
determinate world, against the realm of the commonplace and dull.”72  Without imagination 
the person cannot conceptualize the potential that exists beyond the natural world.  
Accordingly, without imagination the person cannot respond to the Spirit‟s inspiration.  
Imagination is what makes possible the reconfiguration of perceptions and values necessary 
for creativity, since “Creative fancy is capable of producing real and vital consequences.”73  
For Berdiaev, then, the creative act is that which can “imagine something higher, better and 
more beautiful than . . . the „given‟.”74 
Imagination, however, is not neutral.  Berdiaev recognizes that imagination, like 
mysticism, can degrade and turn the focus away from things „higher‟ and „more beautiful‟.  
“Imagination may also be a source of evil; there may be bad imagination and phantasms.  
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Evil thoughts are an instance of bad imagination.”75  A bad imagination is that which 
deceives.  “But a lying imagination, and it is not rare for it to be lying, precipitates a man into 
a reality which is a nightmare.  It is always to be remembered that the imagination can be 
creative of falsehood, it can cast man into a world which, for all that it is a world of things, is 
fictitious.”76 
The risk of a bad imagination exists because freedom exists (freedom always 
presupposes the possibility of tragedy).  As with mysticism, the element of danger does not 
negate its validity; it merely reinforces it.  If no danger was present, imagination could not be 
part of a free response; it would be merely a static act linked to necessity.  Because of 
freedom, “It is possible for man to become the victim of his own imagination, despite the fact 
that the imagination is capable of being a way out towards a higher world.”77 
 
B.  Contemplation 
A second discipline necessary for the development of creativity and engagement with 
the Spirit is contemplation.  “Creation is in a profound sense the contemplation of God, truth, 
and beauty, of the supreme life of the spirit.”78  The act of creativeness utilizes both the 
imagination and contemplation.  For the person “has as much need of contemplation as of 
creative activity.”79 
Contemplation serves two important functions for Berdiaev.  In the first instance, it is 
the practice by which the person is able to maintain proper focus.  In the process of creativity, 
the creator can experience a “superabundance of creative energy which has free scope”80 
resulting from union with God.  In experiencing this creative energy it is possible for the 
person to lose perspective, thereby placing the process at risk.  Berdiaev writes, “As soon as 
man begins to create in his own name, and to affirm himself in his creation refusing the path 
of sacrifice and asceticism, his work is threatened by eventual sterility.  Vanity lies in wait for 
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the creator and even his creative nature becomes warped.”81  Contemplation is the means by 
which the creator remains attuned to the Creator. 
Secondly, contemplation is the solution to the inherent struggle that occurs with 
creative activity.  Berdiaev believes that creative activity always involves „struggle‟ and if the 
creator is to overcome, she must be contemplative.  The struggle of creativeness is the 
struggle of living within a world of necessity, a world where freedom and communion are not 
readily apparent, and contemplation is the rejoinder to this struggle.
82
 
This juxtaposition of „struggle‟ and „contemplation‟ could intimate contemplation 
being considered only as rest.  If contemplation is „rest‟, demonstrating how it contributes to 
the creative process, which is active, can be problematic.  Berdiaev believes that 
contemplation should not be considered a passive state where the person is unaffected by the 
world.  “Contemplation and activity should not be considered as antithetical principles.”83  
The „contemplator‟ is a person who has an “active spirit.”84  “But contemplation of God is 
creative activity. . . . The contemplation of God Who is love is man‟s creative answer to 
God‟s call.”85 
Because the contemplator is focused on a God of love, love then becomes a primary 
theme of contemplation and therefore of creativeness.  True creativeness involves an ascent, a 
love for God, and a descent, a love for the world.  Berdiaev: 
Proudly to forsake the world and men for the lofty heights of the spirit and refuse to 
share one‟s spiritual wealth with others is un-Christian, and implies a lack of love, 
also a lack of creativeness, for creativeness is generous and ready to give.  This was 
the limitation of pre-Christian spirituality. . . . But it is equally un-Christian and 
uncreative completely to merge one‟s soul in the world and humanity and to renounce 
spiritual ascent and acquisition of spiritual force.
86
 
 
Contemplation as the means to maintain proper focus, as well as proper balance, is a 
necessary discipline for the person to continue in union with the Spirit and to develop his 
creative action.  As the person is inspired by the Spirit, contemplation is a primary means for 
the creative act to maintain its integrity.  Hence “. . . contemplation is also creativeness, 
spiritual activity which overcomes anxiety and difficulties.”87 
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C.  Humility 
The third component necessary for creativity is humility.  As humility is sometimes 
misunderstood as a devaluing of self, it may appear strange to certain readers that Berdiaev, 
who consistently propounds the fundamental value and dignity of the person, also emphasizes 
humility.  Berdiaev acknowledges this by proposing a specific understanding of humility. 
Berdiaev believes that humility has all too often created an “external authoritative-
hierocratic system”88 where the person is devalued and authority is established over the 
person.  In this system, he believes the expectation for the person is obedience to a set of 
values or beliefs that are externally determined.  Humility is imposed upon the person – 
unless the person is humble they are denied what they seek.  “The foundation of all 
Christianity, the foundation for all the spiritual pathways of the individual, the way of 
salvation for eternal life was supposed to be humbleness.  The person must resign himself, 
and all the rest will happen by itself.”89  Berdiaev considers this to be a „deteriorative 
humility‟ that favors systemization (developing a system as to how the person should act) 
over liberation (a concern for the person‟s maturation and demonstration of her higher 
nature). 
This type of humility not only devalues the person but also results in passivity.  In this 
respect „deteriorative humility‟ mirrors heteronomous freedom.  „Deteriorative humility‟ 
resembles heteronomy in that a concept (i.e. being humble) is deemed more worthy than the 
person.  Devaluation occurs and with that there is a loss of freedom.  This “servile conception 
of humility distorts the true meaning of Christianity and the spiritual life.”90 
In contrast to this Berdiaev states that true humility is based on freedom and 
enlightenment by the Spirit and results in a „heroic‟ act as the humble person „conquers‟ the 
self-centeredness within him.
91
  True humility is a condition the person freely adopts. 
An act of humility is not the act of a will alien to my own, but that of my own will 
enlightened and transfigured by a higher spiritual nature.  For example humility 
towards an elder in the shape of the submission of my will to his spiritual direction is 
an entirely voluntary act, an act of freedom and not one of forced submission. . . . 
Humility means the abandonment of self-centredness for God centredness.
92
 
 
Following on from this conception of true humility, Berdiaev introduces the concept 
of sacrifice.  The person who strives for humility is a person who realizes a higher value in 
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life.  A humble person, Berdiaev believes, is a person who seeks to break free from those 
things that enslave while attaining to higher spiritual values.  For this to occur, a humble 
person must be willing to sacrifice, to leave behind those things that appear important for that 
which is greater. 
As humility is central for the development of the person and overcoming „self-
centeredness‟, it is also central for creativeness.  Along this same line of thought, as humility 
is necessary for creativeness so is the ability to sacrifice.  Without an ability to sacrifice, the 
person cannot look beyond himself; consequently, the creative act cannot be made manifest.  
Berdiaev writes, “All creative work, all knowledge, all art, the making of all that is new, is 
impossible without some self-limitation and a transcending of one‟s lower nature.”93 
The truth of humility and sacrifice, Berdiaev asserts, is ultimately revealed by Christ, 
the revelation of God‟s sacrifice.  “It [freedom] reveals tragedy in the Divine life itself.  God 
Himself, the Only Begotten Son, suffers and is crucified, an innocent sufferer.”94  God is not 
to be understood through a monarchial concept, but through sacrifice.
95
  As God undergoes 
sacrifice to restore the cosmos and make freedom possible, so the person must also be willing 
to sacrifice.  Although the „sacrifice‟ the person makes in creating is not commensurate with 
God‟s sacrifice, the principle remains.  Overcoming the „necessity‟ of the fallen world, while 
preserving freedom, requires some form of sacrifice. 
For Berdiaev, following the thought of Dostoevsky, the Son reveals the necessity of 
sacrifice for the existence of freedom; and since freedom and creativity are interdependent, 
sacrifice is also necessary for creativeness.  Thus, for the person to fulfill her calling to 
create, she must be willing to sacrifice.  “But the way to all creativity lies through readiness 
to sacrifice.”96  The person who refuses this sacrifice is on a path that “. . . inevitably 
undermines its own creative powers, for creativeness presupposes sacrifice.”97 
In summary, creativity begins with the free person in union with God through the 
Spirit.  As the process of creativity develops (what Berdiaev refers to as „inner creativity‟), 
the person is required to exercise imagination, contemplation, and humility.  Having 
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exercised these disciplines the person is prepared to engage in the actual manifestation of the 
creative act – what Berdiaev terms „outer creativity‟. 
 
2.  Outer Creativity 
 
Berdiaev uses the term „outer creativity‟ to designate the embodiment of the creative 
act within the phenomenal world.  Outer creativeness highlights a central dilemma for 
Berdiaev.  If inner creativity is the apex of creativeness, what value is there for the creative 
act in the phenomenal world?  The answer to this question was to change during Berdiaev‟s 
career, yet his overall conviction remained constant – outer creativity has value, even though 
it is negatively affected by „objectification‟.  We can examine his thought under the headings 
of objectification, transfiguration, and realization. 
 
A.  Objectification 
Within the phenomenal realm, the key impediment to creativeness is the same 
impediment to freedom – objectification.98  Due to the alienation of the phenomenal from the 
noumenal, objectification is the tragic reality of creativity within the phenomenal.  The 
person‟s attempt to embody what has been inwardly achieved can never fully encapsulate the 
original vision.  Regardless of the person‟s skill, the created product cannot replicate the 
spiritual conception.  “It must emphatically be recognized that failure is the fate that awaits 
all embodiments of the creative fire, in consequence of the fact that it is in the objective world 
that it is given effective realization.”99 
This stance is consistent with Berdiaev‟s bifurcated world-view.  He is unwilling to 
accept that any creation within the natural world, whether it be material or intellectual, can 
equal its original spiritual conception.  The fallen world always limits creativeness.  
“Objectification is adaptation to the condition of this world.  It is a concession made by 
freedom of spirit to the necessity of the world.  It is an alienation and cooling down.”100  This 
does not mean that creativity manifested has no value; rather it is to propound that creativity 
suffers a reduction in value as it is embodied.
101
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In one of his final works, however, Berdiaev begins to modify this position, as we see 
in the following statement: 
There is an inward creative act, and there is the created product, the outward 
disclosure of the creative act.  I have written a great deal on this subject.  Here I shall 
say what is necessary on a new aspect of the matter.  It is most important to elucidate 
the question of whether the created embodiment is an objectification or whether we 
ought to distinguish between embodiment and objectification.
102
 
 
This „new aspect‟ is an important move for Berdiaev – objectification is no longer absolute.  
By opposing the term „embodiment‟ to „objectification‟, Berdiaev attempts to modulate his 
long standing proposition that the materiality of creation always results in objectification. 
In this development „embodiment‟ indicates a created realization where the „infinite‟ 
shines through the „finite‟ image – within the created realization, the noumenal influence can 
be detected.  This is not to say that embodiment circumvents objectification; the tragedy of 
objectification remains.
103
 
Yet, even with this limitation, Berdiaev maintains that the created realization still 
possesses value and potential.  “Creative power is noumenal in its origin but it is in the 
phenomenal world that it reveals itself.  The product of creative power belongs to the 
phenomena, but the noumenal also shines through in those phenomena, the eternal is also in 
them.”104  When the noumenal is revealed within the created realization, the realization can 
be regarded as „embodied object‟. This shift in thought results in a new focus where the 
created realization is now seen as a necessary outcome of creativity.  “Creative activity 
presupposes matter in the world, in nature, in society and in the soul; it is bound up with 
them.”105 
Consequently, within the created object two principles co-exist – the noumenal and 
the objectified.  Berdiaev:  
Beethoven makes a symphony and thereupon in this creation . . . people discover 
„objective‟ regulating principles.  But the creative activity of Beethoven ought to have 
led to the whole world‟s breaking into sound like a symphony.  And in the same way 
the creative power of a genuine philosopher should have led to the changing of the 
world and not merely to the enrichment of it by new and expensive books.
106
 
 
Embodied creative realization is a creation where the noumenal has not been negated 
by objectification.  Because of the existence of the noumenal within embodied creation, the 
                                                 
102
 BE, 180 (Italics mine). 
103
 BE, 181. 
104
 BE, 185. 
105
 TNE, 82. 
106
 BE, 181. 
119 
 
realization points beyond the phenomenal realm.  By pointing beyond the phenomenal realm 
and revealing the reality of the noumenal, embodied creativity also contributes to the 
overcoming of the phenomenal realm.  Berdiaev: 
Every creative act, whether moral or social, whether in the sphere of art or in the 
realm of knowledge, is an act which has its share in the coming of the end of the 
world, it is a flight upwards towards a different world, it makes a new plan for 
existence. . . . The creative act of man is an answer to the call of God, it ought to 
prepare the way for the end of this world and the beginning of another.
107
 
 
Embodied creativity is “therefore, eschatological.”108  It is eschatological because 
embodied creativity gives “bodily form to its images of the other world, to its ecstasy, its fire, 
its transcending experience, its communion with another life; and it is obliged to do this in 
accordance with the laws of this world.”109  The eschatological element is further emphasized 
in Berdiaev‟s final work (published posthumously), in which the term „symbolization‟ is used 
instead of „embodiment‟. He writes, 
It is very important to understand the difference between symbolization and 
objectification.  Symbolization always provides signs of another world.  It does not 
remain within the closed circle of this world.  But symbolization is not actual 
realization and it is of the utmost importance to grasp the truth that it is not 
realization, though there are in it reflections of another world and it foreshows the 
transfiguration of this world.
110
 
 
The use of the term „symbolic‟ can be helpful in understanding how creativity is 
eschatological.
111
  It is eschatological because by „symbolizing‟ a higher reality it 
demonstrates that the phenomenal is not the final reality.  From an eschatological perspective, 
symbolic (embodied) creativity is an important event within the phenomenal realm as it acts 
as a marker of a spiritual reality by embodying a noumenal presence. 
Since this symbolic creativity contains the noumenal within it, and directs the 
attention of the phenomenal to the noumenal, it possesses a value that is eternal.  Berdiaev 
observes, “Creative failure in this world is a sad and tragic thing.  But there is success on the 
grand scale in the fact that the results of every true creative act of man enter into the 
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Kingdom of God.”112  True creativity then has a lasting significance, since creative acts, 
which are embodied, will be integrated into the Kingdom. 
Berdiaev expands this position to assert that embodied creativity not only reveals the 
noumenal and is eternal, but creativity also functions as the means by which the agent, acting 
in unison with God, prepares the way for the Basileia.  The success of the creative act “lies in 
the preparation it makes for the transformation of the world, for the Kingdom of God.”113  To 
address this issue we now turn to the idea of transfiguration. 
 
B.  Transfiguration 
Throughout his corpus, Berdiaev maintains that transfiguration is what the human 
must look toward and God desires; Berdiaev considers transfiguration to be an axial theme 
for Christianity.  “Nevertheless for Christian thought the primary idea is not that of progress 
or development, but of illumination and transfiguration.”114  He believes that Orthodox 
thought clearly demonstrates this. 
The central idea of the Eastern Patristic Fathers was the idea of theosis, of deification 
of the creature, transfiguration of the world and cosmos and not personal salvation.  
Not by accident the greatest Eastern teachers of the Church, inclined towards the idea 
of apokatastasis, not only St. Clement of Alexandria and Origen, but also St. Gregory 
of Nyssa, St. Gregory of Nazianzen, St. Maximos the Confessor.
115
 
 
The person‟s “creative role in the transformation of the world” is one of Berdiaev‟s 
“most original themes,” Spinka writes.116  Berdiaev‟s combination of Orthodox thought with 
his vision of freedom and creativeness produces a unique synthesis – human creativeness 
becomes an integral part of the transfiguration God is enacting.  Copleston observes that “. . . 
Berdyaev saw what is called the second coming of Christ „as dependent on the creative act of 
man‟.”117 
Because embodied creativity advances transfiguration, Berdiaev considers it to be 
„eschatologically realistic‟. “Truly creative realism is eschatological realism.  It takes the line 
not of reflecting the natural world and not of adjustment to it, but of changing and 
transforming the world.”118  Eschatological realism then connotes the world yet to come, a 
                                                 
112
 BE, 187. 
113
 BE. 188. 
114
 FS, 315. 
115
 Berdiaev, “СПАСЕНІЕ И ТВОРЧЕСТВО,” 34. 
116
 Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev, 46.  See also Calian, Significance of Eschatology, 122. 
117
 Copleston, Philosophy in Russia, 386-387. 
118
 BE, 192.  See also Calian, Significance of Eschatology, 59. 
121 
 
world where the bifurcation between the phenomenal and the noumenal is overcome.  A 
created act that presages and helps initiate the Basileia is eschatologically real.
119
 
The full implication of Berdiaev‟s theory of theandric freedom and creativity is 
revealed at this juncture.  Theandric freedom not only makes possible embodied creative acts, 
but these acts also allow God‟s intentions for the world to be made manifest.  The 
relationship between God and human being is synergistic – “It is not only God Who makes 
all things new, it is man too.”120  Continuous with this idea, Berdiaev considers creative 
action to be the fundamental action a theandrically free person can undertake.  This is true not 
only for the maturation of the person – the creative act makes possible the person‟s exercise 
of freedom – but also for God‟s design for the restoration of the cosmos, wherein creative 
acts are used to prepare the way for the Basileia.  Creativeness is a divine-human action that 
has Divine and human implications. 
The basis for this belief in the potential of creativity is in two parts.  First, creativity is 
linked with transfiguration because it represents a noumenal presence within the world. 
His [the person‟s] noumenal essence remains in him.  And in acts which take their rise 
from that noumenal essence he can change the world. . . . The eschatological outlook, 
the transformation of the world, is a possibility precisely because there is a noumenal 
basis within the concrete life of the world. . . .”121 
 
Embodied creativity creates an intermediary space, a place where the „spiritual‟ and „natural‟ 
are more closely united.
122
  When the person gives form to creativity (providing the person 
follows the aforementioned disciplines to maintain communion with God) embodied 
creativity possesses a transcendent quality since it attempts to unite, even though in a partial 
way, the phenomenal and the noumenal realms.  In this transcendent space God can work in 
and through the person and his creative act for the preparation of the Basileia.  Berdiaev: 
True creative newness is achieved in existential time, time which is not objectified, 
that is to say it happens in the vertical and not in the horizontal.  But creative acts 
which are accomplished in the vertical are projected upon a plane and are accepted as 
accomplished in historical time.  Thus it is that meta-history enters into history.
123
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Copleston observes that without this contact with the spiritual world (vertical contact) true 
creativity is not possible.
124
 
Secondly, as the person experiences freedom and engages creative acts, consciousness 
is altered and expanded.  The creator perceives the natural world with a new horizon. 
Berdiaev: 
But actively creative events in existential time will have their effects not only in 
heaven but on earth also; they revolutionize history.  The illusions of consciousness 
upon which the so-called „objective world‟ rests can be conquered.  The creative 
power of man as it changes the structure of consciousness, can be not only a 
consolidation of this world, not only a culture, but also a liberation of the world and 
the end of history, that is to say, the establishment of the Kingdom of God, not as a 
symbolic but as a real kingdom.
125
 
 
A person who brings forth embodied creativity that is eschatologically real has a new 
vantage point from which to view the natural world and act within it.  What is possible and 
what is hoped for is not based on „eternal progress‟ or scientific achievement, but on a God 
who desires the restoration of the cosmos and a “world of spirituality, of freedom, love, 
kinship.”126  Consequently, the creator experiences a “spiritual revolution.”127  The person 
whose creative activity is an outgrowth of theandric freedom is a person, according to 
Berdiaev, in whom “resting content with this given world”128 is impossible.  She is a creator 
who seeks the world to come and actively strives to work with God to bring that reality into 
existence. 
Embodied creativity that „anticipates‟ God‟s transfiguration is not a renunciation of 
the natural world, it is the exact opposite.  Berdiaev envisages the creative act as that which is 
used to restore the world.  “This does not mean that we have to make a break with the world 
or with history, but rather that we participate in their transfiguration.”129  Sabant‟s analysis is 
correct, “Yet man‟s every creative act changes something in the world, brings the 
transfiguration nearer, even when its visible result, in whatever field, only partly corresponds 
with the original creative upsurge.”130  The person‟s free creative act is Berdiaev‟s 
unequivocal hope for how God will overcome the „objective‟ and establish a unified world. 
Hence, we can say, according to Berdiaev, the following concerning the creative act: 
i. Embodied creativity requires theandric freedom. 
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ii. Embodied creativity is dependent upon the material of the natural realm for 
creativity to take realization. 
iii. Embodied created realization is creativity manifested in the natural 
(phenomenal) realm while disclosing the spiritual (noumenal) realm. 
iv. Whenever the spiritual is revealed it is an eschatological event because it 
proclaims a world that is yet to be fully realized.  “Creative power anticipates 
the transfiguration of the world.”131  Embodied creativity is, therefore, 
„eschatologically real‟. 
v. By partially uniting the spiritual and natural realms the creative act has a 
transcendent quality, which God uses to prepare the way for the Basileia. 
 
Having established the tragic and transfigurative elements of creativity we can now 
turn our examination to what Berdiaev considers to be lasting creative acts. 
 
C.  Realization 
The term „realization‟ is used to designate the product or result of the creative 
process, for creativity results in a realized „some-thing‟.132  Utilizing the aforementioned 
disciplines the person reaches a point of culmination, a point where some thing, whether 
material, intellectual, or spiritual, takes shape; “. . . the creating mind cannot remain within 
itself, it must issue out of itself.”133  This „issuing out‟ is the outcome, for Berdiaev, of the 
creative process.  Creativeness is not a theoretical exercise – it is a striving to bring the 
original vision to some type of realization; even if the realization cannot equal the original 
vision. 
Berdiaev‟s eschatological vision – a vision where embodied creativity is integrated 
into the Basileia – enables him to conceive of the manifested realization as something which 
possesses intrinsic value, even though it is flawed.  The flaw is that the manifested realization 
cannot equal the original vision due to objectification („cooling down‟), but it still has value 
because “the noumenal shines through. . . .”134  Following from this, Berdiaev is able to 
conceptualize the creative act as a moment of transcendence, an „upward‟ movement of the 
person to God, and also as a „downward‟ movement as well, where the creator turns her 
attention to the natural realm.  
. . . creative activity is not only all this, it is also a turning towards men and women, 
towards society, towards this world, it is the attraction of the creative act downwards.  
And here a man must display dexterity, he must be a master of artistry in every 
respect, not merely in „art‟ in the strict sense of the word, but in science as well, and 
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in creativeness in the social and moral spheres, and again in the technical side of 
life.
135
 
 
The person who brings forth an embodied creative act that becomes realized is a 
person who, according to Berdiaev, understands the importance of both the phenomenal and 
noumenal realms.  This is a critical point in his thought.  Berdiaev‟s work has been criticized 
for ignoring the „material‟ in favor of the „spiritual‟.136  His language at times supports this 
charge with his emphasis on transcendence and the realities of objectification.  Yet, in the 
end, if we consider Berdiaev‟s project from a broad perspective we see his concern for both 
movements of creativity, the movement upwards, which is towards God, and the movement 
downwards, which is focused on the world.
137
 
According to Berdiaev, the „downward‟ side of creativity, the realization of the 
creative act, is most easily seen in the sphere of art.  In one of his earlier works Berdiaev goes 
so far as to say that “Artistic creativeness best reveals the meaning of the creative act.  Art is 
primarily a creative sphere.”138  Even though this position is modified in later works, artistic 
creation is a recurring theme throughout his corpus.
139
  This is especially noticeable when 
Berdiaev wants to provide examples of „true‟ creativeness. 
As already discussed in chapter four, Berdiaev looks to the Renaissance (specifically 
the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries) as the clearest example of theandric freedom, and 
therefore, of embodied (true) creativity.  He writes, “In the Renaissance there was an 
extraordinary uprising of human creativeness: the problem of creativity stands out with an 
acuteness never felt before.”140  The Renaissance provides an example of “man‟s creative 
power never before witnessed.”141  He interprets creativeness during this time as a “stormy 
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conflict of opposing elements, the eternal struggle of Christian transcendence with pagan 
immanence, of romantic incompleteness with classic finality.”142 
It is the early period, the Trecento, which Berdiaev holds in particularly high regard.  
This is a time of creativity that is “tinged with Christian colour.”  The work of Giotto “and all 
the early religious paintings of Italy, Arnolfi and others”143 represents, for Berdiaev, a 
definitive example of embodied creativity.  This is, however, not the only example of 
embodied creativity from this period.  Indeed, equally important is the work of Dante, 
Joachim of Fiore, and St. Francis.  In these latter three „artists‟ the ideals were established for 
the Renaissance, and according to Berdiaev, were to be ignored later with tragic 
consequences.  “The Renaissance of the fifteenth century, the quattrocento, did not realize the 
ideals of Dante and St. Francis, did not continue the religious art of Giotto – the fifteenth 
century revealed the struggle between the Christian and pagan elements in man.”144 
We see that Berdiaev‟s interest in the period is not only in the visual arts; embodied 
creativity is beyond the traditional definitions of art – the „realization‟ of embodied creativity 
can be that which establishes ideals for the artist.  It is not insignificant that Berdiaev 
highlights the role of St. Francis.  It is through the „religious genius‟ of St. Francis, among 
others, that the creative eruption of the Renaissance occurs.  The creativity of St. Francis, 
Dante, Joachim, et al. results in change, in newness, in value being added to the world around 
them. 
Berdiaev sees similar results of embodied creativity in the work of Dostoevsky, 
Tolstoy, Ibsen, and the Symbolists of his day (e.g., Ivanov and Byelii), as well as Beethoven.  
In each case Berdiaev believes that there are points of transcendence in their created works 
that can be used in God‟s transfigurative work.  This is because the material realizations that 
they give to their original vision reveal the noumenal within the phenomenal.  Reflecting on 
creators such as these, and what they produced, Berdiaev can write, 
Art is not a reflexion of the world of ideas in the world of sense as idealistic 
philosophy has supposed.  Art is creative transfiguration, not yet real transfiguration, 
but an anticipation of that transfiguration.  The beauty of a dance, a poem, a 
symphony, or a picture enters into eternal life.  Art is not passive but active, and in 
this sense theurgic.
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The obvious problem of using art as an example of creativity, in a discourse that 
assumes God expects creativity from all humans, is that the aforementioned creators are 
exceptional and are not representative of all humanity.  They are creators who possess an 
inner and outer genius in a specific field.  Hence it is important to remember that art is one 
example of creativity for Berdiaev.  His reasoning, based on inner and outer creative acts, 
provides other possibilities. 
Because creativity begins as an inner creative act, it is not initially dependent upon a 
specific material realization.
146
  Accordingly, creativity is not solely equated with a material 
object (so, a person who cannot produce a painting, book, or musical composition cannot be 
said to lack creativity).  Focusing on the inner aspects of creativity (engagement with the 
Spirit, imagination, contemplation, and humility), Berdiaev suggests other demonstrations of 
creativity.  The two most prominent areas where creativity is manifested are knowledge and 
love. 
As already discussed in chapter two, the highest degree of knowledge, for Berdiaev, is 
„integral‟ – knowledge that incorporates the experience of the person‟s intellectual, affective 
and volitional life, where reason is subordinated but not eliminated and „intuition‟ is highly 
valued.  Integral knowledge is creative in that it depends on an engagement with the Spirit, it 
requires imagination (openness to new ideas and concepts), contemplation, and humility.  As 
knowledge is discovery it contains newness and therefore its concepts are original to the 
knower.  “The mystery of knowledge is that in the act of knowing the knower transcends the 
object of knowledge.  Knowledge always means transcendence of the object and creative 
possession of it.”147  In this respect Berdiaev‟s thought resonates with Buber‟s differentiation 
between how the subject apprehends the Thou and the It.  Berdiaev:  
Thus we must ask ourselves whether intuition, considered as the highest form of 
knowledge, is a creative act, or whether it is merely a passive reflection of reality? . . . 
I maintain, on the contrary, that intuition is essentially active.  It is the essence of 
creative activity in the depths of knowledge, and it postulates creative inspiration.
148
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To integrally know is creative.  Even though no material object is produced, integral 
knowledge is an intentional act, based on freedom, which results in newness and is an 
addition to the world.  Ergo, it is a creative act.
149
 
Love is the second area where creativity is manifested.  Whereas the embodied 
realization anticipates transfiguration, and integral knowledge is an important example of 
creativity, it is love that is the ultimate demonstration of creativity.  In discussing the 
relationship between knowledge and love, Berdiaev writes, “To pursue knowledge without 
any consciousness of love, merely to seek power, is a form of demonism.”150  Love is not 
only related to the pursuit of knowledge, it is of pivotal importance to Berdiaev‟s wider 
project. 
This is because, Berdiaev maintains, in the new age, the aeon of the Holy Spirit, it 
will be love, and not obedience, upon which spirituality is formulated.  Love, God‟s love for 
the world and the person‟s love for God and others, will be a creative force that overcomes 
the objectivity that degrades the cosmos.  “Christian love itself should be conceived as a great 
revelation of creativeness in life, as a creation of new life.”151 
He believes that Feuerbach‟s insight into knowledge and love contributes to his own 
thought.  Specifically, he focuses on Feuerbach‟s conception that “knowledge of being is 
attained through love, that knowing man is the loving man, that love is being.”152  Berdiaev 
considers Feuerbach‟s atheism as a “dialectical moment in the purification and development 
of the Christian consciousness.”153  This purification, for Berdiaev, is the reconfiguration of 
love over obedience. 
Berdiaev narrowly interprets a vast majority of Christian practice as placing a far 
greater emphasis on obedience than love.  Such an emphasis has the detrimental consequence 
of degrading the person (an emphasis on obedience treats the person as an object) and 
denying creativity.  A spirituality based on love overcomes these problems, Berdiaev 
believes. 
Feuerbach‟s atheism is a standing reproach to the old Christian consciousness, to 
theological doctrines which insisted on obedience rather than on Christian love; for it 
was the duty of Christians to have affirmed the truths discovered by Feuerbach.  Love 
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is creativeness, knowledge is creativeness, the transfiguration of nature is 
creativeness, freedom is creativeness.  Obedience, on the other hand, was a means of 
stifling creativeness and inspiration, an instrument of man‟s humiliation.154 
 
Created realization, art, knowledge, and love all demonstrate, according to Berdiaev, 
the potency of creativity in the phenomenal world, and the implications for God‟s design.  As 
we conclude our examination of Berdiaev‟s „sketch‟ of creativity, and by extension his 
thought on freedom, one final note must be made as to the quotidian implications of his 
thought for the Christian, what he terms the ethics of creativeness. 
 
D.  Ethics 
Berdiaev writes, “The ethics of creativity is based on the creative gifts of humanity.  
The creative act has a moral significance, and a moral act is a creative act.”155  Creativity is 
moral because it is God‟s intention and calling for the person.  “Creativeness and a creative 
attitude to life as a whole is not man‟s right, it is his duty.  It is a moral imperative that 
applies in every department of life.”156  All creativity Vallon observes “is ipso facto a moral 
act.”157 
Since freedom and creativity are a duty – God‟s calling upon humanity –embodied 
creativity is a positive moral act as it fulfils God‟s calling to create.158  Consequently, 
embodied creativity not only contains lasting significance for the eschaton, it can also be said 
to contain an ethical value for the present day.  A creative act is a moral act when the creator 
takes the talent God has given her and develops it in ways that are unique to her creational 
design.
159
  In this way she answers God‟s call and creativity is manifested. 160 
Berdiaev‟s assertion that creativeness contains an ethical dimension is consonant with 
his overall project.  The ultimate goal of creativeness is not the production of an object.
161
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True creativeness will always have a transcendent value and potency.  Subsequently, the 
ethical dimension is not only concerned with following God‟s call, it is also concerned with 
overcoming the fallen state of the world that the creator inhabits.
162
  Hence, McLachlan is 
correct when he writes, “Berdyaev‟s ethics of freedom and creativity is an ethics of 
compassion.”163 
 
3.  Interdependence 
 
In the beginning of the chapter it was noted that „existential liberty‟ is a foundational 
element for the creative act.  Now that we have examined Berdiaev‟s conception of the 
creative act we can consider the second way in which existential liberty relates to freedom. 
As we have seen, when the person acts creatively Berdiaev believes that the person is 
acting in a self-determined manner.  The foundational elements for creativity (meonic 
freedom, the imago Dei, God‟s „silent expectation‟), combined with the various practices of 
inner and outer creativity, create the potential for the person to act in ways that are influenced 
by external variables (e.g., God, others, materiality of the world) while remaining non-
determined by them.  This is a critical point in Berdiaev‟s thought.  To assert existential 
liberty (non-determination), which enables self-determination, requires Berdiaev to explain 
how the person can act in a non-determined manner; i.e. act in ways that are internally, rather 
than externally, determined. 
We can see that the creative act is, for Berdiaev, the means for understanding how a 
theandrically free person can act, and therefore live, as a free person in union with others in a 
world of necessity.
164
  If a person can participate in a creative act the person is able to act in a 
self-determined measure.  If a person cannot participate in a creative act, he cannot act with 
freedom. 
So, although Berdiaev, in typical fashion, can assign the importance of creativity to a 
number of issues (e.g. creativity is necessary for transcendence,
165
 creativity indicates the 
person‟s value,166 creativity is what God expects from the person167) at the base of these 
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claims, is the fact that Berdiaev understands the creative act as the primary means by which 
a „free‟ person can act within the world.  “Man‟s destiny is linked up with that of the world; 
he must bear the burden of the world, he must be creatively active in as well as free from the 
world.”168  Creativity is the means by which a theandrically free person may act in a world 
bound by necessity.  This proposition is not intended to nullify the preceding claims (i.e. that 
creativity is important for transcendence, value, and God‟s expectation of the person); rather 
the premise of this insight is that creativity is essential to Berdiaev‟s understanding of 
embodied freedom. 
To say that „creativity‟ and „freedom‟ are interdependent one must bear in mind that 
both these concepts, for Berdiaev, are dynamic categories.  In parallel with his view of 
freedom, it is possible to extrapolate from Berdiaev‟s thought the notion that creativity can be 
seen as a spectrum of possible „acts‟: 
 
Externally determined acts          Novel acts          Creative acts 
 
On the negative end of the spectrum are actions that are externally determined, i.e. 
actions that are not „creative‟ but are carried out due to some sort of external force (societal, 
familial, religious, etc.).  Moving along the spectrum we find actions that can be seen as 
„novel‟ acts.  These acts are based on „self-will‟, „newness‟, and „freedom‟.  Moving further, 
we see that the most positive acts are creative acts.  These are actions that build on „novel‟ 
acts and incorporate the aspects of „inner‟ and „outer‟ creativity.  Creative acts are most 
closely associated with a theandrically free person. 
The interdependence of freedom and creativity, then, is an interplay of two multi-
phased concepts.  As a person moves along the spectrum of freedom they can also move 
along the spectrum of creativity.  A free person may only respond with novelty to a given 
situation, but the free person always has the opportunity for his novelty to develop into 
creativity, depending on multiple variables.  The importance of creativity is that it allows the 
person to function in ways that are unique to the person. 
Therefore, „creativity‟ is necessary since Berdiaev‟s conception of freedom is focused 
upon the person either being „self‟-determined, or moving to that state.169  If the person is to 
act in ways that are not external to herself, those acts must be creative acts – acts based on 
                                                 
168
 SR, 98 (Italics mine). 
169
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, the reader must bear in mind that self-determination for 
Berdiaev is proposed in a relational context.  The person who exists in sobornost‟ with God and others has the 
potential for self-determination. 
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freedom, which originate with the person.  If the person cannot act creatively then her actions 
can only arise from external influences, and this is antithetical to freedom.  Since freedom 
exists, creativity is possible; without freedom, creativity is negated.  Also, it is possible to act 
freely in a „world of determinism‟ because the person can act in creative ways.  This 
interdependence is essential for Berdiaev – freedom is required for the creative act and 
creativity is required for a free person to act in the world. 
 
§5  SUMMARY 
 
Berdiaev‟s „sketch‟ of creativity is a complex proposal that seeks to build on his 
vision of freedom.  Within Berdiaev‟s thought, the creative act can be understood as a 
development of embodied freedom, as creativity is the means by which a theandrically free 
person can act in a „world of necessity‟.  In this chapter we have examined the beginning 
stages of creativity and the foundations Berdiaev proposes for the development of creativity.  
We then detailed how Berdiaev conceives creativity occurring within the world through the 
inner and outer creative acts.   To summarize the major points of our discussion: 
i. Creativity, in its beginning stage, can be described as a self-willed act by a 
person that produces some realization (whether material, conceptual, or 
spiritual) of newness, and is dependent on the person‟s freedom.  I have termed 
this beginning stage the „novel act‟. 
ii. The foundations for the creative act to occur are: meonic freedom, the imago 
Dei, and God‟s „silent‟ expectation. 
iii. As with his vision of freedom, the creative act must be considered from a 
developmental perspective – the novel act can progress into a creative act.  For 
this transition to occur there are core elements that need to be in place, as well 
as practices required by the person – the inner and outer creative acts. 
iv. Berdiaev considers the Renaissance to be one of the greatest examples of 
creativity, an historical demonstration of what happens when creators create in 
communion with God. 
v. As God calls the person to create, Berdiaev propounds that creativity should be 
considered an ethical mandate issued by God. 
vi. Creativity, like freedom, can be viewed as a spectrum where the individual‟s 
actions move from being externally determined, to novel acts, to creative acts. 
vii. I have proposed that the „creative act‟ and „freedom‟ are interdependent 
concepts within Berdiaev‟s thought.  „Freedom‟ is necessary for „creativity‟ to 
occur, and, equally important, the „creative act‟ is the means by which a „free‟ 
person acts within a „deterministic‟ world.  Thus, according to Berdiaev‟s 
vision, any theory that posits freedom for the person must also recognize the 
necessity of creativity. 
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The critique of Berdiaev‟s view of creativity, through the work of Moltmann, will 
critically challenge Berdiaev‟s exalted view of the person as creator, the possibility of the 
creative act occurring outside of the „natural world‟, what the imago Dei (which includes 
„geniality‟) means for the person, and how creativity relates to transfiguration.  From this 
critique we will emphasize the significant contributions Berdiaev‟s thought can make to the 
theological discussion of freedom.  Specifically, the idea that freedom and creativity are 
interdependent concepts, and a view of the person that includes the role of creator with God, 
will be developed. 
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Chapter 6 – Jürgen Moltmann‟s Theology of Freedom 
 
§1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  Berdiaev‟s Theological Orientation 
 
At the beginning of chapter two it was stated: “Berdiaev‟s vision is that all individuals 
possess a rudimentary form of freedom.  This freedom will either develop through 
communion with God and others, resulting in personhood and creative acts, or it will 
deteriorate through egocentricity, resulting in objectification and slavery.”1  It has been 
demonstrated that this „vision‟ relies on specific theological principles for its framework.  As 
we have seen, the central theological principles are: 
i. Freedom can only develop in relation with God and others. 
ii. Freedom is dependent upon a triune God – a Father who out of love and desire 
for the „other‟ creates, a Son (God-man) who redeems, and the Holy Spirit who 
enlivens and makes freedom possible. 
iii. Creativity, which is a result of freedom, is ultimately grounded in creating with 
God. 
iv. Berdiaev‟s view of freedom has as its horizon the coming reality of God‟s 
kingdom. 
 
So, while Berdiaev does place a substantial emphasis on a „philosophical‟ 
understanding of the person as an autonomous, self-determining subject whose freedom is 
attributable, in part, to the Ungrund, his vision of freedom is also dependent upon theological 
principles for its formulation and development.  Therefore, as we discussed in chapter 1, 
although Berdiaev considers himself to be an existentialist and his work, by extension, to be 
an existentialist philosophy of freedom and creativity, his vision of freedom is a „theological‟ 
work as well. This is evident in the fact that Berdiaev‟s view draws significantly from 
theology, and his ultimate concern – person, community, and God freely existing in 
communion – is obviously theological. 
It is accepted that Berdiaev would most likely object strenuously to his work being 
classified as theology since he did not hold theology in high regard.
2
  Wernham aptly 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 2, 2. 
2
 Berdiaev maintained that “Divinity cannot be rationally determined and remains outside the scope of 
logical concepts.”  FS, 64.  Since „Divinity‟ cannot be determined rationally and he believes that most theology 
is „rationalist and anti-symbolic‟ (FS, 68), theology can never truly understand the Divine.  His favorite targets 
are the theologies of Aquinas, which is „a form of rationalism‟ (FS, 293) and Barth, where Barth‟s „dialectic 
theology is the dehumanization of Christianity‟.  FMW, 31-32.  Although Moltmann does not share Berdiaev‟s 
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describes Berdiaev‟s position, noting Berdiaev‟s forthrightness: “I am not a theologian, and 
my approach to and formulation of these problems are not theological.  Rather, I speak with 
the voice of free religious thought.”3  However, Wernham goes on to rightly question whether 
Berdiaev‟s protests are enough to prevent his work from being seen as „theology‟. Wernham: 
“Yet it is not idle to raise the question whether Berdyaev‟s own judgment on the matter can 
be allowed to stand.”4 
Berdiaev was wary of theology not only because he considered it to be „rational‟ but, 
as Wernham points out, also because Berdiaev was convinced that theology was constrained 
by the Church, whereas philosophy was a „free‟ enterprise.  Theology must answer to the 
“organized collective, which is invariably the source of orthodoxy”5 and therefore is 
hindered, in Berdiaev‟s outlook, from seeking the truth that is revealed to individual persons.  
This view, which Wernham correctly describes as a “limited and inadequate conception”6 of 
theology, demonstrates Berdiaev‟s narrow perspective of theology, which we need not 
accept. 
Regardless of Berdiaev‟s biases,7 in a contemporary context his thought does fit 
within the broad enterprise of what is today considered „theological‟.  Whether one considers 
his work to be religious philosophy, a theology, or some type of hybrid, what is clear is that 
his vision of freedom is theological. 
To assess the theological tenability of his thought we will use the work of Jürgen 
Moltmann, a theologian who has devoted considerable thought to the issue of freedom, and 
who has also dialogued with Berdiaev‟s work.  In examining Moltmann‟s theology of 
freedom we will encounter similarities of thought as well as important differences that will be 
used to critique Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom.  From this critique it will be shown that while 
Berdiaev‟s existential-mystical approach has discernible flaws, the basic content of his 
                                                                                                                                                        
narrow view of theology, nor Berdiaev‟s interpretation of these theologians, there is some congruence with 
Berdiaev‟s concern.  Early in his career Moltmann observes, “Many believe that Christian theology has become 
irrelevant.  It has become introvert, orthodox, traditionalist, or personalistic.  Occupied only with itself, it has 
lost contact with reality.”  RRF, 200.  From this critique of contemporary theology, he will propose that there 
needs to be a “reorganization of the theological system itself and a reorientation of the entire theological 
endeavor.”  RRF, 200.  In a more recent work, he writes, “There are theological systems which do not merely 
aim to be free of contradictions in themselves, but which aspire to remain uncontroverted from outside too.  In 
these systems, theology becomes a strategy of self-immunization.”  ET, xx.  There is obvious similarity here 
between the two authors regarding a theology that places a high value on reason and systemization. 
3
 DR, 177, as quoted in Wernham, Two Russian Thinkers, 3.  For Wernham‟s argument on Berdiaev as 
a theologian see pp. 3-11. 
4
 Wernham, Two Russian Thinkers, 3. 
5
 Ibid., 4. 
6
 Ibid., 10. 
7
 Berdiaev‟s bias is certainly shaped by his idea of philosophy suffering under the “tortures and 
persecutions” of religious authorities.  See SS, 4-5. 
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thought – what freedom means for God and the person – remains distinctly relevant for 
theology today.  
 
2.  Moltmann 
 
Freedom is a compelling subject for Moltmann and even though his view on freedom 
has notable differences with Berdiaev‟s, in the end freedom holds a comparable value for 
each writer.  It is significant that both began their intellectual careers grappling with Marxist 
theory; from this position they both seek to answer the question of freedom in light of the 
Christian understanding of God in a world where suffering appears to be ever-present.
8
  
Neither author presents a systematic theological interpretation of freedom.  Both believe that 
the Christian view of freedom must be comprehensible not only to the Church, but equally 
important, to the world outside of the Church.  In general, they both contend that to be alive 
is to strive for freedom, that freedom is what God desires for the created order, and 
corresponding to this, freedom has always been, and always will be, a core concern for the 
individual and society. 
To broadly introduce Moltmann‟s concept of freedom, we can say that he envisages 
Christianity as a religion of freedom.  To have a relationship with God is to experience 
freedom and to realize how fettered our lives can be.  Moltmann claims that our “experiences 
of God awaken in us the hope for life, we begin to rebel against the apathy within us and the 
barbed wire round about us.”9  The Christian faith, according to Moltmann, enables people to 
see potentialities all around as they view the world in relation to God; to no longer accept the 
world as it is.
10
  This understanding, he argues, is not solely a development of modernity, but 
the reality of experiencing a triune God and the “written promises of freedom” contained 
within scripture.
11
  Hence, for Moltmann, the „experience‟ of the person and scripture are the 
primary building blocks for his view of freedom, and for that matter, for his entire theological 
enterprise.
12
 
                                                 
8
  As with Berdiaev, the ghost of Ivan Karamazov hangs over Moltmann‟s work as well, e.g., “The 
suffering of a single innocent child is an irrefutable rebuttal of the notion of the almighty and kindly God in 
heaven.” TKG, 47. 
9
 SL, 104-05. 
10
 SL, 115. 
11
 RRF, 98. 
12
 As the experience of the person always occurs within a given context, he can write, “It [theology] has 
to be both „in accordance with Scripture‟ and contextual.”  ET, 15.  The importance of „experience‟ for 
Moltmann is reflected in the fact that his final major work, in which he addresses his history and methodology, 
is Experiences in Theology 
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Moltmann‟s emphasis on „experience‟ arises from his view of faith being a „living 
relationship‟. Because of this, the theologian‟s task is one carried out within a relationship 
with God and others, which means that theology not only contributes to faith, but that faith 
(i.e. the experience of faith) contributes to the theological endeavor.  Consequently, the 
theologian‟s experience of God and of God‟s presence (and sometimes God‟s seeming 
absence) in the world becomes an important element for theological reflection.  Moltmann 
writes, “Theologians will bring the whole of their existence into their search for knowledge 
about God.  „Subjectivity is truth.‟  That postulate of Kierkegaard‟s is true at least for 
theologians.”13 
Although „experience‟ is primarily subjective, Moltmann wants to distinguish 
between the subjectivity of modernity and the subjectivity of faith.  He describes the 
subjectivity of modernity as a “„culture of narcissism‟, which makes the self its own prisoner 
and supplies it merely with self-repetitions and self-confirmations.”14  Whereas the 
subjectivity of faith values the experience of the person within “the over-riding history of 
God, and only finds its meaning in that context.”15  Hence „experience‟ is not the sole 
determinative element in theological reflection but neither is experience negated.  Rather the 
experience of the theologian becomes part of an approach that seeks to incorporate 
experience into the larger web of revelation that God gives through Spirit and Word. 
Regarding scripture, the twin themes of „exodus‟ and „resurrection‟ are important 
reference points for Moltmann‟s view of freedom.  The Biblical narratives are “histories of 
exile and exodus, freedom and estrangement, homecoming and indwelling.”16  The Exodus 
narrative, Israel‟s deliverance from the powers of Egypt, is “the historical foundation for 
liberty,”17 as it reveals a God who wants people to be free – free from political, economic, 
and spiritual oppression. 
In the Resurrection God breaks the power of oppression at a fundamental level.  Not 
only does God deliver people from oppression, but through the Resurrection the powers of 
sin and death are overcome.
18
  Consequently, when we identify God as „the Lord‟, we are 
acknowledging a God who delivers people for freedom, and is the assurance of freedom.
19
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 ET, 23. 
14
 TKG, 5. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 ET, 30. 
17
 SL, 114. 
18
 Jürgen Moltmann, “Freedom in the Light of Hope,” Southeast Asian Journal of Theology 15 (1973), 
14. 
19
 ET, 34. 
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Understanding freedom as a central tenet of scripture, Moltmann claims that theology is 
rightly understood as a discourse about people “on the road to the promised land of liberty 
where God dwells.”20  Theology must be concerned with freedom and liberation in all its 
manifold aspects. 
Freedom, Moltmann acknowledges, is difficult to define since we have yet to 
“experience the „kingdom of freedom,‟ i.e., freedom in a truly free world.”21  This difficulty, 
however, does not prevent him from using multiple perspectives to describe freedom.  For 
instance, freedom can be understood as a fundamental part of human subjectivity. 
The first principles and supreme values of the modern world are to be found in the 
self-determination of the determining human subject.  The great discovery of modern 
times is human subjectivity. . . . Every human being is the subject of understanding 
and will, and can freely confront the forces of his or her origin and nature.
22
 
 
Freedom is also the right to resist
23
 and the rubbing against the chains that bind us in un-free 
circumstances.
24
  In the end, “Freedom is not a possession; freedom is an event,”25 an 
experience of life with God and others where we are not constrained. 
Modernist interpretations of freedom would most likely agree with the notion of 
freedom as being „not constrained‟, but would object, Moltmann says, to any idea of freedom 
being relationally dependent.  The freedom modernity advocates is the freedom of the 
individual, which is often interpreted as „freedom of domination‟, i.e. we are free only insofar 
as we can dominate or exercise our will over others.
26
  Counter to this view, he proposes that 
the Christian view of freedom should be focused on the person who is filled with the Holy 
Spirit; so that freedom “means being possessed by the divine energy of life, and participation 
in that energy.”27 
Therefore, in contrast to many popular conceptions of the Christian faith (from 
without as well as within), the experience of God is the experience of freedom.
28
  God is the 
liberator,
29
 and the source for our “unending freedom.”30  To be a follower of Christ, and to 
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participate in the life of the triune God is, as Moltmann frequently reminds us, „to be set free 
for freedom‟.31 
As is readily apparent, freedom is a far-reaching theme within Moltmann‟s work.  
One can view freedom as being interwoven throughout his thought; in his doctrine of 
creation, Christology, pneumatology, et al, we find his concern for freedom.  Since our space 
is limited, and our task specific, we will not be able to pursue the far-reaching implications of 
freedom for his thought.  Our goal will be to outline the main features of his view, focusing 
on what Moltmann believes freedom to be, how it exists, and its relevance for God and the 
created order. 
The primary texts used for this chapter are: Religion, Revolution, and the Future 
(‟69); The Crucified God (‟74); Man (‟74); The Trinity and the Kingdom („81); Humanity in 
God („83); God in Creation („85); The Spirit of Life („93); God for a Secular Society („99); 
and Experiences in Theology („00).  The criterion for selecting these texts was the inclusion 
of works that best expound his view of freedom and the implications of freedom for God and 
the created order; as well as, texts that would span the length of his prolific career so that the 
development of his thought could be traced. 
 
§2  THE GENESIS OF FREEDOM 
 
Moltmann‟s innovations in theology and the creative applications thereof have 
garnered much attention throughout his career.  As we shall see, his view of freedom is 
certainly one of those innovations.  Amidst the praise and criticism his thought generates, it is 
important to remember that at the foundation of his thought on freedom is the thesis that 
freedom exists because God exists, i.e. God is the originator, or giver, of freedom.  In this 
section we will examine the five distinct, yet related factors that I believe comprise 
Moltmann‟s view of freedom.32  These are: God creating „space‟ for creation, the nature of 
the Trinity, the Father‟s passion, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  We will begin with the 
freedom made possible by God‟s creative act. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 “For freedom Christ has set us free.”  Gal. 5: 1. 
32
 Even though Moltmann at one point proposes a „Trinitarian Doctrine of Freedom‟ (see TKG, 212-
222), which could lead to the assumption that three factors (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) make up his view on 
freedom, his thought incorporates other ideas as well.  I am using these five factors as an organizing principle to 
help detail his thought on freedom. 
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1.  Creating Space for Creation 
 
In the beginning was God.  Moltmann believes that we cannot talk about space that 
was outside of God, because God was all.  When he combines this belief with his 
understanding that “every life needs its corresponding living space”33 he arrives at his 
frequently commented upon proposition that God had to create „space‟ in order to create.  
Without the necessary space for creation, all that God created would be part of the Divine, 
since it would exist within that sphere.  To create a self-differentiated cosmos (as opposed to 
a pantheistic cosmos) God „makes room‟ for creation and in so doing „makes liberty‟ possible 
for non-divine beings.
34
  Moltmann speculates that God makes room for creation by 
withdrawing God‟s self in an act of self-limitation; his thought here is influenced by the 
kabalistic doctrine of zimzum. 
 
A.  Zimzum 
Moltmann develops this line of thought with the help of Isaac Luria (d. 1572), who 
utilized the concept of zimzum for his own work.  Moltmann explains: 
Zimzum means concentration and contraction, and signifies a withdrawing of oneself 
into oneself.  Luria was taking up the ancient Jewish doctrine of the Shekinah, 
according to which the infinite God can so contract his presence that he dwells in the 
temple.  But Luria applied it to God and creation.
35
   
 
Moltmann theorizes that by withdrawing a portion of God‟s self, God creates the necessary 
space for creation to occur and to flourish.  “It is only a withdrawal by God into himself that 
can free the space into which God can act creatively.”36 
Thus, God‟s self-limitation is the first step for creation.  When God limits God‟s self, 
“a kind of mystical primordial space”37 is created, which is the nihil that the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo describes.  When God does create, the cosmos exists in relation to God and 
yet has a life of its own; that is, the cosmos is non-divine, and whereas before everything was 
God, now there is God and created life.  In this way God lets creation „be‟.38 
Moltmann posits that Luria‟s vision allows one to conceptualize a God who creates all 
that exists but does not overpower creation by the sheer magnitude of God‟s Being.  The 
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created order can be thought of as being in God, without „falling victim‟ to pantheism.39  
Although Moltmann uses this idea to counter pantheism, his main objective is to describe 
how the created order can be free.  Because God is willing to withdraw God‟s self and create 
space outside of God, the created order has the ability to experience self-determination.  “He 
withdraws his omnipotence in order to set his image, men and women, free.  He allows his 
world to exist in his eternity.”40 
The impetus for this creative activity – the creation of „space‟, followed by the created 
order, and the resultant freedom – is not based on God‟s desire for a self-determined cosmos 
independent of the Divine, rather God creates and endures the “divine kenosis which begins 
with the creation of the world,”41 so that God can exist in relationship with the world.  The 
creation of space, the cosmos, and the gifting of freedom, all flow from God‟s love. 
 
B.  Love 
The horizon for Moltmann‟s work is love – God‟s love for the created order and the 
expectant history when creation fully reciprocates in its love for God.  God‟s love for the 
„other‟ is witnessed in the interrelationship of the Trinity and in God‟s desire for relationship 
with beings outside of the Trinity.
42
  God‟s “love is literally ecstatic love: it leads him to go 
out of himself and to create something which is different from himself but which none the 
less corresponds to him.”43  As God is love, creation exists because God desires to be in 
relationship with God‟s beloved. 
This does not indicate a weakness on God‟s behalf – God is not somehow „less‟ 
because God seeks relationship.  For Moltmann, it indicates the exact opposite, as God is 
willing not only to exercise self-limitation, but also to suffer, so that a beloved might exist.  
This perspective on love in relation ties into his argument for God‟s passibility, which will be 
addressed below; at this juncture our focus remains on what Moltmann perceives to be the 
implications of God‟s love, which not only impacts the created order, but is the reason for its 
existence. 
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 TKG, 110. 
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 TKG, 118 (Italics author). 
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 God‟s desire for the „other‟ is first witnessed in the trinitarian interrelationship between the Father 
and the Son.  “Creation is a part of the eternal love affair between the Father and the Son.  It springs from the 
Father‟s love for the Son and is redeemed by the answering love of the Son for the Father.”  TKG, 59.  This love 
for the „other‟ is the basis for God‟s love for creation. 
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Love is significant for our discussion of his view of freedom because love and 
freedom are interrelated concerns.  A basic feature of love, for Moltmann, whether it is 
Divine love or human love, is the desire for relationship.  Moltmann‟s thought here mirrors 
Berdiaev – love, whether Divine or human, is never self-sufficient.  We cannot say God is 
love and then envisage God existing within God‟s self and only for God‟s self.  As Moltmann 
rhetorically asks, “Can God really be content to be sufficient for himself if he is love?”44  So, 
when Moltmann says God is love this is not only a descriptor of God, but also an explanation 
as to why creation exists and what God waits for from creation – a loving response. 
The idea of „response‟ is an important factor – not only does God desire a relationship 
with created beings, but God waits for the reciprocation of God‟s desire and call.  A loving 
relationship requires response, and this reciprocation must have some form of freedom if it is 
to be a loving relationship.  A loving relationship must be entered freely by both parties; love 
cannot be dictated or forced.  Consequently, if we are to say God desires a relationship with 
created beings, we must also say freedom is a part of the equation – love must be freely given 
and freely received.
45
 
Although God has the power to bring all into existence, God cannot force others to 
love, as that would be the negation of love.  So, God‟s self-limitation not only applies to the 
withdrawing of God‟s self to create space for creation, self-limitation also means creating a 
cosmos that has the ability and the freedom to love and not love. 
. . . from his image in the world the Father can only expect the love that is a free 
response; and in order to make this free response possible, love must concede freedom 
and offer freedom to the beloved.  In order to experience the free response it desires, 
love must wait patiently.  It cannot compel a response by violence.  For the sake of 
freedom, and the love responded to in freedom, God limits and empties himself.  He 
withdraws his omnipotence because he has confidence in the free response of men 
and women.
46
 
 
As God cannot force the created order into a loving relationship with God‟s self, God will go 
so far as suffering for the redemption of creation and the restoration of relationship. 
Love for God and person, then, is a risk, since there is always the option that the 
response may not be the desired one.  In observing what love means for humanity, Moltmann 
writes, “For love leaves us open to wounding and disappointment.  It makes us ready to 
suffer.  It leads us out of isolation into a fellowship with others, with people different from 
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 “Creation exists because the eternal love communicates himself creatively to his Other.  It exists 
because the eternal love seeks fellowship and desires response in freedom.”  TKG, 59. 
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ourselves, and this fellowship is always associated with suffering.”47  As we will see when 
discussing passibility, this idea of risk applies to God as well. 
Thus we see that God‟s creative acts originate in a love for the other.  In this process 
God creates the „space‟ for the other to be free and freely respond to God‟s outpouring of 
love.  In order to preserve this freedom and not force the desired response from the other, 
God places God‟s self at risk and is willing to suffer to redeem creation and create the 
potential for relationship with the Divine.  God‟s willingness to suffer raises one of 
Moltmann‟s well-known themes – God‟s passibility. 
 
C.  The Question of Passibility 
We will examine the specific ways God suffers when we discuss Moltmann‟s view of 
the Father and the Son, at this juncture we will consider Moltmann‟s simple yet complex 
premise – God suffers.48  According to Moltmann, this is a concept that is evident within the 
history of the cross, and evident in the encounter with God‟s love.  God‟s passion is not a 
result of some sort of defect in God‟s nature; the suffering of God arises from God‟s 
willingness to suffer because God is love.  “God does not suffer out of deficiency of being, 
like created beings.  To this extent he is „apathetic‟.  But he suffers from the love which is the 
superabundance and overflowing of his being.  In so far he is „pathetic‟.”49 
The doctrine of impassibility began, Moltmann propounds, with the early Church‟s 
engagement with philosophy.
50
  Although this view of God has had, and continues to have, a 
prominent voice within the Church, it is problematic.  The problem, Moltmann asserts, is that 
this is not how God reveals God‟s self, especially in light of the cross.  Through scripture and 
the encounter with God, the person (and community) finds a God who is „pathetic‟ not 
„apathetic‟. 
The attraction of the doctrine of impassibility, Moltmann thinks, is due to the fact that 
“in practice down to the present day Christian faith has taken into itself the religious need of 
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 Moltmann‟s idea of passibility is significantly influenced by Abraham Heschel‟s pathos of God.  
CG, 270-274.  Heschel was one of the first, Moltmann states, to challenge the idea of an apathetic God.  TKG, 
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 TKG, 23.  Cf. Berdiaev: “If the capacity for love is ascribed to God, then the capacity for suffering 
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 CG, 214.  Although Moltmann is arguing for God‟s pathos, he still wants to hold the basic doctrinal 
affirmation of Nicaea that, at least in a „relative‟ sense, God is „not changeable‟.  CG, 229. 
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finite, threatened and mortal man for security in a higher omnipotence and authority.”51  
Following from this, then, any idea of death, suffering, or grief must be excluded from God 
and God becomes the Unmoved.
52
 
Moltmann holds firmly to God‟s passibility because without it he believes God‟s love 
cannot be recognized.
53
  Simply put, he states “A God who cannot suffer cannot love either.  
A God who cannot love is a dead God.”54  The ability to love carries with it the risk of 
suffering.  Moltmann makes no distinction between how God loves and how the human 
loves; love is incomprehensible if there is no pathos. 
The importance of this point cannot be overstated.  If it could be demonstrated that 
love could occur without pathos, then, Moltmann‟s position would collapse.  But, as 
Moltmann correctly points out, love is incomprehensible without pathos, and, since God is 
love and cannot do anything that would be contradictory to himself, God‟s suffering is a 
comprehensible phenomenon.  If God wasn‟t love then this point would be moot.  As God is 
love,
55
 ideas of an impassible God who is not affected by anything external to God‟s self 
need to be rejected, as they do not conform with God‟s salvation history. 
God creating space for creation to exist based on love for the other, a love which 
includes God‟s willingness to suffer, is the first factor in making freedom possible for the 
created order.  The second factor is drawn from Moltmann‟s understanding of the Trinity. 
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 I John 4: 16. 
144 
 
2.  Trinity 
 
Moltmann‟s conception of the Trinity plays an integral role in his formulation of 
freedom; he is convinced that an understanding of the Trinity is essential if the age-old 
paradox of freedom existing for both God and human beings is to be resolved.  The Trinity is 
not an abstract philosophical concept, according to Moltmann, but the means by which one 
can discuss a God whose freedom cannot be externally thwarted and a free human whose 
existential freedom does not impinge on God.  As Richard Bauckham aptly states, “. . . the 
doctrine of the Trinity, for Moltmann, is not the problem; properly understood, it is the 
solution.”56   
In considering Moltmann‟s Trinitarian thought our attention will focus on his 
assertion that the intra-trinitarian relationship reveals a God who exists in relation, and that 
this relationship creates the „space‟ for the created order to be truly free.  Thus not only does 
each Person of the Trinity have a part to play in granting freedom, it is also their existence 
and their relation to each other that become essential factors for freedom. 
 
A.  The Triune God 
Acknowledging God as Trinity, Moltmann asserts, means that we recognize the 
Divine Being as the God who “isn‟t a solitary, unloved ruler in heaven who subjugates 
everything as earthly despots do.  He is a God in community, rich in relationships.”57  God is 
an „open Trinity‟, a God who is relation – inviting, integrating, and uniting all things.58  The 
Trinity is the original community of „persons‟; to speak of Trinity, according to Moltmann, is 
to speak of the „divine community‟. 
This doctrine is essential if humanity is to understand that God is Love.  As already 
discussed, Moltmann‟s view of love requires an „other‟, and this is revealed in God‟s 
trinitarian nature.  “Because he not only loves but is himself love, he has to be understood as 
the triune God.  Love cannot be consummated by a solitary subject.”59 
Not only is the doctrine of the Trinity essential for understanding that God is love, but 
it is also essential for understanding how that love is revealed within the created order.  
Because God is love, and the created order is alienated from God, at the heart of the Gospels 
is the cross.  To understand God‟s love in relation to the cross requires trinitarian doctrine – 
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without the Trinity the cross cannot be grasped.  “The Son suffers and dies on the cross.  The 
Father suffers with him, but not in the same way.  There is a trinitarian solution to the 
paradox that God is „dead‟ on the cross and yet is not dead, once one abandons the simple 
concept of God.”60 
Particularly important to Moltmann is that the doctrine of the Trinity helps combat 
what he believes to be the false view of God as the „Almighty Ruler‟, the God who is 
„dominion in super-power‟61 as opposed to the God whose primary being is love and 
relation.
62
 
 
B.  Perichoresis 
Perichoresis is a fundamental idea within Moltmann‟s Trinitarian formulation.  When 
Moltmann states that „God is relation‟, the type of relationality he is intimating is a 
perichoretic one.  The primary way Moltmann utilizes perichoresis is to delineate the „mutual 
indwelling‟ of the three persons of the Trinity.  He writes: 
The idea of mutual indwelling, perichoresis, goes back to the theology of the Greek 
Fathers, and makes it possible to conceive of a community without uniformity and a 
personhood without individualism. . . . In christology, perichoresis describes the 
mutual interpenetration of two different natures, the divine and the human, in Christ, 
the God-human being. . . . In the doctrine of the Trinity, perichoresis means the 
mutual indwelling of the homogeneous divine Persons, Father, Son and Spirit.
63
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 A central discussion to be found in Moltmann‟s political theology is his argument against 
monotheism.  He does not deny the ancient Deuteronomic creed that God is One (Deut. 6.4); however, God is 
one Triune God.  This is a critique of how, he believes, monotheism has been interpreted throughout the history 
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Person) and Rahner‟s (one divine substance) views of the Trinity to be modalistic in their conception (ET, 321); 
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without which we cannot fully understand the suffering of God (TKG, 25), the Basileia (TKG, 131), or how to 
develop a theological understanding of freedom (TKG, 192). 
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Perichoresis is not a „rigid pattern‟, according to Moltmann, it is “at once the most intense 
excitement and the absolute rest of the love which is the wellspring of everything that 
lives.”64 
Because Moltmann believes perichoresis to be the fundamental character of the 
Godhead‟s existence, he also believes that the Trinity should not be defined using a „common 
nature‟ orientation.65  He writes, “There are two points of departure for the development of 
trinitarian doctrine, the metaphysical one and the biblical one.  The metaphysical approach 
presupposes the proof that God is and that God is One.”66  If one is concerned with a 
logically theistic argument, then, a single divine nature is the focus; if the focus is on how 
God reveals God‟s self in the experience of history and through scripture, then, Moltmann 
believes the interrelationship of the Trinity is the starting point. 
 
(a)  Interpenetration 
The interrelationship within the perichoretic union is possible because 
interpenetration is possible.  Perichoresis does not mean that the three Persons of the Trinity 
are fused into each other, thereby losing all differentiation.  Nor are they related to each other 
in the way that humans relate.  Each trinitarian Person is related by mutually interpenetrating 
the other. 
The relationship is so central to the existence of the Trinity that it can be said that 
each Person exists in each other and creates space for each other.  This means that “every 
trinitarian Person is not merely Person but also living space for the two others.  In 
perichoresis each Person makes himself „inhabitable‟ for the two others, and prepares the 
wide space and the dwelling for the two others.”67 
Perichoretic interpenetration opens up a view of relationship that is beyond the human 
experience.  The trinitarian relationship is so intimate that the Persons of the Trinity can be 
said to exist within each other, while also stating that they are distinct.
68
  That is, we cannot 
understand them apart from their relations and we cannot comprehend their relationships 
apart from their individuality.  Based on this paradigm, Moltmann regards the Trinity as a 
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„Social Trinity‟,69 with relationship becoming the primal defining characteristic of the 
Trinity.  God being a Social Trinity, Volf states, is “one of the basic insights in Jürgen 
Moltmann‟s doctrine of the Trinity.”70 
The idea of interpenetration has a close affinity to our earlier discussion of theosis,
71
 
and some of the same metaphors apply.  A helpful analogy for interpenetration is that of a 
red-hot iron, where it is difficult to distinguish between what is heat and what is iron.  
Another metaphor Moltmann cites is that of Moses and the burning bush, wherein the 
presence of God burns the bush but the bush is not consumed.
72
  The Persons of the Trinity 
exist in this manner – intricately related to such a degree that they exist within each other 
while never overpowering the other.
73
 
Moltmann believes that perichoresis is the “the only conceivable trinitarian concept 
of the unity of the triune God, because it combines threeness and oneness in such a way that 
they cannot be reduced to each other, so that both the danger of modalism and the danger of 
„tritheism‟ are excluded.”74  Perichoresis allows the person to understand God as a living 
fellowship, three Persons existing “in the unity of their tri-unity.”75  The concept of Trinity 
does not cloud the revelation of God in philosophical abstraction, but rather reveals a God 
who is relation and in whom there “is the mutuality and the reciprocity of love.”76 
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(b)  The „Broad Place‟ of the Trinity 
The relationship of „space‟ and „freedom‟, which is a critical concern in Moltmann‟s 
theology of creation, is also evident in his development of perichoresis.  He asserts that the 
necessity of „space‟ for freedom not only applies to the created order, but also to the Trinity.  
“For living beings, there is no freedom without free spaces in their social life.  In a 
transferred sense, that is also true for the divine Persons in their perichoresis.”77  By each 
Person making “himself „inhabitable‟ for the two others,”78 the trinitarian nature creates 
freedom.  Hence we can say that God‟s freedom derives not only from God being God, but 
we can also talk about God‟s freedom being due, in part, to the very nature of the Trinity.  
For in the unity of the Trinity we can witness the freedom of the Trinity.  This type of 
unifying freedom, what Moltmann refers to as the „broad place‟ within the Trinity, also has 
direct implications for the created order. 
As we will see in our discussion of the Spirit, when the Spirit dwells within the 
person, the person, in a qualified way, dwells with God.  For the human to dwell with God 
through the Spirit, is to experience this „broad place‟ of the Trinity and in so doing the person 
experiences the freedom made possible by this „space‟.79  This freedom not only applies to 
the individual human, but also to the community striving to walk with God. 
The open space of the perichoretic community of the triune God is the divine living 
space of the church.  In the community of Christ and in the energies of the life-giving 
Spirit we experience God as the broad place which surrounds us from every side and 
brings us to the free unfolding of new life.
80
 
 
Hence Moltmann contends that the nature of trinitarian life creates a potential for 
freedom.  The fact that God as Trinity exists in freedom through the perichoretic community 
does not instantly grant freedom to the created order.  But, if persons and community accept 
the gift of freedom God grants through the Son and the Spirit, the trinitarian nature will 
become a place for that freedom to be truly experienced.  Thus we see the trinitarian nature as 
the potentiality for freedom as a second factor in Moltmann‟s theology of freedom. 
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3.  The Passion of the Father 
 
Moltmann recounts that Dietrich Bonhoeffer, while in his Gestapo cell, “discovered 
that „only the suffering God can help‟.  Christ helps not by virtue of his omnipotence but by 
virtue of his suffering.”81  An essential idea for Moltmann‟s thought on freedom is that the 
„suffering God‟ not only applies to the Son, but also to the Father. 
The passion of the Father is ultimately revealed in the cross – for as the Son suffers on 
the cross, the Father suffers the pains of the cross as well; albeit in a different way.  Jesus 
suffers the pains of physical torment, death, and abandonment, whereas the Father suffers the 
grief of watching the Son suffer and die and the loss of his son.
82
  The passionate Father was 
not an unaffected bystander in the passion of Christ.
83
 
The „active‟ suffering of the Father reveals a God who will suffer for the sake of love.  
The passion of the Father shows how far the Father will go to set the created order free.  
Hence in the concept of the passionate Father, Moltmann finds part of the answer to the 
classic quandary that if God is „almighty‟ or „omnipotent‟ then human freedom is abolished.  
God‟s divinity does not overwhelm creation, not only because God creates „space‟ for 
creation to occur, but also because God is willing to suffer to allow creation the freedom to 
mature and develop into what God intends. 
Moltmann‟s thought here does not diminish the power and wonder of who God is.  
God is still the „Almighty God‟, but as we have already seen, God‟s pathos leads Moltmann 
to radically reconfigure what is meant when God is described as „Almighty‟.84  He still 
considers God Almighty, but „Almighty‟ is redefined in light of the cross.  This contrasts 
with traditional formulations where the term „Almighty‟ is understood in light of God‟s 
power or sovereignty. 
As the Father of Jesus Christ, he is almighty because he exposes himself to the 
experience of suffering, pain, helplessness and death.  But what he is is not almighty 
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power; what he is is love.  It is his passionate, passible love that is almighty, nothing 
else.
85
 
 
Moltmann‟s description of God as Almighty, then, is not only based on God‟s love, but it is 
also based on what he sees as the corollary of God‟s love, the ability to suffer. 
Extrapolating from this leads to a re-consideration of God‟s omnipotence in a way 
that is congruous with the freedom that God gifts to the created order.  Moltmann considers 
God‟s omnipotence to be his suffering love.86  Citing the work of C. E. Rolt, he observes, 
“The sole omnipotence which God possesses is the almighty power of suffering love.  It is 
this that he reveals in Christ.”87  God‟s omnipotence, considered from the perspective of the 
cross, is defined by God being able to suffer for, and with, the created order and still be God, 
that is, God‟s suffering does not negate the fact that in the end God‟s will “will be done on 
earth as it is in heaven.”88 
Thus, for Moltmann, the „active‟ suffering of the Father makes a significant 
contribution to the gifting of freedom and is the third factor in his theology of freedom.  
Through the suffering of the Father, the potential for freedom is preserved.  God‟s being does 
not overwhelm humanity through force, but enables the created order to be free through the 
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88
 Matt. 6: 10.  Within this thought the theology of the suffering God takes precedence over the 
theology of the God who is „Wholly Other‟.  TKG, 35. 
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Father‟s „almighty‟ suffering love.  Consequently, humanity is able to find the space to „be‟ 
within a relationship with the triune God. 
 
4.  The Son 
 
Even though God‟s creative activity engenders a potential for freedom by creating 
space, the reality is that this „space‟ (the created order) is corrupted, which makes talk of this 
„potential‟ problematic.89  Consequently, part of God‟s gifting of freedom is not only creating 
the potential for freedom, but also liberating the created order from that which enslaves.  
Liberation occurs primarily through the efficacies of the Son. 
At the heart of Moltmann‟s theology of freedom is the activity of the Son.  Through 
Jesus Christ, the person and the created order are “set free for freedom.”90  The Incarnation, 
the life Jesus lived, the crucifixion, and resurrection are all part of how Jesus frees the person 
and the created order from the sin that binds and the oppressive forces that enslave. 
The Incarnation demonstrates God‟s love as Christ willingly enters “into the limited, 
finite situation” of humanity and becomes the “human God.”91  Moltmann‟s thought here is 
well-known: freedom is gifted to creation through the life Jesus lived, his inauguration of the 
kingdom, and, ultimately, his becoming the „crucified God‟.92  
If God‟s being is manifest in the passion and the death of Jesus, through Jesus‟ 
suffering and death „for us‟ and for our salvation, he is known by that faith which is 
called freedom.  The God of freedom, the true God, is therefore not recognized by his 
power and glory in the world and in the history of the world, but through his 
helplessness and his death on the scandal of the cross of Jesus.
93
 
 
To have faith in and a relationship with this God results in freedom for creation.  The cross 
proclaims the “human God who is freedom and love.”94  The scandal of the cross is that Jesus 
is abandoned by God; Jesus, God Incarnate, becomes truly God-forsaken,
95
 and in so doing 
becomes, “the most miserable of all „the damned of this earth‟.”96  The gift of salvation and 
the freedom it offers comes at a great price. 
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A.  Bearer of Sin 
To set the created order free so that relationship with God can be restored, Christ 
hangs on the cross for us.  Moltmann forcefully asserts that whatever else is said about the 
cross, what cannot be ignored is that through the pain and forsakenness of the cross, 
humanity is healed.
97
  The gift of freedom flows through the pain of the cross.  “On the cross 
hangs the Son of God, forsaken, cursed and damned.  He hangs there „for us‟, so that we 
might have peace: through his wounds we are healed.”98 
Even though the cross was a form of civil justice, the cross has nothing to do with a 
divine justice that could be construed as retribution or an appeasing of wrath, according to 
Moltmann.
 99
  Jesus goes to the cross out of love, his love for God and God‟s love for 
creation.
100
  The cross proclaims a God who will forsake the Son to provide atonement for the 
world, an atonement that makes relationship with God possible.  For it is only God who can 
“atone by „bearing‟ the sins of the people and taking away the burden of them.”101  Without 
the cross the created order could not enter into relationship with God – the corrupted nature 
of creation would remain and slavery to sin and evil forces would be the reality of the 
human‟s existence. 
 
B.  Solidarity 
The world is not destined for slavery, however, because God does intervene through 
the cross.  Jesus encounters our “world locked up in guilt and death”102 and overcomes by 
entering “into the limited, finite situation of man.  Not only does he enter into it, descend into 
it, but he also accepts and embraces the whole of human existence with his being.”103  This is 
a crucial step for Moltmann‟s thought on freedom.  If, as Moltmann claims, Christ is the 
center for a free humanity and “Lord of the kingdom of liberty,”104 it is not without 
significance that this liberation occurs through sacrifice and in solidarity with the sufferers of 
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corruption and oppression.
105
  By focusing on the cross and the God-forsakenness of Christ, 
Moltmann seeks to strike down any ideas of the „Almighty God‟ who seeks to impose his will 
through divine fiat.  Instead we have a God who atones and delivers through crucifixion, 
suffering, and ultimately, through resurrection.  Therefore, “It follows that the freedom of 
God comes to earth not through crowns, that is to say, the struggle for power, but through 
love and solidarity with the powerless.”106 
The ultimate expression of God‟s love and solidarity with the powerless is revealed 
on the cross, where “all the depths and abysses of human history” are to be found.107  Christ 
descends into the depths of suffering and walks with humanity in darkness; there is no 
darkness too great that can separate God from those in need of God‟s deliverance.  “Christ 
experiences death and hell in solitude.  His followers experience it in his company.”108  This 
means that Christ is the „personal representative‟109 who bears the sin and grief of the world.  
By his bearing the guilt of humanity and descending into the darkest recesses of the created 
order, humanity can find “fellowship with Jesus the brother.”110  It is this fellowship with 
Christ that “opens up God‟s sphere for the whole of man and for all men.”111 
 
C.  The Crucified and Resurrected Liberator 
As Christ bears the sins of the world and walks with people in the darkness of 
oppression, he liberates by breaking the ultimate powers of oppression – sin, law, and death – 
through his resurrection.
112
  Christ is not only able to empathize with the plight of humanity; 
Christ is able to free women and men from the forces that enslave.
113
  We will examine the 
multiple ways Christ liberates in a following section – at this point our focus is on the „agent‟ 
of liberation, the „Crucified Liberator‟.114 
The resurrection of the crucified Jesus is a key component of Moltmann‟s thought on 
freedom.  Ignoring this aspect of his thought can lead one to falsely assume that liberation 
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occurs only through God experientially understanding human suffering.
115
  While this is 
important, Moltmann sees the Resurrection as the event that breaks the foundation of 
oppressive powers.  By bearing the sins of the world, being abandoned by God, and then 
being raised to new life, Christ is able to „unburden‟ the person.  As the resurrected Lord, 
Jesus has the power to set the person free from all that constrains and enslaves.
116
  The 
„ground‟ of human freedom is the cross, Moltmann states, and the „power‟ of our human 
freedom is the resurrection.
117
  Thus, God is able to suffer with humanity and God is able to 
free humanity from their suffering.  Although the full scope of this liberation will not be 
experienced until the Basileia, through the Spirit, Christ‟s liberative work is an ongoing 
reality within the created order. 
As we shall see when examining freedom within the created order, Moltmann‟s 
understanding of Jesus‟ liberation is comprehensive.  His ministry, passion, and resurrection 
are concerned with any forces, be they internal (sin, illness, etc.) or external (political, 
economic, societal, etc.) that would oppress and alienate the person from God, from one 
another, and from self.  The work of Jesus as liberator can be seen in the Gospels, where 
Moltmann observes, “Jesus is believed in as the Messiah of freedom because he sets sinners 
free through his word and liberates the sick by his wondrous works. . . . His suffering works 
as the unburdening of man in order to set man free.”118  The earthly ministry of Christ was a 
ministry of liberation; the present ministry of Christ remains a ministry of liberation and is 
the path to freedom. 
To be set free through Christ‟s death and resurrection creates a new horizon for the 
person.  The person who is liberated regards the world, and what is possible in the world, 
from a radically new position – the forces that bind and seek to destroy life do not have the 
final word.  Thus, the freedom Christ offers is not only a freedom „from‟, but leads the way to 
being a freedom „for‟, as the free person begins to see the potential of what a life with Christ 
can be.  The life of faith, according to Moltmann, is a life of unbounded potential. 
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So faith means crossing the frontiers of the reality which is existent now, and has 
been determined by the past, and seeking the potentialities for life which have not yet 
come into being.  „All things are possible to him who believes‟; and this being so, 
believers become what Musil calls „possibility people‟.  Paul goes even further when, 
talking about believers who live from the powers of the risen Christ, he says: „All 
things are yours; and you are Christ‟s; and Christ is God‟s‟ (I Cor. 3.22f.).119 
 
The freedom that is granted through Christ is the fourth factor of Moltmann‟s 
theology of freedom.  The person is liberated by Christ bearing the sins of the world, by 
Christ‟s solidarity with those who walk in the darkness of sin and oppression, and by Christ 
overcoming the forces of oppression through the Resurrection.  Hence Christ is able to lead 
humanity into the light of God‟s love and bring the person into relationship with the triune 
God and others. 
 
5.  The Holy Spirit 
 
Moltmann‟s thought on the Holy Spirit is a self-described „holistic‟ pneumatology, 
one that recognizes the Spirit‟s pivotal presence in the Trinity and the Spirit‟s life-giving 
power for the created order.
120
  The person comes to know the life-giving Spirit when she 
encounters God.  The Spirit is God‟s presence within creation.  It is the Spirit who „animates‟ 
life, who blesses life with „vitality‟, and makes possible the relation between creation and 
God.
121
  “Everything that is, exists and lives in the unceasing inflow of the energies and 
potentialities of the cosmic Spirit. . . . He does not merely confront it in his transcendence; 
entering into it, he is also immanent in it.”122  Thus the Spirit enables „existence‟ to become 
„life‟.  The life of the created order – the joy and the sorrow – are known to God and the 
suffering God‟s presence is known to creation through the Spirit, who „animates‟ all living 
things.
123
 
The importance of pneumatology for Moltmann‟s thought is reflected in the number 
of ways in which the Spirit is reflected on throughout his work.
124
  Although the efficacies of 
the Spirit are closely related to the efficacies of Christ, he also maintains that they are distinct 
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from each other; the efficacies of the Spirit should not be considered „absorbed‟ by those of 
Christ.
125
  As affirmed by the early Church, the Spirit is a particular Person within the Trinity 
whose presence and work fulfils an essential function in the nature of the triune God. 
The Spirit not only brings life to the created order, the Spirit is also an integral factor 
in granting freedom.  We shall detail this by examining the Spirit as the wellspring of life and 
relation, and as the giver of freedom. 
 
A.  The Wellspring of Life and Relation 
Life within the created order begins with the Spirit.  “God the Spirit is the source, the 
wellspring of life (fons vitae) – life that is healed, freed, full, indestructible and eternal.  
Christ himself is „the resurrection and the life‟ in person.”126  Life begins with the Spirit, and, 
equally important, life is also restored by the Spirit – restored from sickness, oppression, and 
even death.  “It [the Holy Spirit] is the power that raises the dead, the power of the new 
creation of all things; and faith is the beginning of the rebirth of human beings to new life.”127 
Moltmann‟s perspective on life is dependent on the concept of relation.  If the human 
cannot live in relationship, life becomes death.  “Total lack of relationship is total death.  So 
„the fellowship of the Holy Spirit‟ is simply another way of describing „the life-giving 
Spirit‟.”128  Woven into the power of giving and restoring life, the Spirit makes life possible 
by being the power that can bind life together in relationship. 
The fellowship of the Spirit, which enables the union of the Son with the Father, is the 
same fellowship which gives birth to true human community.  The Spirit is the divine force 
that creates the “union of men and women with God and their union in God (John 17.21).”129  
The fellowship of the Spirit, then, is the „divine energy‟ that makes relationship possible 
between all living things, and between all living things and God, and in so doing is not only 
the wellspring of life but also the sustainer of life.
130
 
Life began in relation and life can only be sustained in relation.
131
  Moltmann regards 
the interrelation between God and the created order, and the interrelation between living 
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things within the created order, as foundational to the creation and continuance of life.  Since 
the efficacy of the Spirit makes this relation possible, through the Spirit life is sustained.
132
 
The Spirit is able to create community because it is God the Spirit who “indwells the 
creatures he has made, animates them, holds them in life, and leads them into the future of his 
kingdom.”133  God‟s presence does not overwhelm the created order; God‟s Spirit is one of 
mutuality, which can bring together diversity and bind it together in love.
134
  The Spirit‟s 
presence, then, is always seeking relation – between God and creation and between the living 
things within creation. 
Admittedly, history offers numerous examples that are counter to this view.  One 
could argue that civilizations have been built on force – military and economic might – not on 
the Spirit and, in this context, relationship has consisted of the „haves‟ relating to, and 
controlling, the „have-nots.‟  Moltmann would not deny this.  It would be proof that true 
community cannot be achieved without the Spirit, and when the Spirit is ignored, community 
and relationship are reduced to hierarchy, control, and eventually death. 
The reality of history does not alter Moltmann‟s stance.  The Spirit is able to 
overcome these forces since the Spirit is the power of resurrection, the life-giving power 
through which God is committed to creation.
135
  The assurance of this commitment is found 
in the presence of God‟s Spirit within the world and within communities – it is in the 
presence of the Spirit where humanity has hope.
136
  Regardless of history, the experience of 
God‟s Spirit opens up a new „all-embracing horizon‟,137 where it is possible to perceive “God 
in all things, and all things in God.”138 
 
B.  The Giver of Freedom 
The Spirit, who is the wellspring of life and who sustains life, is also the Spirit that 
gifts freedom to the created order.  As Christ has broken the forces that enslave creation, it is 
in the life of the Spirit where creation can begin to live in freedom.  The life of the Spirit is 
the life of freedom, for „where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom‟.139 
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Although Christ, through the cross and resurrection, has already broken the forces that 
enslave, creation has yet to participate in the full freedom of a restored creation.  Therefore, 
to enter into relationship with God and experience the Spirit is to “long for liberty.”140  In 
relation with God, the person and community can begin to see the life to come, as well as the 
potential for life as it now exists.  Moltmann‟s thought does not lead away from the reality of 
present day existence, but rather the promise of what is to come provides perspective to the 
liberation that is already being made available. 
Because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the resurrection, when the human enters into 
relation with God through the Spirit the person is already partially participating in the 
ultimate freedom, the freedom over death.  To experience the Spirit, therefore, is to 
experience the freedom over the most constraining force known to the created order, the force 
of death.  In this experience “. . . we are possessed by a hope which sees unlimited 
potentialities ahead, because it looks towards God‟s future. . . . This gives our own finite and 
limited life an infinite meaning.”141  The experience with the Spirit does not obliterate the 
oppressive forces and unjust conditions that exist in the world, but the Spirit opens the way 
for God‟s transformative work to begin.  For, as Christ has revealed, even death cannot resist 
the power of God. 
Consequently, the experience of the Spirit is the broadening of the person‟s life, and 
here again we return to the correlation of space and freedom.  Moltmann contends that a 
central way in which the Spirit liberates is by expanding the „living space‟ for the person.  By 
being brought into relation with God, the person‟s sphere of existence is radically expanded 
through „God‟s living energies‟.  “In the open air of the eternal Spirit, the new life unfurls.  In 
the confidence of faith we plumb the depths of the Spirit, in love we explore its breadth, and 
in hope its open horizons.  God‟s Spirit is our space for living.”142 
In experiencing this new „space‟ the person can begin to experience the liberation 
from „extraneous rule‟ while still existing within the realm where oppression exists.  The 
Spirit‟s gift of freedom is not an escape, but rather the beginning of the transformation where 
God will deliver the created order from all that enslaves.
 143
 
To experience ruach is to experience what is divine not only as a person, and not 
merely as a force, but also as a space – as the space of freedom in which the living 
being can unfold.  That is the experience of the Spirit.
144
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The space that is granted by the Spirit is a space formed in fellowship.  Hence, in 
contrast to a popular Western notion of freedom, liberation does not occur when the 
individual exists in a space as a singular agent with no relation to others; it is the complete 
opposite – liberation occurs in and through relation and commitment to the „other‟. The space 
required for freedom cannot be achieved by the person living life as an individual.  It is only 
in closeness to the triune God and with others where the person can find the space to be free, 
a space made possible by the Spirit.
145
  The Spirit brings the person and the community into 
the perichoretic unity of the Trinity, a space where true freedom is known through God‟s love 
for all living things.  Thus it is in the „kingdom of the Spirit‟ where freedom is found and 
preserved.
146
  The Spirit, then, in its life-giving energies and relationship-binding activity, 
forms the fifth and final factor of Moltmann‟s conception of freedom. 
 
6.  Summary 
 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom is a complex conception of freedom that engages 
various theological concerns in light of humanity‟s present day existence.  As we have seen, 
by focusing on the triune nature of God, Moltmann has developed a theology wherein the 
freedom for the person and community relies on five different factors: God creating space for 
the person to be free, the nature of the Trinity wherein the free person can exist, the Father‟s 
willingness to suffer and let creation „be‟, the Son redeeming the created order through the 
cross and resurrection, and the Spirit granting life and drawing people into relationship with 
God and others so that freedom can be experienced. 
 
§3  FREEDOM WITHIN THE CREATED ORDER 
 
We have, thus far, examined the God who grants freedom to creation.  We now turn 
our attention to the fundamental questions of why creation needs liberating and what this 
freedom means for life.  In this section we will examine (1) the object of God‟s liberating 
work, (2) the liberation from sin and oppression, (3) what freedom is for, and (4) how 
freedom becomes the horizon for liberated people. 
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1.  The Object of Liberation 
 
God‟s liberating action has two interdependent foci – humanity and nature.147  
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom seeks to establish that freedom is not merely an existential 
concern for the human agent, but a concern for the entire created order. 
 
A.  The Human 
The individual whom God desires to liberate is a union of two seemingly opposite 
qualities.  She is a relational being who is also singular and autonomous.  While these may 
appear antithetical, Moltmann argues that they are necessary for human development and, 
when held in proper balance through relation with God and others, provide the key elements 
for the individual to become a person. 
People experience themselves in the relationships of society, and society is made up 
of independent people.  This polarity is part of life, and keeps life tense and expectant.  
The Spirit of life is the Spirit of love.  Love unites what is separated, and separates 
what is united, and in this rhythm gives life its movement.
148
 
 
Through the Spirit, the individual can become „soluble‟ in relationship and yet also 
remain „separate‟ and „autonomous‟.149  Moltmann believes that this bi-modal existence 
allows the person to become a „determining subject‟,150 and thus develop into the person God 
intends – the person becomes a „spiritual‟ person.151  Space forbids a detailed analysis of 
Moltmann‟s anthropology; however, we can trace certain elements of his anthropology that 
intersect with his thought on freedom by considering three different factors: God‟s image, the 
imago trinitatis, and the person‟s relation to the triune God.  We begin with God‟s image. 
 
(a)  God‟s Image 
The human as the imago Dei is God‟s creational intent.  The imago is not a distinct 
characteristic per se, which allows the person to perform certain functions (contra Berdiaev); 
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rather the imago is a mode of being that is the foundation of what it means to be a „person‟.152  
Moltmann asserts that to be the imago Dei is to be a person in relation with God and with 
others.  Propounding the imago as relation to God and others, the „person‟ is therefore 
defined by relationship.
153
 
Moltmann‟s exegesis of Genesis 1 arrives at the conclusion that the imago was only 
completed with the creation of both male and female – neither Adam nor Eve could be said to 
possess the imago individually.
154
  In considering their humanity in relationship to one 
another and to God, we see the imago Dei.  The imago designates community; when humans 
are in relation to God and each other, the imago is present. 
The presence of the imago may be God‟s original intention, but the person now exists 
in a fallen order, so what does that mean for the imago?  There has been little agreement 
within Christianity as to how the imago can exist in a world that is fallen, or whether it exists 
at all in this present world.
155
  For Berdiaev, the imago remains with the person (although in a 
„dimmed‟ state) by the very nature of being God‟s creation; for Moltmann, the imago 
remains, not due to any inherent quality of the person, but rather because of God‟s faithful 
presence.
156
  Through God‟s grace the imago may be fulfilled as people enter into 
relationship with God and with others.  The importance of this last point cannot be 
overlooked.  It must be remembered that, for Moltmann, the imago can only be achieved 
through God‟s grace and its development is dependent on relationship with both God and 
other humans. 
We can see, then, that Moltmann‟s view of the person possesses not only a vertical 
perspective (the person‟s relation with God) but also a horizontal perspective (the person‟s 
relation with others).
157
  These two perspectives are interdependent, for life is dependent on 
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both horizontal and vertical relationships.
158
  This position is what Moltmann refers to as the 
„social‟ concept of the person.  An isolated individual is not a „person‟; a person is a human 
who lives in relation with others.
159
  As Moltmann states, “We say „I am because you are: 
you are because I am‟. . . .”160 
To describe how people relate to one another and to God within the context of a 
„social‟ model, Moltmann uses the concept of „open friendship‟. Friendship plays a crucial 
role in his thought and it fulfils various roles: friendship is what affirms the person, it creates 
space for freedom, it also creates the space for love, it confers respect, and thus “the future of 
the world will belong to open friendship.”161  Moltmann conceives of „open friendship‟ as a 
modality wherein people can be in relation with one another and still maintain a high degree 
of autonomy. 
Joy Ann McDougall describes Moltmann‟s view of friendship as being “based on a 
dynamic of self-donation and self-differentiation”162 – the person is open, vulnerable and 
dependent upon others, while maintaining a clear sense of individuality.  McDougall goes on 
to observe that “„open friendship‟ is predicated upon perfect reciprocity and equality among 
human beings.  A person neither appropriates nor possesses another, nor do the two become 
subject to one another.”163  Moltmann‟s „open friendship‟ is the means by which he conceives 
that liberated people can be committed to one another in relationships without being „subject‟ 
(McDougall) to each other.  Thus, it is not surprising to see him use Hegel‟s idea of 
friendship as „the concrete concept of freedom‟.”164 
It is at this point in discussing „relationship‟ and „friendship‟ that we find the 
correlation between the imago Dei and freedom.  Moltmann maintains that freedom is 
enriched when it receives the mutual help of others.
165
  Thus to be in relation with the other 
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(i.e. to be the imago) is to be open to mutual help. This then means that a greater range of 
freedom becomes possible, which in turns means a greater development of personhood is also 
possible.  He regards this type of freedom as „communicative freedom‟ – a freedom that can 
grow in “the intersubjective relationships in which and from which the human subjects 
live.”166  Consequently the maturing of „intersubjective‟ relations produces the maturation of 
freedom, which in turn produces a maturation of the person. 
 
(b)  The Imago Trinitatis 
The emphasis on imago Dei as relation is yet another important element within 
Moltmann‟s thought on freedom.  If freedom is only understood as domination, then God‟s 
liberation of the individual can only lead to „individualism‟ (i.e. the person as „master‟ of 
self) – a position that both Moltmann and Berdiaev hold as antithetical to Christianity.  
Moltmann‟s emphasis on the imago Dei seeks to expound freedom as being relationally 
dependent if freedom is to be fully experienced. 
God liberates the individual so that she may be free to develop into what God has 
created her to be – an imago Dei.  God‟s liberation is a not an escape from the others and the 
world, rather God liberates in order that the person may exist in relation with God and the 
world around her.  Thus the liberation of the person is understood within the context of 
mutuality and indwelling as opposed to domination and obedience. 
Moltmann develops this thought further, believing that the traditional understanding 
of God‟s image does not adequately described the freed person – the person is more than the 
imago Dei.  The person who is freed is a human who exists in relation with the triune God 
and others; they are not only the image of God but the image of community – the community 
of God (Trinity) as well as the community of people who make the individual‟s life possible.  
The liberated person who is free and is in relation with God and others becomes an imago 
trinitatis.
167
 
 
(c)  The Person‟s Relation to the Trinity 
The potential to be the imago trinitatis is found in God‟s liberating acts carried out 
through the Son and the Spirit and grounded in the perichoretic nature of the Trinity.  
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Perichoresis not only reveals a God who is relation, but also demonstrates how this Triune 
God relates to the world and how the world relates to God.
168
  The relationship between the 
person and God is not based on „lordship‟, „sovereignty‟, or „obedience‟.  What God desires 
is a relationship based on God being within the person and the person being within God; in 
other words, a relationship based on abiding in love freely given and freely received.
169
  
Moltmann acknowledges that the human cannot relate to God in the same way as the three 
Persons of the Trinity interrelate, but the person can still dwell with God in a „creaturely‟ 
way
170
 that is made possible through God‟s grace.171  God‟s goal is the restoration of all 
things; a creation that corresponds to God and dwells with God.
172
 
The telos of this relationship is what Moltmann calls a “realistic divinization.”  He 
writes, 
Life in communion with Christ is full life in the trinitarian situation of God. . . . The 
human God who encounters man in the crucified Christ thus involves man in a 
realistic divinization (theosis).  Therefore in communion with Christ it can truly be 
said that men live in God and from God, „that they live, move and have their being in 
him‟ (Acts 17.28).173 
 
Moltmann‟s provocative idea of „realistic divinization‟ follows the thought of the Eastern 
Church.  He is attempting to establish that to be in communion with the triune God is an 
intimate relationship wherein the person dwells with God and God dwells with the person.  
Thus we see that, according to Moltmann, God‟s liberating actions, which are rooted 
in God‟s love and occur through God‟s suffering, have a specific focus – that the individual 
may become a person who dwells with God and with others.  God‟s liberation, however, not 
only applies to humanity, but also to the created order.  Freedom is not simply an existential 
or societal concern, but a concern for all living things. 
 
B.  Nature 
The second object of God‟s liberating action is nature.  For nature is, according to 
Moltmann, “. . . the material promise of glory, being full of the cyphers and signs of the 
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beauty to come.”174  Nature as God‟s creation reveals „traces of God‟ and created things are 
the „real promises‟ of the kingdom to come.175 Hence faith in a God who is non-material does 
not mean that the material world should be ignored. 
Nature may be a „cypher‟ and a „sign‟, but it is also corrupted.  A natural world that is 
corrupted is a world that does not exist as God originally intended; creation is enslaved and 
„hopes‟ for liberty.176  One aspect of this enslavement is found in the reality that God does not 
fully dwell within the world.  There is a separation between God and nature that will not be 
restored till the Basileia.  Another form of enslavement is found in the human domination and 
exploitation of nature.
177
  This exploitation occurs when humanity only understands freedom 
as being „freedom of domination‟.178  It is a form of freedom that will only degrade and lead 
to death, as is readily witnessed in the long history of human interaction with nature. 
God desires that the created order be liberated.  One way this liberation will occur is 
when God restores all things.  Another way this liberation will occur is through humanity‟s 
relation with God, others, and nature.  The love of God, Moltmann believes, is a love for all 
living things.
179
  As humans come to understand God‟s creational intent and God‟s presence 
with all living things, those who love God should become active participants in the liberation 
of the created order, especially in the areas where enslavement is a direct result of human 
exploitation.  This means that Christians and Christian theology should develop a clear 
ecological focus in outlook and praxis. 
Therefore, we see that Moltmann‟s theology of freedom maintains that God seeks to 
liberate both the person and the world.  To examine Moltmann‟s conception of freedom 
within the created order, we begin with his „negative‟ view of freedom, which explores how 
God frees the person from that which oppresses.  In what follows we will focus primarily on 
the liberation of the human, although we will return to the liberation of nature when we 
address the „project of freedom‟. 
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2.  Freedom „From‟ 
 
Freedom, as Moltmann envisages it, is clearly not common to vast segments of 
humanity.  Although it is possible to cite numerous examples as to why this occurs, at the 
base of all of these freedom-denying forces is the corrupted nature of the creation.
180
  The 
fallenness of creation means that freedom is highly problematic.  Any discussion of freedom, 
then, for Moltmann, must begin with the idea of being liberated from.  Within his thought 
there are two main concerns, which are related, but each receive separate attention – freedom 
from sin and freedom from oppression (both personal and societal oppression). 
 
A.  Freedom from Sin 
Moltmann‟s conception of being freed from sin is a multi-faceted view that seeks to 
address various concerns.  With regard to the individual he begins his thought with the 
orthodox understanding of sin as rebellion and alienation.  As we have already seen, the 
efficacies of the Son and the Spirit free the person from sin; however, the state of the 
individual before this redeeming work is one of alienation, with the alienated person being 
seen as „dehumanized‟.181  An individual in this state exists in the „agony‟ of searching for 
himself
182
 and until he sees himself in light of God‟s creative love, he remains lost within 
“inhuman definitions” and “idolized assertions,” which is the result of sin on an existential 
and societal level.
183
  In this state of alienation the individual is turned away from God and is 
therefore turned away from the source of freedom and life.  “The person who loses sight of 
God and puts something else in his heart instead of God becomes homo incurvatus in se, to 
use Luther‟s phrase – he becomes turned in on himself.”184 
                                                 
180
 It is acknowledged that Moltmann has a very distinctive understanding of „fallenness‟.  For further 
detail, see the following section on „freedom from sin‟ and his concern about the Protestant doctrine of 
justification. 
181
 CG, 70.  When the human regards himself as the center of existence, his humanity, which is 
predicated upon relationship, becomes compromised.  “Inhuman is the man who abandons his humanity and 
makes himself the proud and despairing God of himself and his neighbour.  He is afraid of himself and of his 
fellowmen.  He can no longer love.  He loves only himself.”  Moltmann, “God Reconciles and Makes Free,” 
108.  That said, in light of Church history, the terminology of „inhuman‟ and „dehumanized‟ is highly 
problematic.  Moltmann does not regard individuals who are not Christian as somehow less human than the 
Christian.  All of humanity is deserving of respect and dignity.  Yet, his language here could certainly lead to the 
misunderstanding that outside of relationship with God a human can be regarded as somehow „less than human‟ 
(a thought Moltmann would clearly not support).  Clearly a more appropriate term could be used by Moltmann 
to convey his thought that for humanity to mature, relationship is required and that all of life must be respected. 
182
 RRF, 101. 
183
 CG, 72. 
184
 SL, 91. 
167 
 
Yet all is not lost, for life can be restored through Christ, who bears the sins of the 
world
185, and by the Spirit‟s ability to convict people of sin.  Moltmann propounds: 
It is „the Spirit of truth‟ who convinces the world of its sins (John 16.7f.), puts the 
unjust world to rights, and turns believers, from being the slaves and victims of sin, 
into free servants of the divine justice and righteousness which leads to eternal life in 
this world and the next (Rom. 6.13ff., 22).
186
 
 
God‟s redeeming work means that the person can begin to experience the liberation 
from the godless powers of this world – sin and death.187  In an interesting turn of phrase, 
Moltmann states that to be reconciled and free is to be „wholly godless‟.188  By this he means 
that the liberated person rejects self-deification – since she is now free and exists in relation 
to God, she no longer has to try to be God.
189
  The „godless‟ person is liberated from the 
„God-complex‟ – striving to dominate all things, which only results in isolation and death.190 
Another important element to Moltmann‟s thought on „sin‟ is his attempt to re-orient 
the place sin has in Protestant thought.  He is responding here to what he sees as the 
“lopsidedness” in the “viewpoint and emphases of Reformation theology.”191  He does not 
want to diminish the importance of God justifying the sinner and forgiving sins, but he wants 
to assert that justification is more than forgiveness.  In essence, he maintains that to be 
liberated from sin is a process of justification that is always moving towards „regeneration‟ or 
„rebirth‟.  He writes, “The forgiveness of sins is a backward-looking act.  The forward-
looking act of justification is the new creation of life, the awakening of love, and the rebirth 
to a living hope.” 192  Thus in examining what it means to be freed from sin, sin is not the 
focus.  The focus is the new life that is made possible by God‟s liberating actions, which 
bring the person and community into right relationship with God and others, resulting in 
rebirth and new life. 
This is a significant point for Moltmann, for rebirth and new life not only pertain to 
the person‟s status in relation to God, but also to the world where the person lives out her 
„new‟ life.  The „new life‟ that God brings about must be a new life for the community just as 
much as it can be a new life for the individual.  Consequently, to be liberated from sin means 
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not only that the person should turn away from the former desires of his past life,
193
 but that 
the person desires to work with God in breaking the oppressive and „sin-ful‟ structures that 
enslave individuals and communities.  God‟s liberation from sin must be understood, 
according to Moltmann, as vital for the individual and, equally importantly, for society as 
well. 
Here we have the final element we will highlight in Moltmann‟s thought on freedom 
from sin.  He does not consider sin to be only an individual action that contradicts God; sin is 
also unjust systems and structures that oppress individuals and communities and harm the 
created order.  To be freed from „sin‟ is not only to enter into relationship with God, but to be 
delivered from oppressive societal, economic, and political forces – one can be a slave to sin 
as well as a victim of sin.  Liberation from sin, then, must always be directly related to the 
liberation from oppression. 
 
B.  Freedom from Oppression 
While sin does oppress the individual, the liberation from sin and the liberation from 
oppression are two distinct, yet related, types of liberative work.  This is because Moltmann 
wants to assert that sin is not only an act of the person (or persons), there is also the „sin‟ of 
oppressive structures.  Oppressive structures, which are the result of actions that are often 
sinful, have a „structural‟ constitution that oppresses regardless of the person‟s relation to 
God (the influence of liberation theology is clearly evident here).  “Structural sin is sin that 
has taken on an independence of its own.  Now sin is no longer a human act.  It is a quasi-
objective compulsive force dominating human beings.”194 
The individual, or community, may exist in right relation to God and still be 
oppressed by external forces that deny their personhood and reject God‟s intention for life.  
God‟s liberating action is not only concerned with freeing the person from the sin that 
alienates, God is equally concerned with liberating people from the „sin-ful‟ structures that 
oppress. 
Thus Moltmann propounds that the cross of Christ not only frees the person from the 
oppression of sin that is experienced existentially, the cross of Christ seeks also to break 
through all the oppressive forces that enslave.  The cross is God‟s divine opposition to and 
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liberation from the „vicious cycles‟195 that only lead to death.  When the person is liberated 
by God they are not only recipients of God‟s gracious act, but are also called to be 
participants in God‟s ongoing concern for all who are oppressed.196  Therefore, „authentic‟ 
Christianity, for Moltmann, is always a liberating experience, as Christ breaks “through the 
boundaries of our limitations” and liberates from all that enslaves, even death.197 
Authentic Christianity is a freedom from sin and oppression on existential and 
societal levels.  From this perspective, the liberated person can see that death is not only 
personal, but that it is also social and political.
198
  So, Christian misery is not only the 
separation from God, it is also the misery of oppressive forces, within the realm of politics, 
society, and nature, which degrade the person and community.
199
 
God‟s liberation from oppression has a preferential focus – the alienated of society.  
Salvation history, from Israel onwards, reveals a God who is concerned with those who have 
been denied justice.  Thus, to be freed from sin, and to be freed from oppression, are both acts 
that center on justice.
200
  In the former, justice is found wherein the person delivered from sin 
is made righteous before God.
201
  In the latter, the person delivered from oppression is a 
person who has received justice in an unjust world. 
God‟s preferential focus on the alienated does not mean that God‟s redeeming action 
is exclusive.  God‟s desire is to redeem all, both the oppressed and the oppressors.202  The 
cross of Christ seeks to bring all into the kingdom.  God may seek to destroy the structures 
that oppress, but in God‟s great mercy, deliverance is offered to all, even to the very authors 
of those structures.  In so doing, God seeks the restoration of God‟s image throughout the 
created order.
203
 
                                                 
195
 CG, 329-335.  In the cross and resurrection God overcomes the powers that oppress.  SL, 212.  
Hence the cross of Christ inaugurates a kingdom that stands in stark contrast to the power structures that 
oppress.  CG, 327. 
196
 “Exodus theology is not yet resurrection theology, but resurrection theology must always include 
exodus theology and must again and again be embodied in acts that liberate the oppressed.”  HG, 59. 
197
 HG, 62. 
198
 HG, 68. 
199
 “What Christians call the misery of man includes, by all means, political, social, and natural misery 
and does not exclude these forms, as Christianity Today does: „. . . man‟s problem lies in his sins against the 
creator, not in domination by capitalistic economic forces.‟  The possibilities after which Marxists are striving to 
overcome this misery are also possibilities for the Christians‟ struggle for freedom.”  RRF, 78. 
200
 SL, 129.  See SL, 138-142, where Moltmann outlines how God‟s righteousness can be “the creative 
source of justice for every rule of law which leads to lasting peace.”  SL, 142. 
201
 SL, 116. 
202
 CG, 307. 
203
 “But reconciliation and liberation through Christ are directed towards man‟s destined „likeness‟ to 
„the image of God‟.  That is to say, what is at stake is the fulfilment of the promise given with creation.”  TKG, 
118. 
170 
 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom, like Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom, is not only a 
negative definition; there is also a positive definition, what Moltmann refers to as the 
„project‟ of freedom. 
 
3.  Freedom „For‟ 
 
We have a reached a critical juncture in Moltmann‟s thought.  The person has been 
liberated by the triune God and delivered from sin and oppression.  This person, by the very 
fact that they are free, is a person who exists in relation with God and others and is, therefore, 
on a path where the highest form of freedom may be discovered.  To attain this freedom one 
must avoid the false claims of freedom as „domination,‟ and move beyond the initial freedom 
found in „communicative‟ freedom.  If the person follows the leading of God and remains 
open to God‟s grace and Spirit, the person will find freedom as the „creative passion for the 
possible‟.  “The definition of freedom to which Christian faith brings us goes even beyond 
freedom as sociality.  We said that the faith of Christians is essentially the hope of 
resurrection.  In the light of this hope, freedom is the creative passion for the possible.”204  To 
explore Moltmann‟s idea of freedom as a „creative passion‟ we turn to his concept of 
creativity. 
 
A.  Creativity 
Moltmann‟s conception of creativity is often framed in terms of what is „possible‟ – 
what is yet to exist.  Within his thought, creativeness can be regarded as the means by which 
something other than what already exists is brought into being.  To create is to „imagine‟ 
something different and act in ways which will embody what has been envisioned.
205
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Creativity begins with God, whose creative activity did not end with the creation of 
the cosmos – God continues to create.206  An example of this ongoing creative activity can be 
seen in God‟s righteousness.  Moltmann conceives of God‟s righteousness as creative in that 
it reconciles those who are lost to God and restores hope to the hopeless.
207
  Creativity is 
demonstrated in that both reconciliation and hope, which formerly did not exist in the 
histories of specific individuals (or communities), have now come into existence. 
Human creativity is a different form of creating as compared to divine creativity, but, 
according to Moltmann, it is nonetheless related.  He is not concerned to delve into 
significant detail as to how human creativity differs from God‟s creative activity, nor does he 
explain how human creativity occurs.  Human creativity, for Moltmann, does not threaten the 
role of God as creator; i.e. there is no inherent tension between creaturely creative activity 
and God‟s creative activity. 
This view of creativity utilizes a view which is similar to Berdiaev‟s – creativity, the 
free person‟s action, is made possible through relation with God and others.208  Creativity, in 
this sense, is always seen in light of relationship.  So while Tinsley is correct that human 
creativity (if it is non-relational) can lead to a „Promethean‟ stance;209 human creativity, as 
Moltmann conceives it, by its very nature, negates the „Promethean‟ possibility.  The person 
who creates is not trying to usurp God; creativity is how the person exists in relation with 
God. 
This view is congruous with our earlier discussion on freedom, where we saw that the 
liberated person is freed from the „God-complex‟ – the person is no longer seeking to be God.  
A person who is free and who creates isn‟t concerned with the specific distinctions between 
the creative abilities of God and humanity.  It is the relationship between God and person, 
rather than theoretical delimitations, which establishes the parameters of human creativity.  
To be a person in right relation with God and others is to be an imago Dei and to be an imago 
is to be called to create, since the person is the image (relation) of the God who creates.  
Hence the person as the imago Dei can create, because she is „rooted‟ in the creative ground 
of the divine life.
210
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This does not mean that the imago is some type of „faculty‟ or „genius‟ that enables 
creativity.  Rather, as the imago is only evidenced in relationship, to be in God‟s image, for 
Moltmann, is to have faith in, and relationship with, God.  In this relationship God calls the 
liberated person to participate in God‟s creative action within the created order.211  “Through 
faith we participate in nothing more and nothing less than the creative power of God.”212  
To those who would deny that God continues to create, Moltmann holds forth the 
cross and the resurrection.  When Christ is raised from the dead, a new order is established 
and the powers of sin, law and death are broken.  The person who is in relation with God is a 
person who has faith in this resurrected Lord.  For Moltmann, resurrection faith is a faith in 
“creative liberty and a rising up in the Spirit”;213 it is a faith that through God „all things are 
possible.‟  This reality means that the freedom found in relation with the resurrected God is, 
in its highest degree, “the creative passion for the possible.”214 
As human creativity is enabled through relationship with the triune God, creativity is 
possible within the created order because newness, or novelty, is possible.  Newness, for 
Moltmann, is not an assertion for something that is without precedent, but rather that newness 
can arise within a given context.
215
  While a completely new creative endeavor may not be 
possible, neither is it possible that newness cannot exist. 
There are two primary examples Moltmann uses to support this claim.  The first is 
found in the resurrection.  When Christ rises from the dead, history is altered, and what is 
possible becomes radically reconfigured.  There is a potential for newness (and hence 
creativity) because “the new possibilities in the world spring from the world as a possibility 
of the creator God.”216 
The second example he uses is derived from his understanding of the future.  The 
future, with all the potential that is found in the triune God, also means the possibility of 
newness.  A future that contains „newness‟ is the Christian hope.  If there was no potential for 
newness, in Moltmann‟s thought, there would be no future.217  But, because of God‟s power 
to create, newness remains – God is the power that can create the new out of the old.218  
Consequently, Moltmann believes that the universal Christian message of newness is, 
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“Behold, I make all things new.”219  The resurrection, which opens the future to all that is 
dying, means newness is always possible.  Therefore, to be in relation with God is to be a free 
and creative person who participates in this reality.
220
  
Moltmann considers people who engage in God‟s ongoing creative activity as 
„construction workers‟ who have “a creative and militant hope in history.”221  This „creative 
and militant hope‟ is based on the belief that creating is, at its core, a liberating act.  
Creativity, for Moltmann, is not primarily concerned with the creation of objects (although it 
does not exclude this); at its core creativity is about new life and participating in the 
liberation of all living things.
222
  Creativity is the means by which more just and liberating 
ways of existence are brought into being.  Therefore, to create is to participate in God‟s 
liberating work in novel ways that are unique to the person who creates, with the objective 
that the creative activity will be used to bring about freedom for those who interact with the 
new creation. 
Therefore, the „creative passion for the possible‟ can be understood as the highest 
form of freedom wherein the person and the Trinity exist in an intimate communion and the 
person comprehends the future as unbounded potential.  The person, then, who has a „creative 
passion for the possible‟ is someone who freely undertakes „projects‟ that nurture freedom 
and foster liberation for others. 
 
B.  The „Project‟ of Freedom 
Freedom as the „creative passion for the possible‟ is freedom „turned towards‟ the 
future.  When freedom turns towards the future and seeks to realize what is possible as 
opposed to what already exists, freedom becomes a creative movement.  This creative 
movement is what Moltmann terms the „project‟ of freedom.  “It [freedom] reaches out to 
future, for future is the unknown realm of possibilities, whereas present and past represent the 
familiar sphere of realities.”223 
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It is a problematic task to explain what this „project‟ entails.  In a broad sense, 
Moltmann understands it as a hope and movement towards a „greater‟ future.224  The „project‟ 
of freedom moves beyond the liberation from the realm of necessity, as the person who is 
liberated by God begins to see the future with God as a future of „limitless possibilities‟.225  
In this context freedom becomes the creative passion for the future.  “Creative passion is 
always fascinated by a project for the future, which is anticipated in creative imagination.”226  
The „project‟ of freedom, then, is a creative initiative based on the liberated person‟s 
engagement with God, others, and the world that imagines something greater than what 
already exists, either on the existential, communal, or global level.
227
  The task is a hope-full 
endeavor, as the person looks towards a future where „God‟s will be done on earth as it is in 
heaven‟.  The person, therefore, in relation with God, engages a project that furthers his 
freedom and God‟s liberating works. 
The „project‟ of freedom is an essential element for the nurture and growth of freedom 
within the created order.  Freedom is not an object that can be grasped, nor can it be hoarded 
as can wealth or resources (things that Western society often equates with freedom). 
In this last respect, freedom is not a possession, nor is it a quality.  It is a happening.  
We have our creative liberty only in the process of liberation.  We are never free once 
and for all, but we can continually become free.  And only the people who make use 
of their freedom remain free.  If it is not used, freedom is an empty slogan.  In history, 
freedom is experienced in liberating events, processes and movements.
228
 
 
Stasis degrades freedom, while the continued exercise of freedom fosters its growth and 
development.  The „project‟ of freedom, the creative turning towards the future, enables this 
growth. 
Since Moltmann believes there is an essential relationship between „project‟ and 
freedom, he asserts that true freedom cannot be comprehended without a „project‟ (which 
may include an array of initiatives and creative endeavors).
229
  True freedom is realized when 
the liberated agent, in relation with others, acts in ways that further freedom, for themselves 
and the world.  As Moltmann considers creativity, in its most fundamental sense, as liberating 
action, we see that when he posits true freedom as a creative passion, he is claiming that free 
creative activity will be a liberating event in its reception and in its exercise. 
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Although it is problematic to detail what a „project‟ is, we can make the following 
observations as to what a „project‟ entails.  The „project‟ of freedom must work towards the 
liberation of others – liberation from the political, economic, societal and spiritual forces that 
enslave.
230
  Moltmann contends that the exercise of freedom must be cognizant of a „moral 
duty‟ to liberate both the oppressed and the oppressors.231 
The „project‟ is also doxological.  Moltmann envisages that the person who exercises 
true freedom and offers his praise to God does so in the knowledge of God‟s desire for all to 
be free.  Praise and liberation are then inextricably linked.  “. . . theology in action and 
theology in doxology belong together.  There must be no theology of liberation without the 
glorification of God and no glorification of God without the liberation of the oppressed.”232 
Consequently the „project‟ of freedom strives to create freedom for communities and 
society.  It is the goal of God‟s life-giving Spirit to create community, a community where all 
are equal.
233
  The „project‟ of freedom works towards that goal in light of the passion of 
Christ and the Spirit‟s ongoing work.  The crucifixion should lead people “beyond a concern 
for personal salvation” to inquire about liberation for society.234  God‟s liberation of 
individuals should lead to the creation of communities, which are freely constituted; this is a 
task of those who are followers of Christ. 
Lastly, the „project‟ of freedom should strive for the liberation of the whole created 
realm.  The free person, who lives in relation with God and others, is a person who may 
intercede and act before God on behalf of creation.  This person, Moltmann suggests, is not 
only an imago Dei, but also an imago mundi, an individual who may “intercede before God 
for the community of creation”.235  The „project‟ of freedom means that the person seeks „the 
reconciliation of the world‟, and works with God towards the time when God will restore all 
to a harmonious whole.
236
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4.  The Horizon of Freedom 
 
God‟s liberating actions in setting the person free for freedom are ultimately fulfilled 
in God‟s eschaton.  Christian theology finds that its “beginning is in the end,”237 and within 
this paradigm freedom is only understood, Moltmann maintains, by keeping this end in sight.  
To be set free for freedom is not enacted so that the individual may become the lord of all 
with no attachments and nothing to impinge on his existence.  God sets the human free for 
freedom so that the individual may become a person, free to enter into relations with God and 
others, free to love and receive love, free to create and in that creativity to become part of the 
great kingdom of freedom, which will be finally realized in the Basileia.  Thus, the horizon of 
freedom has been, and always will be, Christ‟s return, when all things are restored and God 
dwells in all life.  The person is set free so that he may be a part of that great community. 
Moltmann‟s thought on freedom is consistently geared towards this event.  He 
believes that the eschaton is not about a return to some sort of paradisal state, but the creation 
of a new heaven and a new earth.
238
  It will be a time when heaven and earth will become 
God‟s dwelling and God will be all in all.239  This will be the „glorious perichoresis‟ of God 
and the world.
240
 
The Basileia began with the resurrection, which marks the beginning of the end of 
history.
241
  Through the passion and resurrection of Jesus the new creation has already 
begun.
242
  Jesus proclaimed the kingdom and he was, and continues to be, the sign and 
promise of its fulfillment.
243
  Therefore, the Christian hope is a hope fixed on God‟s promises 
being realized in a time when Christ returns and „all will be well‟.244  
Freedom that has the horizon of the eschaton is a freedom that „cannot be quenched‟. 
That is why every partial freedom presses forward to total freedom and to the freedom 
of the whole creation.  The thirst for freedom cannot be quenched by any partial 
satisfaction.  It knows no limits.  That is why even the freedom of God‟s friends is not 
yet complete freedom.  In history it is the best of all possible freedoms in our 
relationship to God.  But even this points beyond itself to the freedom that only 
achieves its complete and perfect bliss in God in the kingdom of glory.  When God is 
known face to face, the freedom of God‟s servants, his children and his friends finally 
finds its fulfilment in God himself.  Then freedom means the unhindered participation 
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in the eternal life of the triune God himself, and in his inexhaustible fullness and 
glory.
245
 
 
§4  SUMMARY 
 
In examining Moltmann‟s theology of freedom we have seen that it is a multi-faceted 
view that we have considered through five distinct yet related factors.  This freedom, when 
directed towards creation has two related objects – the human and the cosmos.  It is a 
freedom that is both „negative‟ (freedom from) and „positive‟ (freedom for) and has as its 
horizon God‟s eschaton. 
To summarize our major points of discussion: 
i. Life requires „space‟ and God‟s initial act of creation is the creation of space in 
which life can grow and flourish.  Freedom, like life, also requires space for its 
existence and development. 
ii. The nature of the Trinity establishes a pattern of relationship and existence for 
the person.  Even though human existence cannot replicate trinitarian existence, 
there can be a correlation nonetheless.  The life of the Trinity also provides and 
continually maintains the necessary space for the person to be free in relation to 
God. 
iii. The „active‟ suffering of the Father reveals that God suffers not only in the 
activity of the Son on the cross, but also in the Father‟s suffering over the death 
of the Son.  By being willing to suffer – to allow events to occur that are 
contrary to the Father‟s desire and result in suffering – the passionate Father 
shows that he is willing to allow the creation „to be‟ in order that freedom may 
be granted and experienced.  Relation with the „almighty‟ God does not 
overpower the finite creature because the Father is a passionate God. 
iv. God liberated when Jesus became „God-forsaken‟ and bore the sins of the 
world on the cross, and then conquered the great enslaver, death, through the 
resurrection. 
v. The Holy Spirit, who makes life possible by making relationship possible, 
grants freedom by drawing people into relationship with God and others.  
Through the Spirit‟s dwelling within the person and within the community, 
liberated people are drawn into relationship with the triune God and are able to 
experience the „broad place‟ of the Trinity. 
vi. The objects of God‟s liberating actions are the human and the created realm.  
God liberates the person so that he may be not only an imago Dei but also an 
imago trinitatis.  An imago Trinitatis is a person who exists in relationship with 
God and with others in a relationship of „open friendship‟. 
vii. The person is freed from sin and is brought into right relation with God.  This 
liberated person experiences „new life‟ of living with God and in community 
with others. 
viii. The person is also freed from oppression – the „sin-ful‟ structures that oppress 
individuals and communities.  A particular concern for God is freeing from 
oppression those whose lives are exploited by oppressive forces, although 
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Moltmann also holds that God seeks to deliver both the oppressed and the 
oppressors. 
ix. The person is also liberated for freedom.  The liberated person creatively 
engages life in order to be an agent of God‟s liberation for others and the 
natural world.  A liberated person can be a creative person who participates in 
the „project of freedom‟ and thus works with God in bringing about liberation 
for all. 
x. The horizon for Moltmann‟s freedom is the eschaton, when God will restore 
and dwell with all living things. 
 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom will help us to critique Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom 
through a theological lens.  This perspective enables us to see the theological orientation 
within Berdiaev‟s vision on freedom, as well as establishing a sounder foundation for his 
thought.  Although this critique will draw on Moltmann‟s thought in criticizing Berdiaev, 
there will be a certain reciprocity, as Berdiaev‟s own work will foster critical comments on 
Moltmann‟s conception of freedom. 
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Chapter 7 – A Critique of Berdiaev in Light of Moltmann 
 
§1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In his article on Solov‟ev‟s view of the Trinity, David Brown not only argues that 
Solov‟ev‟s “stranger interests” are peripheral to what he “wished primarily to convey,” but 
also that these peripheral interests do not negate Solov‟ev‟s „compatibility‟ with „orthodox 
Christianity‟.1  Our critique of Berdiaev will follow a similar line of thought as we challenge 
his more questionable ideas and examine the theological benefits his vision of freedom can 
offer.  This will be accomplished through three primary objectives.  First, it will be argued 
that his „stranger interests‟ – which Berdiaev, in many cases, considered foundational for his 
vision (e.g., a bifurcated reality, the Ungrund, etc.) – are actually not essential to his core 
concerns.  Second, we will show that these „stranger interests‟ can be replaced with 
alternative and stronger lines of thought using, in particular, Moltmann‟s theology of 
freedom, while still remaining faithful to much of Berdiaev‟s insight.  Third, we will 
highlight the strengths of Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom.  When we combine the strengths of 
Berdiaev‟s insights with aspects of Moltmann‟s thought we can see that this reconfigured 
vision can make a plausible contribution to the theological enquiry regarding the nature of 
freedom for the person and God. 
Although this research has explored a wide range of Berdiaev‟s thought, due to 
limitations of space this critique will only address those areas that are directly related to his 
view of freedom.  For example, we will not attempt a detailed critique of Berdiaev‟s 
methodology and epistemological formulations; rather we will focus on certain 
methodological assumptions upon which his vision of freedom is predicated.
2
 
The chapter is divided into nine sections, which will allow us to address the various 
ideas and concepts pertaining to Berdiaev‟s vision.  We will begin by assessing certain 
methodological assumptions along with his mystical outlook; this will be followed by a 
critique of his view of „spirit‟. In these initial three sections we will be highly critical of 
Berdiaev‟s mystical outlook and his bifurcated view of reality.  Even though these threads 
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 To appreciate the rich complexity and character of Berdiaev‟s methodology and epistemology would 
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run throughout his thought we will show that they are not as „foundational‟ to his thought as 
Berdiaev believed and can be replaced with concepts that are more theologically sound.  It is 
important to remember that the critique in these sections is aimed at the concepts he uses to 
„explain‟ the „origins‟ of freedom.  We are making a sharp distinction between meonic 
freedom and what we have called „embodied‟ freedom within his work.  Our critique here 
will strongly challenge the concepts he uses to defend his idea of meonic freedom, while 
supporting his view of „embodied‟ freedom. 
Moving beyond these weaker links our focus turns to his understanding of sobornost‟ 
and the role it plays with regard to freedom.  Next is an analysis of the „justification‟ of the 
person and his complex understanding of personhood.   We will then critique the 
„justification of God‟ and from there our attention turns to the Ungrund.  Having analyzed the 
various supporting elements of his thought on freedom, the final two areas to be critiqued will 
be his conceptions of „embodied‟ freedom and the creative act. 
Our use of Moltmann‟s theology will follow the approach we are taking with 
Berdiaev.  While Moltmann‟s theology of freedom engenders interesting and challenging 
questions for the theologian on a number of fronts, our engagement with his thought will be 
restricted to his view of freedom and the points of correlation and difference with Berdiaev‟s 
view. 
 
§2 CRITIQUE, ASSESSMENT, AND RECONFIGURATION 
 
1.  Methodological Assumptions 
 
Berdiaev insists that his vision of freedom began with an „intuition‟ that freedom 
exists.  As we have seen, „intuition‟ was an important concept within his intellectual and 
cultural context and his understanding of it is complex.  In examining his work we have been 
able to discern a subtle, and highly nuanced view of „intuition‟.  Intuition is not simply a 
„flash‟ of revelation, but encompasses all of the person‟s cognitive capabilities.  Although his 
view of „intuition‟ can be useful for theological reflection, there remains a problem with the 
stress he places on intuition and how he uses it at as a defense for the more questionable areas 
of his work. 
The highly existential character of Berdiaev‟s „intuition‟ leads the reader to believe 
that intuition is the origination and source for his vision of freedom.  While we do not deny 
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Berdiaev‟s claim that his vision of freedom began with an intuition (i.e., an initial insight), 
his vision has a much wider grounding.  Also, as we now more fully understand (than when 
his first works were being translated and commented on) the context of his time, we realize 
that Berdiaev was not the only Russian writing on freedom and creativity and that many were 
drawing from the same wells, i.e. the Slavophile movement, Marxist thought, Solov‟ev‟s 
philosophy, et al.  It is safe to say that there were multiple factors involved that exercised 
considerable influence on his work, not just „intuition‟.  This is not to downplay the creative 
force of Berdiaev‟s thought or his original synthesis of multiple streams of ideas.  Rather, 
what we need to challenge is Berdiaev‟s privileging of „intuition‟ over what we can call 
„experience‟, i.e. the influence of ideas, people, and culture in unison with the experience of 
God. 
Berdiaev does not deny the effect of experience or external influences on his thought, 
but throughout his work he exercises considerable effort to maintain this idea of „intuition‟ 
over against any idea that knowledge can be based on an „objective‟ reality.  This motivation 
(along with other factors) leads him to formulate his thought in such a way that „intuition‟ 
overshadows the influence of the milieu in which he exists.  Berdiaev may very well have had 
an „intuition‟ concerning the centrality of freedom, but this „intuition‟ was significantly 
influenced by the intellectual, cultural, political currents he was experiencing. 
Our concern here is not only how Berdiaev formulates the cognitive framework for 
his thought; even more problematic is the way he uses intuition as a defense for highly 
speculative ideas that could otherwise not be supported (e.g. the Ungrund).  His defense of 
these ideas is, ultimately, found in „intuition‟. Berdiaev relies on the position that he „knew‟ it 
to be true and thus it is true.  This „knowledge‟ was based on his intuition.  While we 
suggested in chapter 2 that his view of intuition included the category of experience, his 
privileging of the initial intuitive thought often diminished the idea of experience.  This 
leaves Berdiaev‟s thought open to the charge of being idiosyncratic and therefore unable to 
provide a generally comprehensible view of what freedom means for the person.  This is an 
unfortunate outcome, since his vision of freedom is not derived solely from an intuition, but, 
this research contends, also from his experience of the freedom that the Triune God grants to 
creation.  Berdiaev‟s views on theodicy and non-determination, of course, would prevent him 
from acknowledging that freedom originates with God.  But, if he had been able to 
understand that freedom originates with God and not with the Abyss, his thought would have 
had a much more solid footing. 
182 
 
Even though Berdiaev‟s emphasis on „intuition‟ leads him to a questionable 
understanding of cognition, this does not undermine the internal coherence to be found in his 
self-described intuitive thought.  To use Volf‟s phrase once again, there is “a basic „goodness 
of fit.‟”3  Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom remained a constant focus within his work, and his 
thought is consistently directed towards that vision.  Therefore, since Berdiaev‟s vision of 
freedom is in actuality not derived from a „singular intuition‟ but is rather a vision, comprised 
of an impressive mosaic derived from differing strands of thought – including philosophy, 
theology, the arts, and culture – and experience, we find his vision to have a certain plasticity, 
and therein the capacity for reconfiguring his thought in a different theological framework.  
Because of this we can state that his conception of intuition can be regarded as peripheral and 
need not be understood as the primary factor for the origination of his core vision.  The 
strength of Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom is not dependent upon an intuition, but rather upon 
his creative synthesis (which uses his intuitive capabilities) and astute analysis as to the 
nature and implications of freedom – a freedom God grants to creation. 
The importance he placed on „intuition‟ is directly related to his mystical approach 
and it is to this area that we now turn. 
 
2.  Bifurcation and the Mystical Approach 
 
While Berdiaev‟s reliance on mysticism and his particular interpretation of it may be 
comprehensible within the context of the Silver Age, this approach makes little contribution 
to his vision of freedom.  His mystical constructions contain difficulties that, at best, do not 
accomplish what he proposes (either from a theological or philosophical perspective), and, at 
worst, obfuscate his thought. 
Our critique in this section will be focused on his mystical approach and the 
consequences of this approach.
4
  We will bracket out, for the time being, a specific concept 
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 While our critique of Berdiaev‟s mystical approach is, for the most part, negative, this should not be 
construed to mean that this research views the Christian mystical tradition and practice in the same negative 
light.  Moltmann, especially in SL, offers a more acceptable alternative to Berdiaev‟s own understanding.  In 
describing mystical theology Moltmann comments, “By „mystical‟ we do not mean here special supernatural 
experiences.  We mean the intensity of the experience of God in faith, so that in this sense we are talking about 
the deep dimension of every experience of faith.”  SL, 198.  The mystical experience, for Moltmann,  is not the 
domain of the spiritually elite, but rather the province of those who faithfully follow the words of Christ and 
develop a child-like trust.  SL, 211.  See also, Moltmann, “Theology of Mystical Experience.”  Moltmann‟s 
perspective provides a worthwhile alternative to Berdiaev‟s mystical approach. 
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his mystic-thought propounds – the Ungrund – till later in the chapter when we address the 
idea of „embodied‟ freedom. 
It is important to remember that Berdiaev‟s mystical approach is based on viewing 
the world as phenomenal and noumenal, which becomes an important theme in his thought.  
His mystical approach can, in many regards, be seen as a speculative cognitive approach used 
to assert this bifurcated understanding of reality.  He believed that a viable understanding of 
freedom required this perspective. 
There are certainly points of agreement between this understanding and orthodox 
Christianity.  The Christian tradition proclaims that the material world is not the only reality 
and that God cannot be defined with material concepts.
5
  Berdiaev‟s mistake, however, is his 
belief that the spiritual world that Christianity speaks of is wholly separate from the material 
world.  When he communicates this through his „tentative‟ style, one is left with the 
impression that he is not discussing the existence of two realms but rather two separate 
worlds.  In conjunction with this, Berdiaev wrongly conceives of the Fall as resulting in the 
bifurcation of the world into two realms (worlds) as opposed to one realm in need of 
restoration. 
Berdiaev‟s commitment to this idea is based on his understanding that freedom is 
constrained by the reality of existence.  He adopts the idea of a bifurcated world early in his 
career, believing that if freedom and existence only occur within the material world then 
determinism would be proved right.  The problem is that in attempting to overcome the 
supposed determinism of the material world, his thought results in a depreciation of the 
„material‟, along with a highly elevated view of elements conceived to be „spiritual‟ (we shall 
see in the following section the problem this raises with regard to his view of the Spirit). 
Within this thought the created order possesses little value for the pursuit of freedom.  
The material (phenomenal) must be transcended, for material is an impediment to the full 
experience of freedom.  One of the problems of a position such as this is highlighted by 
Moltmann: 
Ever since Romanticism, the „unhappy consciousness of the beautiful soul‟ (Hegel) 
has fled from the constricting, alienating, and meaningless reality of phenomena into 
the dream world of the beyond, into the unhindered realm of play where imaginary 
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possibilities abound.  Yet, it is precisely this flight from reality which has abandoned 
the social and political dimensions to inhuman powers.
6
 
 
In fairness to Berdiaev, he was not „abandoning‟ the material to pursue the spiritual, 
but was seeking the restoration of the material through the spiritual.  Yet Moltmann‟s 
observation strikes a chord in Berdiaev‟s approach.  While Berdiaev alludes to the material 
being united with the spiritual in the eschaton, his belief in a clear separation between the 
spiritual and the material means that his thought considers the phenomenal world from a 
decidedly negative perspective.  This is a significant problem, for it leaves Berdiaev with a 
low regard for the material. 
Moltmann‟s perspective on the relationship between the „spiritual‟ and the „material‟ 
provides a clear alternative to ameliorate this deficiency.  In discussing contemporary 
Christian spirituality, Moltmann rightly observes a „Platonization‟ of Christianity, which 
“takes the form of a kind of hostility to the body, a kind of remoteness from the world, and a 
preference for the inner experiences of the soul rather than the sensory experiences of 
sociality and nature.”7  Although Moltmann is not addressing Berdiaev directly, his 
assessment certainly fits the problem we see in Berdiaev‟s view.  In contrast to this 
„Platonization‟ Moltmann asserts that a person must be seen as a part of the created (material) 
world.  A human being is the image of God in “their whole and particular bodily existence.”8  
The person cannot be understood apart from creation, the materiality of the person is not 
something to be overcome.  The person belongs “within the all-embracing coherences of 
God‟s history with the world, the history of creation and the history of redemption.”9 
Moltmann shares with Berdiaev the hope for the restoration of all things, but that 
hope is grounded in the crucified God and the presence of the Spirit, not in a devaluation of 
the present world.
10
  The experience of the Spirit “means that we shall be redeemed with the 
world, not from it.  Christian experience of the Spirit does not cut us off from the world.  The 
more we hope for the world, the deeper our solidarity with its sighing and suffering.”11 
Moltmann‟s thought allows us to affirm Berdiaev‟s basic understanding of the 
importance of experiencing God through the Spirit, while understanding the material world as 
a necessary part of that experience and not an impediment to it.  Thus, the person does not 
move between two realms in some sort of Cartesian paradigm but lives in the present as a 
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spiritual-physical being.  Even though Berdiaev‟s mystical approach posits a problematic 
view of reality and the material, it does not have a completely negative effect on his vision of 
freedom. 
His mystical approach, in fact, allows him to rightly assess the difficulty of the person 
attaining freedom through his own power.  Recognizing the impact of external forces, 
Berdiaev‟s analysis is correct – only through relationship with God and others can the person 
experience a robust freedom.  Thus, although the premise of his mystical approach is faulty (a 
bifurcated reality), the conclusion is correct – freedom has a relational and „spiritual‟ aspect 
to it. 
Another benefit gained from his mystical approach is how it molds his understanding 
of „integral knowledge‟.  We have seen that this thought is not original to Berdiaev, but he 
does use it to the fullest in expounding his vision of freedom.  The idea that cognition 
involves the “intellectual, affective, and volitional” capabilities is consonant with a general 
Christian theological understanding of cognition.
12
  This research does not attempt to detail 
Berdiaev‟s more speculative epistemological constructs, but even these speculations (based 
on his bifurcated world-view) do not negate the benefit of understanding knowledge – and 
particularly knowledge of God – as involving the whole person and not simply the use of 
reason. 
Although Berdiaev was convinced his mystical approach was essential to 
understanding freedom, we have seen that it actually makes understanding freedom within 
the created order highly problematic.  For humanity does not exist in two worlds, but in one 
world that contains the spiritual and the material.  By separating the two he makes it difficult 
to understand the value of freedom for human existence.  Moltmann presents a more holistic 
conceptualization for the experience of God and the role of the material.  This approach is not 
completely contradictory to Berdiaev‟s, yet it is more broadly comprehensible and congruous 
to the reality of human existence.  If we use Moltmann‟s understanding of the relationship 
between the spiritual and the material we see that we do not have to negate Berdiaev‟s 
contribution that knowledge must be integral and that freedom requires a spiritual aspect. 
As Berdiaev‟s mystical approach was based on his concept of the spiritual, we now 
turn our attention to his view of spirit and what the spirit means for freedom. 
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 Cf. Moltmann: “This identification of the true centre of human beings with consciousness and reason 
is Western, modern and, not least, typically male. . . . But we acquire most of our experiences neither through 
our consciousness, nor through our reason, nor as the result of any deliberate intention.  We perceive the 
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3.  Spirit 
 
The critique of Berdiaev‟s thought on „spirit‟ utilizes the distinction we made in 
chapter 4, where it was proposed that Berdiaev‟s use of the term „spirit‟ has two different, 
although related, functions and applications – „spirit‟ as a sphere of existence and „Spirit‟ as 
the Holy Spirit.  In both instances, Berdiaev‟s creative thought is obscured by his adherence 
to a bifurcated understanding of reality and false elevation of elements he conceives to be 
spiritual. 
First, with regard to spirit as a sphere of existence, we recall Berdiaev‟s formulation 
of theandric freedom, where the most substantial forms of freedom will be found in the 
person‟s spiritual existence.  This position may appear to be congruous with the apostle 
Paul‟s words, “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom,”13 but it is not.  The problem, 
of course, is that Berdiaev uses „spirit‟ to denote a sphere of existence, and this is not the 
same as Paul‟s understanding of the “Spirit of the Lord.”  For Berdiaev, the spirit as a sphere 
of existence is the noumenal realm, and while the Spirit exists in the noumenal realm, the 
noumenal realm and the Spirit refer to two separate realities. 
Hence we encounter the problems of a bifurcated reality yet again.  Berdiaev‟s 
connection of „spirit‟ and freedom means that in certain cases he is attributing the person‟s 
experience of freedom to the experience of the noumenal realm.  It is at this juncture that the 
weakness of this bifurcated view is exceedingly apparent.  For Berdiaev, the noumenal 
experience (i.e., the person‟s spiritual experience) is something that takes place outside of 
time, space, and matter.
14
  Berdiaev‟s thought here could be construed to mean that a person‟s 
spiritual experience is disembodied.  This position is clearly not tenable. 
A Christian understanding of experiencing the Spirit does not envisage the person 
becoming disembodied; his materiality is not an impediment.  Even if some sort of 
„disembodiment‟ was possible, wherein the person transcends the material, how could the 
person have any understanding of the experience without the framework of time, space, and 
matter?  Berdiaev‟s prejudiced view of the material leads him to a confused position.  It is 
unfortunate, since his initial idea that spiritual experience is an experience of freedom has 
merit. 
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There is certainly a strong strand within Christian theology that would agree with 
Berdiaev – to experience the Spirit is to experience freedom.15  It is even possible to say that 
this experience is a fuller experience of freedom than what is possible without the Holy 
Spirit.  Moltmann consistently argues for a position that echoes Berdiaev‟s thought – the 
experience of the Spirit grants „space‟ to the individual, to live „in‟ the Spirit is to have the 
space to be free.
16
  But, living „in‟ the Spirit, for Moltmann, is living in the material world; it 
is not an escape from the material.  Berdiaev cannot hold this position due to his faulty 
understanding of the material world.  Thus, even though Berdiaev could agree with 
Moltmann that life „in‟ the Spirit brings freedom, he would claim that this life has to 
transcend the material world for the experience to occur. 
Hence transcendence is another important issue for Berdiaev‟s view of „spirit‟ and 
freedom.  This is due to the misunderstanding that the spiritual is a transcendence from the 
material world, with transcendence connoting an overcoming of the materiality of creation.  
Moltmann argues that this is not the case with the transcendent experience of God.  The 
Spirit‟s transcendence is also immanence; i.e. through the Spirit the person experiences a God 
who is beyond this world and yet because God dwells in the world through the Spirit, it is 
also an immanence.  “To experience God in all things presupposes that there is transcendence 
which is immanent in things and which can be inductively discovered.  It is the infinite in the 
finite, the eternal in the temporal, and the enduring in the transitory.”17  Contrary to Berdiaev, 
Moltmann rightly conceives of the transcendence of the Spirit being understood as the 
transcendent God dwelling within the person and within the created order.  It is through this 
transcendence that the person is made whole – spirit and body.18 
Berdiaev‟s thought on the Holy Spirit is also questionable.  His tentative style, fear of 
objectification, and bifurcated view make it problematic to understand Berdiaev‟s exact 
conception of the Spirit.  In some sense the Trinity becomes a binity, as it is difficult to detect 
in his work the Spirit being a Trinitarian Person.  So, while he gives considerable attention to 
the Spirit, the Spirit often functions as the presence that makes freedom and life possible – 
the Spirit can be viewed as an „actualizer‟ for a true humanity.  The Spirit who acts 
independent of the person is often missing from his thought.  Any notion of the Spirit leading 
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(Gal. 5: 18) the person becomes difficult to detect as Berdiaev only focuses on the Spirit 
empowering the person to mature and transcend. 
Even with these acknowledged weaknesses, the strength of Berdiaev‟s assertion that 
freedom is dependent on the Spirit remains valid.  This validity is possible because his 
conception of the Spirit, ultimately, has its moorings in the Christian faith.  For instance, even 
though his Germanic philosophical influences are pronounced, Idinopulos rightly points out,  
He diverged, however, from the tendency of nineteenth-century idealism to conceive 
of spirit as an autonomous, impersonal, and abstract power of will or mind which 
expresses itself historically through the instrumentality of human thought and action.  
In place of rational or “pure” spirit, Berdyaev substituted personality and the 
meanings of the interpersonal which he discerned in the affirmations of the Christian 
faith.
19
 
 
Berdiaev‟s rejection of the Hegelian „Spirit‟, commitment to the „affirmations of the 
Christian faith,‟ and his understanding of the Holy Spirit as the link between the person and 
God (“In the Holy Spirit God becomes immanent in the world and in man. . . .”20), indicate 
the importance of the Holy Spirit for Berdiaev‟s thought. 
The importance of the Holy Spirit for freedom is mirrored in Moltmann: “Freedom 
and life are the two key facts in experiences of the divine Spirit.  Freedom without new life is 
empty.  Life without freedom is dead.”21  One of the strengths of Berdiaev‟s vision of 
freedom and creativity is that he understands freedom as finding its fullest expression in 
union with God and others, and that this union is made possible by the Spirit.  Berdiaev‟s 
thought would certainly have profited if he had been more disciplined and jettisoned his 
commitment to the phenomenal/noumenal perspective; however, his vision of freedom 
finding fulfillment in the life of the Spirit can certainly contribute to a theological discourse 
on freedom. 
 
4.  Sobornost‟ 
 
Berdiaev‟s sobornost‟ is one of the clearest demonstrations that his thought was not a 
modernistic project which sought to replace God with the individual.  Berdiaev discovered 
early in his career that the person‟s freedom depends on the „other‟, and the only way for the 
free person to relate to the „other‟ would be through love and the Holy Spirit.  Even though 
sobornost‟ is central to his vision, he does not devote that much attention, comparatively 
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speaking, to the concept.  Sobornost‟ is a concept that is assumed throughout his thought.  He 
acknowledges that it has not received widespread attention, but does not see fit to remedy that 
in his own work. 
Of all the concepts that Berdiaev synthesizes into his vision of freedom, sobornost‟ is 
the least modified, with his basic understanding mirroring the general formulations of 
Khomiakov and the Slavophiles.
22
  Because Berdiaev‟s formulation of sobornost‟ is so 
closely related to Khomiakov‟s understanding, Berdiaev‟s thought is open to the critique that 
has been leveled against the Slavophiles – namely that the concept is impracticable at best 
and anarchic at worst. 
Walicki states that “The main weakness of his [Khomiakov‟s] conception was its utter 
impracticability, characteristic of the Slavophile movement.”23  The issue of practicality is 
not the only challenge to sobornost‟, there was also the assertion that it denied ecclesial 
authority and succumbed to Protestant individualism.  This was the basis of Fr. Florensky‟s 
(whom Berdiaev labeled an „ultra-Orthodox‟24) pointed article in 1916 where he questions 
Khomiakov‟s loyalty to the Orthodox Church and to the Tsar.25 While there is some merit in 
these charges, in the end it is not sufficient to invalidate the concept or Berdiaev‟s integration 
of it when considering freedom for the person. 
As sobornost‟ is predicated on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit it is first and foremost 
a Christian ideal.  Berdiaev was not proposing a sobornost‟ State (although he did believe 
that Christians should relate to government and society within a soborny framework).  So, in 
this sense, any charge that Berdiaev was naïve because sobornost‟ is an impractical „political‟ 
solution cannot be supported. 
With regard to the person‟s immediate faith community, the issue of practicality 
becomes more pointed.  Is it possible for a Christian community to be a soborny community, 
a free egalitarian fellowship based on the Spirit and love that eschews hierarchical structures?  
Yes, it is.  We can see a soborny structure in Paul‟s admonition to the Corinthians that they 
should live as one body to such a degree that “If one member suffers, all suffer together with 
it; if one member is honoured, all rejoice together with it.”26  One can also recall the early 
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church in Acts 2 for another example of a community that could be regarded as a soborny 
community.
27
 
Although there is scriptural reference that intimates sobornost‟, the question of 
practicality remains – how does this occur?  Berdiaev‟s response would most likely be that 
„practicality‟ has little to do with the generation and maintenance of sobornost‟.  Sobornost‟ 
cannot be programmed or instituted from „above‟, it can only be developed on a relational 
level through the presence of the Spirit, which, at times, may appear highly impractical.  If 
practicality or success were the criteria used to demonstrate validity, then one could rightly 
question whether the Sermon on the Mount is actually applicable to a contemporary context.  
The strength of Berdiaev‟s thought is in realizing that because freedom is central for the 
person‟s existence, there must be a paradigm for relationship that values relationality, the 
person, and her freedom.  Sobornost‟ is such a paradigm and through it Berdiaev propounds a 
robust freedom that is relational and „anti-individualistic‟.28 
There is a considerable correlation between Berdiaev‟s sobornost‟ and Moltmann‟s 
idea of „open friendship‟.29  It is not without significance that Moltmann arrives at a similar 
conclusion to Berdiaev‟s – the existence of freedom requires „open‟ and egalitarian 
relationships and rejects blind acceptance to hierarchal structures.
30
  Although Moltmann has 
been criticized for his idea of „open friendship‟, his commitment to it reflects an important 
consideration for a theological perspective on freedom.
31
 
For both authors, their respective positions are not a complete rejection of tradition or 
obedience (although it is accepted that in Berdiaev‟s case this is sometimes difficult to 
determine).  Both want to assert that if the person is free, and if their freedom is maturing 
through relationship with others and with God, then there must be an alternative paradigm 
possible (Berdiaev: sobornost‟ and Moltmann: „open friendship‟) for how the person can 
exist in community with others.  There is little doubt that communities that place a strong 
emphasis on clear lines of authority and a stress a univocal understanding, where possible, of 
God and human existence, have a better chance of „surviving‟ and being „practical‟ than a 
community that adopts a sobornost‟ principle.  But, Berdiaev would most likely assert, the 
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primary objectives of the person and the community are not survival, practicality, or even 
success, but rather the growth of the person‟s freedom in relation to God and others, and 
becoming co-creators with God.  Sobornost‟ may sound like an idealized vision, but the idea 
has strong parallels with the prayer that Jesus prays: “The glory that you have given me I 
have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one.  I in them and you in me, that they 
may become completely one. . . .”32 
It is acknowledged that even though practical concerns do not negate sobornost‟, they 
cannot be entirely avoided.  The „how‟ of sobornost‟, and for that matter Moltmann‟s „open‟ 
friendship as well, needs to be addressed, since soborny thinking is directed towards the life 
experience of the person and community.  While there cannot be a proposal that is both 
general and specific since each community, like each relationship, is different, we can, 
however, develop Berdiaev‟s thought further by returning to the idea of „embodied‟ freedom. 
„Embodied‟ freedom is a developmental proposal, i.e. freedom is not a singular 
phenomenon but exists as a range of possible modalities of freedom.   This research contends 
that sobornost‟ should be considered from a similar perspective.  It would seem clear that if 
sobornost‟ (and for that matter Moltmann‟s „open friendship‟) exists in a symbiotic 
relationship with freedom, and if freedom is experienced in varying degrees, then, sobornost‟ 
must also be considered as existing with a range of possible modalities.  Consequently, a 
soborny relationship develops and grows with freedom and deteriorates through the loss of 
freedom.  Sobornost‟ should not be considered a static concept; it is, to use one of Berdiaev‟s 
favorite words, dynamic.  Because of its „dynamic‟ nature, one must expect that the 
manifestation of sobornost‟ will vary greatly between persons and communities. 
Viewed from this perspective we can see that sobornost‟ is not a utopian ideal.  A 
soborny community is not a community without conflict, a community where there is 
harmony and unanimous agreement on all things.
33
  A soborny community will experience 
conflict, but it recognizes that unity of the community is as important as any concept or 
debate that may rupture it.  In periods of conflict the question then becomes not who is right 
and who is wrong, but how bonds of love and fellowship are maintained amongst differing 
views. 
Another contribution that Berdiaev‟s sobornost‟ makes to a theological discourse of 
freedom is the uniting of freedom with love.  We have already suggested that a strength of 
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Berdiaev‟s thought on spirit is that he links the experience of the Spirit with experience of a 
robust freedom.  In sobornost‟ we see that the experience of the Spirit is also an experience of 
love and this love is integrally connected to the experience of freedom.  A similar connection 
is evident in Moltmann describing the experience of the Holy Spirit: “The fellowship of the 
Holy Spirit is experienced by those who know it as both the love that binds and the freedom 
which allows everything to arrive at itself, in its own unique nature.”34  Through his 
commitment to sobornost‟, we see that Berdiaev does not regard the higher forms of freedom 
as isolating experiences that result in individualism, but rather as a way of existence that 
leads both to personhood and to whole communities. 
 
5.  Justification of the Person 
 
The importance of sobornost‟ must be seen in the light of Berdiaev‟s „justification‟ of 
the person.  Although the individual must exist in relationship to mature and grow, the 
community is never greater than the individual.  He is consistent in his belief that the person 
is never a „means‟ but always an „end‟.  His thought on personality, while convoluted at 
times, constantly returns to this theme, as he rightly asserts that the person possesses an 
intrinsic value. 
The integration of freedom and creativity into the discussion concerning the 
development of the individual into a person is one of the strengths of Berdiaev‟s view of 
„personality‟.  Personality cannot be solely given by God; the individual must freely 
contribute to her development.  He is unusually direct in maintaining the importance of 
freedom for personhood.  Without freedom (and the human subjectivity it engenders) the 
individual‟s own contribution to her development is problematic.  Embodied freedom, then, 
can be rightly seen as an integral concept for his idea of personhood. 
Recognizing the benefit of his view that stresses the importance of the person and 
maintains a linkage between freedom and personality, there are several areas that are 
problematic.  First, although Berdiaev was correct to posit that the person must contribute to 
his development, his view can be seen to be too simplistic, since the development of 
personhood (personality) relies on more than freedom.  The individual develops his 
„personality‟ in concert with a host of factors, including the gift of being created, and the 
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context of his existence.  Freedom does play an important role in this, but a free person needs 
more than himself to develop, grow, and mature.
35
 
Personhood relies on the giftedness of relationship with God and others, as well as the 
context of the person‟s existence, which is not (contra Berdiaev) always negative force.  
Berdiaev‟s thought, with his stress on the individual‟s freedom and creative abilities, looks 
past this fact.  It would seem that in the attempt to demonstrate that the individual can be free 
from external forces, Berdiaev downplays the important reality that the gift of external 
sources is required in the person‟s maturation.36  Berdiaev‟s existential outlook at times 
ignores the important differentiation between external „forces‟ and external „sources‟ for the 
development of the person. 
The second concern pertains to his concept of „divine-human‟.  As we saw in chapter 
4, Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom is closely related to his vision of the person, with the 
intersecting point between his ideas of „freedom‟ and the „person‟ being „divine humanity‟.  
From a theological perspective, the first obvious problem concerns terminology.  „Grace‟, 
„imago Dei‟, and „theandric freedom‟ all overlap and in the end, for him, seem to intimate the 
same thing: the person‟s divine-human potential.  His appropriation of these terms was 
creative and original, and his speculative thought hints at some interesting interpretative 
possibilities, but in the end his thought remains that, a „hint‟.  His treatment of grace and the 
imago requires significantly more development than he provides.  His thought, in its current 
state, reduces „grace‟ to a „theandric‟ action – an act dependent on God and the individual.  
This means that „grace‟ is no longer „freely‟ given, since it is now dependent upon the 
person‟s response. 
Berdiaev was trying to overcome the tension between God‟s grace and human agency, 
and his „theandric‟ concept moves in a helpful direction (the person‟s response to God does 
matter).  But, because his thought is under-developed, his fear of grace becoming something 
that is „forced‟ upon the person leads to his view of „grace‟ becoming something that is 
dependent upon the person.  As such, the free and gracious acts of a loving God, who wishes 
“to freely bestow”37 grace, becomes difficult to see in Berdiaev‟s view of personality. 
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A reason for this under-development can be found in his flawed vision of „divine-
humanity‟.  Berdiaev‟s early commentators supported this concept of divine humanity as 
evidence of Berdiaev‟s valuing the person.  Vallon: “The conclusion of the matter is that 
Berdyaev‟s emphatic anthropodicy or defense of the infinite value of man is both scriptural 
and Christian.”38  The problem with Berdiaev‟s idea that the person is divine-human (and its 
related view that God is „humane‟39) is that he moved beyond highly valuing the person, and 
instead elevated the person beyond what can be supported by scripture or a vast segment of 
tradition.  Vallon‟s comment that Berdiaev‟s view is “both scriptural and Christian” is false.  
This is not to say that Berdiaev did not have important contributions to make concerning the 
relationship between God and human.  There are certainly grounds to view the person as 
participating in the divine nature of God, but Berdiaev‟s thought takes him beyond a 
participation to often regarding the person as divine.
40
 
Berdiaev does acknowledge that the person is not „Divine‟, but his tentative style 
along with his desire to elevate the person often intimates that the primary concern is seeing 
the person as „divine‟.41  This can be seen in his use of theosis.  A concept that is well-
established in the Orthodox tradition, Berdiaev frequently only emphasizes deification while 
neglecting the theme of redemption.  He does acknowledge that the person‟s divinity is 
realized in relationship with God, but more often than not, the „divinity‟ of the person 
overshadows the importance of the relationship with God through redemption.  Theosis, then, 
becomes a concept to affirm the „divine‟ nature of the person, as opposed to a doctrine that is 
concerned with the relationship between the divine and the human.
42
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Thus even though he states that the divine and human natures of the person must be 
preserved to avoid a „monistic‟ perspective, it becomes difficult to understand what value 
Berdiaev sees in the person‟s human nature.  His emphasis on the divine nature of the person 
creates the impression that ultimately he is not really that concerned with the humanity and 
bodily form of the person.
43
  This is a regrettable turn in his thought, especially considering 
his constant references to the humanity of Christ along with his novel interpretations of the 
Monophysite heresy.  As we have seen, he correctly points out that the “The Son of God 
became a man and not an angel”44 and therefore God affirms the value of humanity.  Yet, 
more often than not, the „humanness‟ of the individual is lost in repeated attempts to assert 
the person‟s „divine‟ nature. 
Berdiaev‟s belief that by emphasizing the „divinity‟ of the person he could show the 
distinctiveness of the person is problematic.  By blurring the differentiation between Divine 
and human, and the resultant misreading of theosis, Berdiaev loses sight of what makes the 
person distinctive, namely his humanity.  Obviously his bifurcated view of reality contributes 
to this difficulty, since in his desire to elevate the person beyond the realm of necessity and 
slavery, he regards the material as an objectifying force.  We thus see that Berdiaev‟s skewed 
view of divinization is directly linked to his bifurcated view of reality.  In a certain sense they 
are two sides of the same coin.  His belief that the person is „divine-human‟ is his „answer‟ 
for how the person can avoid the objectifying nature of the material realm. 
It is possible to affirm Berdiaev‟s basic tenet (highly valuing the person), without 
having to maintain his „divine-human‟ concept, through Moltmann‟s perspective.  Moltmann 
shares a similar conviction that the person, who is more than an individual, must be valued.  
Yet, for Moltmann, the dignity of the person does not depend upon a „divine‟ nature that is 
based on the imago, but rather, the imago indicates that the person is created by God and can 
exist in relation to God and others.  It is these two factors – being created by God and existing 
in relationship – from which the person derives her value.  Hence Moltmann conceives of 
relationship as something that not only makes freedom possible, but personhood as well.
45
 
                                                                                                                                                        
person as opposed to the „communion‟ with God while also ignoring the „negative‟ (i.e. redemption).  This 
aspect of his thought tends to neglect his work on sobornost‟.  Berdiaev does not recognize that his emphasis on 
the „divine-human‟ has an „individualist‟ tendency as it elevates the individual above the relationship in which 
the individual participates. 
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The individual becomes a person in relationship and relationship becomes the most 
decisive characteristic of her existence.
46
  This thought does not preclude talk of „deification‟, 
but „deification‟ („realistic divinization‟) becomes dependent upon the person‟s existence 
with God through Christ and the ongoing work of the Spirit, as opposed to Berdiaev‟s 
construct that depends on his speculative understanding of grace, the imago, and the person‟s 
theandric capabilities.  Moltmann‟s thought does not seek to „elevate‟ the person at the 
expense of the individual‟s humanness, but rather highlights the dignity of the person as a 
human (mind, body, and spirit) in relation to God and others. 
Moltmann‟s perspective does not vitiate Berdiaev‟s understanding that the person is 
called to participate with God in creative acts, but rather it more firmly grounds the person‟s 
creativity in their participation with God as opposed to any inherent nature the person may 
possess outside of relation to God and others. 
 
6.  Justification of God 
 
The justification of God (Berdiaev‟s theodicy) is a constant reference point for his 
vision of freedom.  We have seen that the problem of evil is an ever-present concern in 
Berdiaev‟s work.  The focus on theodicy is notable for his strong conviction that any talk of 
freedom must always address the question of evil.  At the core of his „justification‟ is the 
Ungrund.
47
  In this section we will assess whether the conception of meonic freedom is 
effective in his theodicy; in the following section we will critique Berdiaev‟s integration of 
the Ungrund in his vision of freedom. 
Our main critique of Berdiaev‟s „justification of God‟ is that it fails to accomplish 
what it proposes – it is not the unassailable theodicy he claimed it to be.  As we have seen, 
Berdiaev was convinced that the Ungrund provided the explanation as to how freedom can 
exist without God being responsible for evil.  It is an interesting view but in the end it does 
not solve the paradox of freedom, God, and evil.  Berdiaev is convinced that if God creates 
freedom, God is then responsible for evil.  Yet his solution, that God is absolved because 
„freedom‟ does not originate with God, God only engages with this „stuff‟ to create, falls far 
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 “Theologically, the human being‟s likeness to God is not based on the qualities of human beings.  It 
is grounded in their relationship to God.  That relationship is a double one.  It means God‟s relation to human 
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relation to them.”  GSS, 84 (Italics author). 
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critique of „divine anthropomorphism‟, however, pertains more to the person‟s „divine‟ nature than to the 
humanity of God.  See fn. 39 above. 
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short of „justifying‟ God.48  Spinka correctly argues that God is not successfully „justified‟ (to 
use Berdiaev‟s term). 
. . . Berdyaev‟s “uncreated freedom” theory really does not free God from 
responsibility for at least consenting to use the “meonic” stuff in creation, although he 
knew it contained freedom.  Did not God know what the consequences of freedom 
would be?  How much difference is there between God‟s creating freedom, and his 
using matter which contained it?
49
 
 
Berdiaev‟s myth creates an extra step in the process of creation; it does not, however, 
remove God‟s responsibility for the existence of evil.  If God brings creation into existence 
using meonic „stuff‟ (even if it is „no-thing‟), and this meonic „stuff‟ can also precipitate evil, 
then the absolute separation that Berdiaev seeks between God and evil is not clearly 
demonstrated.  God is still responsible for using this „stuff‟, which contains the potential for 
evil, in bringing creation into existence. 
Vallon counters this with the argument that God creates because that is who God is 
and, therefore, God also redeems creation.
50
  It is accepted that highlighting redemption is 
one approach to theodicy, but this is not Berdiaev‟s approach.  Beside the unintentional 
intimation Vallon‟s argument seems to make, that redemption can be viewed as „atonement‟ 
for creating (God could not help creating with the Ungrund so God will redeem creation), 
Vallon‟s argument does not meet Berdiaev‟s own standard and, thus does not support 
Berdiaev‟s position.51 
A much more comprehensible approach to theodicy is found in Moltmann‟s theology.  
Moltmann shares Berdiaev‟s angst over the problem of evil, but Moltmann‟s position, that 
theodicy must be the „open‟ question that humanity lives with, provides a more helpful, and 
plausible, response.  It is an „open‟ question because, in the end, humanity cannot formulate 
an ultimate answer for theodicy.
52
 
Theodicy as an „open‟ question does not deny the existence of suffering, or ignore the 
reality that suffering causes in the world.  By not focusing on a final answer and keeping the 
question „open‟, it strives to keep the sufferer‟s plight from becoming abstracted.  Also, by 
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stressing the openness of the question, further investigation and thought is encouraged, as 
opposed to claiming that the question has been solved.  Therefore, all views of freedom and 
relationship must be cognizant of those who are not free and those who suffer. 
Moltmann‟s „open‟ question not only seeks to recognize the suffering of humans and 
the created order, it also recognizes God‟s suffering.  Both writers contend that God suffers, 
but whereas Berdiaev‟s thought begins with Dostoevsky‟s Legend, Moltmann grounds his 
„open‟ question in the cross and in God‟s suffering and devotes considerable attention to the 
idea of a passible God.  Moltmann‟s view of the cross being a two-fold response to evil (God 
„walks‟ with those who suffer and will eventually restore all, either in this time or in the time 
to come) has much to commend it.
53
  Although Berdiaev‟s use of Dostoevsky is highly 
creative, Dostoevsky‟s image of Christ being silent before the Grand Inquisitor appears to 
have led Berdiaev to not seriously consider the implications of his conviction that God 
suffers.  Dostoevsky‟s influence kept the angst of theodicy in front of Berdiaev, but 
Berdiaev‟s belief that he could solve the problem using Boehme‟s mystical construct leads 
him to an unsatisfactory conclusion. 
Therefore, Berdiaev‟s contention, that the origination of freedom and God must be 
separated so that God is not responsible for evil, is faulty.  A freedom originating outside of 
God does not provide a comprehensible theodicy if one wants also to maintain some sort of 
fidelity to the basic Christian understanding of God‟s nature (which Berdiaev does strive for).  
Also, as Moltmann rightly contends, theodicy is not a problem that can be solved in this 
current time.  Thus, the response to theodicy is not to be found in separating freedom and 
God, but rather in focusing on a God who suffers for the creation and delivers it through his 
suffering. 
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 Regardless that inside academic theological circles “there is a strong conviction about the suffering 
of God” (Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 1), passibility remains for some, especially for those within the Church, a 
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continuity with our normal experience of love, the conclusion seems inescapable that a loving God must be a 
sympathetic and therefore suffering God.”  Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 17. 
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7.  The Ungrund 
 
The Ungrund is the most controversial aspect of Berdiaev‟s work.  It is the 
culmination of his mystical approach and as such the weaknesses of this approach are fully 
evident within this „myth‟.  The extremely speculative character of his conception of the 
Ungrund raises numerous difficulties, and with no grounding in scripture and little support 
from the Christian tradition, it is theologically indefensible.  The speculation about the 
Ungrund – what Wernham refers to as “turgid metaphysics”54 – is a visible fault line in his 
vision.  Spinka observes that “The doctrine of „uncreated freedom‟ drew upon Berdyaev more 
criticism than any other of his views.  He was aware of it, and even came to the conclusion 
that he was alone in holding the doctrine.  And no wonder.  For this highly speculative theory 
raises more serious problems than it allays or solves.”55  Spinka‟s analysis is clearly in line 
with the majority of Berdiaev commentators. 
One of the primary problems with this thought is that Berdiaev never clearly 
delineates the relationship between the Ungrund and God.  McLachlan observes that 
Berdiaev‟s modification of Boehme (the Ungrund to be „outside‟ of God) is problematic. 
But I don‟t think it is clear how even symbolically this can be.  The Ungrund as pre-
existential freedom provides a common link between both God and creation [in 
Boehme‟s thought].  It precedes them both and they are both grounded in it.  To place 
the Ungrund outside the divine life thus makes little sense if we accept what Berdyaev 
says elsewhere about the priority of freedom.
56
 
 
Although McLachlan ignores the primary reason for Berdiaev considering the 
Ungrund to be outside of God, his observation on the problem that this modification raises is 
correct.  McLachlan points out that Berdiaev‟s position (God and Ungrund being separate) 
leads to God, in relation to creation, being reduced to an “intelligible ideal pole in relation to 
the indetermination of freedom.”57  God as an „ideal pole‟ is clearly not Berdiaev‟s vision of 
the Deity, and yet because Berdiaev is unable to provide a cogent explanation of how God 
relates to the Ungrund, God‟s interaction with creation can be reduced to such a status. 
As questionable as Boehme‟s vision was, at the minimum it maintained some type of 
unity between God and the Ungrund.  When Berdiaev severs that relationship in the interests 
of theodicy he creates a dualist picture that is contrary to one of the most basic tenets of 
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orthodox Christianity; i.e., in the beginning there was only God.  We have seen that Berdiaev 
rejects the charge of „ontological dualism‟, claiming that the Ungrund is a „myth‟, (the 
Ungrund is a „no-thing‟) and that this therefore cannot be an „ontological‟ dualism.  This 
defense is inadequate. 
There are some scholars who have supported Berdiaev‟s defense of the Ungrund on 
the grounds of „myth‟, and in so doing have attempted to counter Lampert‟s assessment that it 
“is probably the most disastrous conclusion in his [Berdiaev‟s] philosophy. . . .”58  Osborn 
(echoing the work of Clarke and Seaver) seeks to mitigate some of the harsher criticisms by 
emphasizing that the Ungrund is a premise and not a metaphysical conclusion.
59
  This 
argument, however, fails to address the problem that while Berdiaev claimed that the 
Ungrund was a „myth‟ about „no-thing‟, in the end he is still describing „some-thing‟.  
Berdiaev attached great significance to this „myth‟, to explain the existence of freedom, non-
Being, and even God; all the while claiming it was a „void‟ or „nothing‟.  This is nonsensical.  
By attaching such significance and claiming that the „void‟ is „meonic‟ freedom and thus the 
„potential‟ for Being and non-Being, he is intimating (despite his denials) that this „no-thing‟ 
is really „some-thing‟.  One cannot describe something as „potential‟ and then claim it to be 
non-existent.  
While his „no-thing‟ statement is a clever riposte to the dualist charge, in the end it 
cannot be supported, since his „myth‟ is trying to describe something that “escapes both the 
unequivocal character of the concept and its abstraction from time” (Moltmann).60  Even if 
we were to accept Berdiaev‟s mystical approach and his claim that his mystical experience 
verifies the Ungrund‟s existence, we would still have to say that he is describing something 
and, because it is „some-thing‟, his critics are proved right.  Berdiaev is postulating an entity 
that is completely independent of God and existed with God before all things.  The charge of 
the Ungrund being part of a dualist view is valid. 
Once we recognize the dualism that comes with this conception of the Ungrund, it 
becomes impossible to integrate this idea into a broadly Christian view of freedom, which is 
what Berdiaev was attempting.  To begin with, the „myth‟ contradicts the doctrine of creatio 
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ex nihilo.  Berdiaev asserts that God creates out of the Ungrund; as such God is relying on 
something outside of the Deity to bring creation into existence.  Berdiaev‟s claim that it is a 
„void‟ or an „abyss‟ does not negate the fact that God is still „using‟ something for God‟s 
created activity.  This stands in direct contrast to an orthodox Christian understanding of 
God‟s creative endeavor.  As Moltmann rightly explains, 
Whenever and whatever God creates is without any preconditions.  There is no 
external necessity which occasions his creativity, and no inner compulsion which 
could determine it.  Nor is there any primordial matter whose potentiality is pre-given 
to his creative activity, and which would set him material limits.
61
 
 
As this critique demonstrates, the Ungrund cannot be integrated into a Christian 
theological discussion of freedom.  The concept is too flawed to serve any real purpose in 
explaining how freedom originates or exists. 
That stated, we can only give a qualified assent to Lampert‟s assertion that the 
Ungrund is a „disastrous‟ conclusion, since his assertion could be taken to intimate that the 
„myth‟ does irreparable damage to Berdiaev‟s thought.  This, however, is not the case.  As we 
will demonstrate, the Ungrund can be removed from Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom and 
replaced with a more cogent understanding of freedom‟s origination, while still maintaining 
the valuable insights of Berdiaev‟s vision.62 
Furthermore, despite the fact that our critique of the Ungrund has been 
overwhelmingly negative, there are several aspects of this thought that have potential for a 
current dialogue on freedom.  First, by operating from a perspective that freedom originates 
in an „abyss‟ (a non-determined potentiality), Berdiaev was able to fully explore what he calls 
the „irrational‟ side of freedom.63  With freedom having no connection to God, imagining the 
Ungrund enabled Berdiaev to see that freedom is the potential for either good or ill.
64
 
One of the strengths of Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom is the emphasis on freedom not 
being a guarantee of progress or a better state; freedom is the potential for progress and 
growth and for rebellion and tragedy.  This is a significant point; for as we have seen with 
Moltmann‟s thought, the existence of freedom, with the resultant „creative passion for the 
possible‟, is almost always presented by Moltmann as a positive development.  Berdiaev‟s 
speculative concept allowed him to recognize the „irrational‟ nature of freedom.  Thus, while 
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his concept may have been faulty, his observation as to the nature of freedom was correct – 
freedom contains the potential for evil and tragedy. 
Second, the „myth‟ of the Ungrund can help describe the non-determinative nature of 
freedom.  This can be seen in Macquarrie‟s interesting interpretation of Berdiaev‟s „myth‟.  
While acknowledging the „obscure‟ language Berdiaev used in formulating the idea of the 
Ungrund, Macquarrie concurs with Berdiaev that freedom is „no-thing‟.  Macquarrie: 
“Freedom is the empty space, the room that is still left for manoeuvre and has not yet been 
filled up and determined.  It cannot therefore be grasped by rational thought; it cannot be 
observed.”65  Macquarrie‟s creative interpretation is commendable.  Following Macquarrie‟s 
lead, if we treat the Ungrund as a „myth‟, i.e. recognize it has not objective or mystic reality 
but rather points to a truth we experience, the „myth‟ can illustrate that freedom has an 
„empty‟ quality to it, which is its non-determinative character.  To develop this thought 
further, we must assess Berdiaev‟s conception of „embodied‟ freedom. 
Before we address the central elements of this critique – embodied freedom and the 
creative act – let us summarize what we have examined thus far: 
i. Berdiaev‟s emphasis on „intuition‟ tends to overshadow the vast mosaic of 
thought from philosophy, theology, art, and culture that constitutes his vision.  
Because his vision is constructed with multiple strands we find his vision to 
have a certain plasticity, while also possessing a strong internal coherence as to 
the centrality of freedom. 
ii. Berdiaev‟s mystical approach degrades the materiality of creation by stressing a 
bifurcated understanding of reality.  We have seen that Moltmann provides a 
clear alternative to this understanding by advocating the unity of creation 
through the presence and life-giving energies of the Holy Spirit. 
iii. A benefit of his mystical approach is that it supports his understanding that 
freedom requires relationship. 
iv. A second benefit of his mystical approach is the stress on knowledge being 
„integral‟. 
v. Berdiaev‟s thought on „spirit‟ also suffers from the weakness of his bifurcated 
view of reality, which also has a deleterious effect on his view of the Holy 
Spirit.  These weaknesses do not negate the positive development of 
recognizing a dependence on the Holy Spirit for a robust expression of 
freedom.  The dependence on the experience of the Spirit for freedom finds 
parallels in Moltmann‟s thought. 
vi. Berdiaev‟s use of sobornost‟ establishes the interdependence of freedom and 
relation – relation between the person and God and the person with others.  It 
also provides a key element to understanding how the individual can exist as a 
free person, which is through the indwelling of the Spirit and love for God and 
each other.  Moltmann‟s „open‟ friendship can be seen as a complementary idea 
to Berdiaev‟s sobornost‟. 
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vii. In the „justification of the person‟ Berdiaev rightly emphasizes the value of 
personality (personhood) and the importance of freedom in the development of 
personality.  His stress on the person‟s freedom, however, fails to see how 
personhood is also a gift.  The emphasis on the person‟s contribution is carried 
further when the „justification‟ focuses on the „divine-human‟ nature of the 
person.  In an effort to demonstrate the significance of the person, Berdiaev 
improperly credits the person with a divine nature.  Moltmann‟s thought allows 
for an understanding of the person participating in the Divine, while avoiding 
the problems of Berdiaev‟s „divine-human‟ paradigm. 
viii. We have recognized the „justification of God‟ as an admirable quest on 
Berdiaev‟s part.  Yet, as a comprehensible theodicy it fails; the Ungrund does 
not provide the resources for an unassailable theodicy.  Moltmann‟s approach 
to theodicy, with his emphasis on the Crucified God, and theodicy being the 
„open‟ question that must be ever-present, provides a much more satisfactory 
approach to theodicy, while encouraging further thought. 
ix. We have rejected Berdiaev‟s premise concerning the Ungrund.  It is not a 
„myth‟ but rather a metaphor, as Berdiaev is attempting to describe some-thing.  
Even though this creative approach is rejected, we have seen that there is a 
positive element to his thought – freedom being considered „no-thing‟.  We will 
return to this in our critique of „embodied‟ freedom. 
 
We have critiqued a vast range of thought that Berdiaev uses to support his vision of 
freedom.  It is important to note that although our critique has been pointed at times, there has 
not been a negation of Berdiaev‟s basic understanding of freedom.  Also, Moltmann‟s 
perspective provides a helpful corrective to Berdiaev‟s own understanding.  Thus, even 
though we have rejected Berdiaev‟s belief that his thought is primarily „intuitive‟ and 
dependent on a mystical approach, we have affirmed his conviction that the role of the Spirit, 
loving relations with God and others, and an awareness of the problem of evil are important 
elements to a Christian understanding of freedom. 
 
8.  Embodied Freedom
66
 
 
Before we can evaluate the contributions that Berdiaev‟s concept of embodied 
freedom can make there are two concerns to address.  The first concern relates to the 
rejection of the Ungrund.  Since Berdiaev was convinced that the Ungrund was critical not 
only for theodicy but also for understanding how freedom exists, one may rightly question 
whether it is possible to reject this premise without collapsing his entire vision of freedom.  
Here we return to our earlier critique of Berdiaev‟s methodological assumptions.  As 
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previously stated, since Berdiaev‟s vision is not constructed as a system with a set of 
necessary premises, it is sufficiently plastic to allow for reconfiguration, providing it 
conforms to the overall assumptions of his outlook.  As Lossky observes: 
. . . Berdyaev‟s doctrine of the Ungrund and of the creature‟s will not being created 
by God, cannot be accepted as a part of Christian philosophy.  But this by no means 
implies that the rest of his system must be rejected also; the main content of it is 
unaffected.
67
 
 
Lampert concurs when he writes that the rejection of the Ungrund does not negate Berdiaev‟s 
thought in toto.  “If Berdyaev claimed to have built up a harmonious philosophical „system‟ 
this doctrine would be a real rent in it.  Fortunately his philosophy is no such system….”68  
The Ungrund is not an inviolable proposition for Berdiaev‟s vision. 
As we have seen, outside of his theodicy concerns, Berdiaev‟s commitment to the 
idea of meonic freedom stems from his belief that it provides a „myth‟ (or narrative) that 
unfolds the origination of non-determined (meonic) freedom and its latency (what we have 
termed „existential liberty‟) within the created order.  Berdiaev uses the Ungrund primarily to 
assert one theme: non-determined freedom.
69
  The importance of this point cannot be ignored.  
The Ungrund is intended to explain a concept that Berdiaev believes to be a reality (non-
determined freedom), but because of his concerns (1) to separate God from evil and (2) to 
separate freedom from God (Berdiaev cannot conceive of freedom originating from God and 
still being non-determined), he is convinced that non-determined freedom cannot be 
attributed to God.  Thus Berdiaev clings to the concept of the Ungrund because without it he 
believes he cannot assert non-determined freedom. 
Even though Berdiaev believed there was no other way to explain non-determined 
freedom, it has been demonstrated that Moltmann‟s theology of freedom propounds just such 
an idea.  Moltmann‟s conception of freedom is one where the freedom of the person is non-
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determined, maturing or degrading depending upon the person‟s relation with God, others, 
and self.  Consequently, since Moltmann‟s theology of freedom results in a concept of 
freedom that is in many ways identical to Berdiaev‟s, we are able to reject the Ungrund and 
insert Moltmann‟s understanding without altering Berdiaev‟s view of embodied freedom.70  
The obvious benefit is that we can ground freedom in the Triune God as opposed to a 
mystical abyss, and provide a more theologically comprehensible vision of freedom. 
A second concern to address is the relationship between freedom and constraint in 
Berdiaev‟s thought.  In describing his relation to others and the world around him, Berdiaev 
writes, “. . . the feeling of distance, the knowledge of having come from some other world, to 
which I would return, never left me.”71  This theme of distance and dissonance with what he 
calls the „objective‟ world is significant.  As we have seen in his bifurcated view of reality, 
Berdiaev clearly regarded human existence as a negatively constraining experience.  Hence 
he writes that his love for metaphysics “is largely the result of a reaction against the external 
environment, against the „necessities‟ of empirical reality and the commonplace.”72  At the 
base of his thought there is a conviction that the created order constrains one‟s freedom. 
This belief is certainly not unique to Berdiaev; indeed some would say that this is a 
basic flaw in much modernist thinking concerning freedom.  By contrast, in his insightful 
work, Theology, Music and Time, Jeremy Begbie carefully sets forth the argument that the 
context of human existence is not a negative constraint to be overcome but rather a „liberating 
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sufficiency, domination) while at the same time affirming the distinct values that were emphasized in modernity.  
As Berdiaev and the religious renaissance of the Silver Age demonstrate, subjectivity cannot be instantly 
equated with individualism.  Thus Moltmann can affirm human subjectivity and at the same time state, “It is not 
the human being who is the measure of all things.  It is God, who has created the whole of life in order to invite 
everything living to the sabbath feast of creation.  Once we overcome modern anthropocentricism, we shall once 
more set free the suppressed dimensions of human bodiliness and the senses.”  GSS, 22. 
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 DR, 88 (Italics mine).  It is noteworthy that this belief did not lead to a retreat from humanity and 
world or the problems that afflict it.  Throughout Berdiaev‟s life we see an abiding concern for the plight of 
others and a devotion of time and energies to various political and social causes. 
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constraint‟ that „marks the freedom of the Christian‟.73  Begbie‟s analysis has much to 
commend to it and is a trenchant response to this weakness in Berdiaev‟s thought.  Berdiaev 
(and there is an echo of this in Moltmann as well) did not properly take into account the 
context of human existence and often interpreted it as being antagonistic to freedom. 
Human freedom always exists within a context and that context (cultural, familial, 
religious, political, etc.) is not always antagonistic to freedom.
74
  Begbie rightfully details the 
numerous ways in which a „constraint‟ can be a liberative force for the human and her 
development, which can result in more robust forms of freedom.  It is clear that Berdiaev‟s 
vision of freedom would have benefited from a broader appreciation of the context in which 
the human exists and freedom is experienced.  Yet Berdiaev is also correct that there are 
numerous ways that a context can constrain and degrade the person‟s freedom and existence.  
Thus there are times when it is proper and necessary for the person to strive to overcome and 
break free of constraints that bind.
75
 
Although Berdiaev‟s thought is often negative regarding the human context we must 
be careful to avoid carelessly labeling Berdiaev as a „modernist‟, and assuming that he 
subscribes to the modernistic understanding of freedom that Begbie details.  The context of 
Berdiaev‟s development and maturation was that of the Silver Age, a religious and cultural 
environment that rejected the individualist tendencies of the West and highly valued the 
concept of sobornost‟.  His dedication to sobornost‟ and, equally importantly, his 
appreciation of the Renaissance with its influence on people and culture, demonstrate that 
within his thought, not all factors external to the person are negative. 
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As we saw in chapter 4, even though Berdiaev‟s view has trouble appreciating the 
„material‟, his vision of freedom was still directed towards the human in his daily life.  We 
introduced the term „embodied‟ to distinguish between this type of freedom, which is 
experienced within the realm of existence, and meonic freedom.  Although Berdiaev‟s view 
of meonic freedom was too speculative to support, his view of „embodied‟ freedom has much 
to commend to it.  Berdiaev‟s astute analysis as to how freedom exists in the created order 
and what freedom means for the person and God can be a valuable resource for a theological 
view of freedom.  In this section we assess three contributions Berdiaev‟s vision can make 
under the following headings: modality of existence, subjective-relational approach, and 
tragedy.  In our last section we will critique a fourth contribution, Berdiaev‟s view of the 
creative act. 
 
A.  Modality of existence 
One of the primary strengths of Berdiaev‟s vision is his rich description of freedom, 
which emphasizes the importance of non-determination.  To be free is to have the possibility 
to do otherwise.  Macquarrie is correct; Berdiaev‟s description of primal freedom being a 
„no-thing‟ is an apt description for freedom.  Freedom as „no-thing‟ is a freedom that cannot 
be determined, a freedom that is the „empty space‟ where the person has „room‟ to move and 
live.
76
  As we have seen, from a theological perspective, this can be traced back, at least, to 
Augustine and, from a standpoint of scripture, to the Deuteronomic author who recounts 
God‟s charge to the Israelites through Moses: “Choose life so that you and your descendants 
may live. . . .”77  This thought has a close correlation with Moltmann‟s thought where 
freedom is valued as the space „to be‟. 
Speaking of freedom as a „no-thing‟ does not indicate that the freedom is nothing; 
freedom is something, although trying to characterize it is a difficult proposition.  Begbie‟s 
observation has merit when he maintains that freedom cannot be grasped.  But his description 
of freedom being „adjectival‟ wherein freedom “qualifies arrangements of persons and things; 
it describes proper relationships. . . ” is lacking.78  Moltmann‟s description of freedom being 
a type of „happening‟ is closer to Berdiaev‟s thought.79  Berdiaev‟s rich description of 
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freedom, as represented by the term „embodied‟, may not provide a precise definition, but it 
does illustrate that freedom can be viewed as a modality of existence.  Freedom is an integral 
and distinctive feature of the person‟s existence and, although it depends on a wide array of 
variables, its base characteristic is non-determination. 
Based on Berdiaev‟s view, the examination of freedom can move beyond the binary 
paradigm of an individual either being free or not, to see that freedom is experienced on 
differing levels and to differing degrees.  Embodied freedom stretches across a wide spectrum 
of life and the person‟s exercise and experience of it will vary depending on context, 
relationships, and the person‟s maturation.  Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom allows for all of 
these contingencies (and others) to be considered.  Thus while freedom is part of the person‟s 
existence, it is possible to understand that the person will experience freedom in differing 
modes and in differing situations.  Freedom is not a static category but a dynamic experience 
that is constantly modulating. 
Therefore, the conception of embodied freedom shows that freedom is a 
developmental concept.  The person‟s freedom will mature or degrade; seldom is freedom a 
constant within a person‟s life.  In this sense freedom is a „theandric‟ enterprise, as the person 
must seek to develop his freedom in relationship with God and others.  From a theological 
perspective this view of freedom allows one to consider how the person who is liberated by 
God can be can still be „enslaved‟ in specific areas of his life. 
Being enslaved brings up the complicated issue of „sin‟.  Sin is addressed by 
Berdiaev, but not extensively.  The loss of freedom, „objectification‟, and „slavery‟ are all 
topics that are concerned with sin and evil, but Berdiaev was hesitant to devote too much 
attention to the matter.
80
  His vision of freedom, however, does recognize sin‟s detrimental 
consequences for the person and her freedom, but sin never has the power to completely 
negate the freedom of the individual. 
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For example, take the apostle Paul‟s words to the Romans.  He exclaims, “For I do 
not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.”81  Clearly Paul is talking 
about sin – the sins of commission and omission – and calls out to Christ to deliver him from 
this.  Are we to assume then that Paul, the apostle who proclaims that Christ has set us free 
for freedom, is no longer free?
82
  If it is accepted that sin is the complete negation of freedom, 
then that is the conclusion.  Understanding freedom through the lens of embodied freedom 
we can state that Paul, at that moment, still had some form of freedom, but his freedom was 
degraded, not completely lost.  Depending on the significance of this sin for Paul, it would 
also be possible to talk about the loss of freedom in a specific area, while still retaining fuller 
experiences of freedom on a deeper level of his life. 
The degree, or intensity, of the sin will have a corresponding impact on the person‟s 
freedom.  The subtlety of Berdiaev‟s view provides a context to deal with the complex 
relation between sin and freedom. 
 
B.  Subjective-relational 
One of the most significant variables in the development of freedom is the 
individual‟s relation with others and God.  Due to the import of relationship within this view 
we can talk about the concept of embodied freedom as a „subjective-relational‟ concept.  The 
term „subjective-relational‟ may seem self-contradictory (in the same vein as a „determined 
freedom‟83) but if we understand the term „subjective‟ as Berdiaev and Moltmann do, we see 
that this phrase is fitting.  The claim that we have embodied freedom seeks to assert the 
importance of the person in the context of relationship, thus human subjectivity is a valued 
idea, and not directly connected with individualism.  As we have seen, how the person 
understands and conducts himself has a marked effect on his experience of freedom.  If he 
sees himself as secondary to more primary concerns (heteronomy) or understands himself as 
the center of existence (slavery) and acts accordingly, his freedom (and hence his existence) 
will suffer.  It is only when a person realizes that as a „subject‟ he carries responsibilities for 
his development, and crucial to that development is his existence in relation with others and 
God, will his freedom mature and expand. 
This perspective has a certain coherence with both the person‟s experience of freedom 
in culture, and specific theological assumptions concerning what freedom means for the 
                                                 
81
 Romans 7: 19. 
82
 Galatians 5: 1. 
83
 Colin E. Gunton, “Barth, the Trinity and Human Freedom,” Theology Today (1986), 316, 321. 
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person.  From a cultural standpoint, Berdiaev‟s qualified acceptance of „autonomy‟ 
recognizes that individuals today (especially in the West) certainly can live relatively 
autonomous lives.  His complex understanding of autonomy and the individual, however, 
allows him to affirm the importance of autonomy and the human subject, while also being 
able to maintain a view that asserts that „autonomy‟ and the human existing as an individual 
are limited modes of freedom and existence.  Autonomy is an integral point in the spectrum 
of freedom – if valued and understood for what it is, the person can move to greater 
experiences of freedom and relationship; if misconstrued and understood as an end goal, the 
person‟s freedom will degrade. 
Therefore, Berdiaev‟s conception of embodied freedom allows the theologian to posit 
the value of subjectivity, along with the necessity of relationship with God and others, within 
a discussion of freedom.  Relationships and commitment to others need not be seen as 
limiting factors to the person‟s experience of freedom, but rather can be regarded as sources 
for the person‟s exercise and experience of freedom and, equally importantly, for the 
individual‟s development as a person. 
This approach also affords an interesting perspective on the issue of obedience.  
Although Berdiaev‟s tentative style and enthusiastic writing concerning the individual‟s 
divine-human nature would seem to indicate otherwise, Berdiaev did not completely reject 
the idea of obedience.  He maintained that obedience is not the primary focus for human 
existence.  The human was not created to obey but to live in relation with God and others. 
It is accepted that obedience does play a part in the relationship with God and others.  
The examples in scripture are well-known.  From the Decalogue in the Hebrew Bible to the 
Great Commission where Christ exhorts his followers “to obey everything I have commanded 
you,”84 obedience is obviously part of Christian faith.  What Berdiaev insisted upon, 
however, was the recognition that love is of greater importance to God than obedience.  
Berdiaev would not deny that obedience is part of what it means to love God, but as the 
person matures the emphasis on obedience grows into an emphasis on love – a love for God 
and others.
85
  Berdiaev does overstep when he states that “Obedience is a pseudo-
spirituality;”86 though the reader must remember that what he was opposing was a tradition in 
                                                 
84
 Matthew 28: 20. 
85
 Berdiaev will acknowledge Christ‟s command to love, but he does so in the context of a mystical 
union: “It [the mystical union] is the realization of love and of creative energy, for love is creation.  In this way 
the command of Christ to love God and man is fulfilled.”  FS, 266. 
86
 SR, 169. 
211 
 
Christianity wherein he felt obedience was the primary concern and, in his opinion, led to the 
devaluing of love for others.  As Copleston comments: 
A point emphasized by Berdyaev is that, whatever human societies, secular or 
ecclesiastical, may have done or do, God does not coerce anybody. . . . Christ, as 
represented in Dostoevsky‟s Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, refused the temptation to 
exercise coercion of any kind; he sought a free response of love, not submission to 
power.
87
 
 
A subjective-relational freedom does not make freedom and obedience antithetical 
concepts.  Instead it seeks to understand freedom as being a condition for obedience as well 
as freedom as being a goal of obedience.  A person who freely obeys God, i.e. a person who 
is not „forced‟ by external authority, is a person who will grow in relation with God and 
others.  As the person grows relationally her freedom will then become more robust.
88
  
Berdiaev‟s subjective-relational freedom offers the advantage of not denying „obedience‟, but 
rather seeing it as a means and not an end.  God grants freedom that the person may obey, 
mature, and grow in relationship with God and others.  The telos of the freedom God grants is 
not obedience, but relationship and love. 
 
C.  Tragedy 
It is a belief, almost without question, that freedom is a worthy goal, and Berdiaev 
would certainly concur.  Yet what is noteworthy in Berdiaev‟s thought is that he not only 
expounded the value of freedom, but also a characteristic of freedom that is often overlooked 
– freedom‟s tragic nature.  His conception of embodied freedom recognizes that the 
experience of freedom may not always result in a positive outcome.  Freedom may bring 
harmony and growth and freedom may also bring turmoil and discord. 
Berdiaev‟s thought is based on his view of the Ungrund as “primal irrational freedom 
and infinite potentiality.”89  Despite the fact that we have rejected the Ungrund, his 
observation concerning freedom‟s irrational nature was valid.  The existence of freedom 
invites a wide range of contingencies that are positive and negative.  Niebuhr writes, “As 
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freedom develops, both good and evil develop with it.”90  The insight that freedom may 
produce negative or evil consequences is sobering and is an important contribution of 
Berdiaev‟s thought.  For the theologian who speaks of freedom there should be, according to 
Berdiaev‟s position, the recognition of the possibility of an „irrational‟ outcome. 
Moltmann‟s theology follows a similar line of thought when he maintains that 
freedom “may be used properly – that is to say, for life‟s preservation and not for its 
destruction.”91  Yet, although Moltmann does recognize the potential for „destruction‟, his 
thought is often focused on the positive side of freedom, which colors his view with a utopian 
bias.  Thus, “Freedom in the light of hope can be compared with a train travelling through 
history into an increasingly greater future.  Freedom, like this train, can not [sic] be stopped 
once it is running at full throttle.”92  While this quote is from earlier in his career (‟73), we 
can still read his positive assessment in later works. 
That is why this „lordship‟ is better described as „the free power‟ and „the free space‟ 
or „free place‟ of human freedom.  Through it and in it people are raised above earth 
and heaven, life and death, present and future, to God himself, and participate in his 
creative freedom (cf. I Cor. 3.22 with Rom. 8.38f.).  Anyone who experiences God 
and a „deification‟ (theosis) of this kind, is freed from all the godless ties of this 
world, and is nobody‟s slave.  He lives in the free space of God‟s creative 
possibilities, and partakes of them.  But for that very reason he also participates in the 
complex web of relationships through which the Creator loves everything he has 
created, and preserves its life.
93
 
 
Berdiaev would certainly find much to agree with in these statements.  The problem, 
however, is that Moltmann at times treats the experience of freedom as an inevitable 
progression and this is something that Berdiaev would rightly oppose.  Freedom cannot be 
seen as a guarantee of positive development.  The overall picture of embodied freedom shows 
that freedom, even its fullest forms, is a necessary potential, but it is not an assurance for 
positive development.  For the potential of freedom to develop there must be a context that 
values freedom; it must also recognize that freedom contains an „irrational‟ aspect, an 
irrationality that cannot be externally determined.  Berdiaev‟s sobornost‟ was his outline for 
such a context, where freedom could be valued and developed through God‟s presence and 
the love of others, while also recognizing the possibility of tragic outcomes. 
Berdiaev‟s recognition of the tragic side of freedom raises the question of whether the 
experience of freedom is to be highly valued – if tragedy can arise from freedom would 
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humanity be better off without it?  This is a question that has plagued theologians and 
philosophers through the ages.  Augustine decided that “a creature that sins by free will is 
more excellent than one that does not sin only because it has no free will.”94  Berdiaev and 
Moltmann would strongly concur – the „irrationality‟ of freedom is troubling and painful, but 
life without freedom is inhuman. 
We now turn to the fourth contribution to a theological view of freedom, the „creative 
act‟, which due to its wide implications is examined in our final critique. 
 
9.  The „Creative Act‟ 
 
We have described Berdiaev‟s view of the creative act as a „sketch‟ since there are 
various ideas and concepts that are not fully developed.  Although the term „sketch‟ may have 
a negative connotation (since it intimates a lack of completeness), one must remember 
Berdiaev‟s context and time period when he was developing his thought.  Pope claims, 
. . . it is an arresting fact that the abstract noun „creativity‟ was not widely current 
until the 1940s and 1950s (it did not appear at all in the 1933 edition of The Oxford 
English Dictionary), and when it was used it was invoked in contexts and with 
applications that were highly specific to that time.
95
 
 
In many respects Berdiaev‟s thought was ahead of its time and while he could draw on the 
work of Solov‟ev, he was introducing a highly original synthesis concerning freedom, the 
creative act and its implications for the person.  Considering that Weisberg observes (over 75 
years after Berdiaev‟s publication of The Meaning of the Creative Act) that “understanding 
creativity is a challenging task,”96 it is not necessarily surprising that we find Berdiaev‟s 
thought to be not fully developed. 
Berdiaev‟s highly complex view of creativity includes a notable attempt to discern the 
relationship between freedom and creativity.  Berdiaev discovered early in his career that the 
concept of the creative act would be essential for his understanding of freedom and his 
anthropological concerns.  His thought on creativity, while obscure at times, consistently 
focused on the importance of creativity for the growth and maturation of the person and for 
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God‟s intentions in creation.97  We will critique his work by first highlighting the 
contributions of his thought under the headings: interrelatedness, theological discourse, 
positive freedom, and love.  Following these contributions we then turn our attention to the 
equivocal areas in Berdiaev‟s thought and we will conclude with some suggestions for 
overcoming these deficiencies. 
 
A.  Contributions 
 
(a)  Interdependence of Creativity and Freedom 
As we have seen, Berdiaev was not the first Russian to highlight the importance of 
creativity; Solov‟ev‟s work had made the topic a point of interest for many in the Silver 
Age.
98
  What makes Berdiaev‟s thought notable is the stress he places on creativity and his 
formulation of the interdependence between freedom and the creative act.  His view of the 
relationship between freedom and the creative act is an astute insight into the nature of 
freedom.  Without creativity, freedom would have no means to be fully embodied.  As we 
saw in chapter 5, since creativity, like freedom, has a spectrum-like quality, there is a 
considerable range as to how creativity is expressed, which depends on a host of variables; 
yet the interdependence remains.  Even if a free person willingly follows or obeys an external 
authority, how the person follows and acts on those instructions will contain some form of 
creativity (novelty). 
Creativity is the outcome of embodied freedom and embodied freedom must exist for 
creativity to occur.  At the core of Berdiaev‟s complex understanding of creativity is this 
basic tenet.  While his thought in this area can be ambiguous, it never negates this central 
idea.  If the free person cannot act creatively, i.e. act in ways that possess some form of self-
determination and novelty, the person‟s freedom is endangered.  The potential for a creative 
act, however small, is required for the person to freely act.  The converse is also true, if the 
person is to create (be creative) there must be some degree of embodied freedom. 
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(b)  Theological Discourse 
Berdiaev‟s view enables creativity to be seen as an inherent theological concern.  
Because freedom and creativity are interrelated, this means that a theological assertion of 
freedom must be cognizant of creativity.  Hence for the theologian to propose freedom for the 
person there must be some type of recognition and provision for the person‟s creative acts as 
well.  Setting aside Berdiaev‟s „divine-humanity‟, his thought still rightly posits that one 
aspect of what it means to be human is to create.  Creating is a human activity.  Theology 
may properly differentiate between the creative acts of God and the creative acts of the 
human, but it also seems plain that humans create – culture, technologies, politics, 
philosophies, etc. 
Berdiaev‟s thought on the creative act provides a point of reference to examine the 
phenomenon of creativity from the context of the person in relation to God and others.  
Berdiaev‟s position has visible weaknesses, but the basic thrust of his thought has merit for 
the theologian.  As we have seen in Moltmann‟s view, he generally mirrors Berdiaev‟s idea 
in categorizing the highest form of freedom as a „creative passion for the possible‟ – freedom 
leads to creative activity and this creative activity is necessary for freedom. 
 
(c)  Positive Freedom 
Another contribution is the idea that creativity can be regarded as a positive 
expression of freedom – creativity is not only necessary for freedom, creativity is valued by 
God.  Berdiaev develops this in his thought on the „silent call‟ of scripture.  Although this 
concept is speculative and difficult to support with specific scriptural reference, this 
suggestive idea has merit. 
One does not need to completely adopt Berdiaev‟s view on obedience to recognize 
that God desires something more from his followers than obedience to a set of 
commandments and laws.  This idea can be seen in one of Berdiaev‟s favorite passages of 
scripture, the parable of the talents.
99
  The person who is rewarded is the person who uses his 
talents and multiplies their worth.  Berdiaev understood this parable to mean that God expects 
the person to use and develop her talent.  To use one‟s talents, according to Berdiaev, is to 
engage in creative acts.  Thus to view God as calling for creative acts from humanity, and 
more specifically from the followers of Christ, can enlarge the scope of what it means to be in 
relation with God.  The person who walks with God, and is a „co-participant‟ in God‟s 
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creative works, is a person whose creative acts play a part in God‟s intentions for the created 
order.
100
 
This valuing of human creativity does not negate the difference between Divine and 
human creativity.  Berdiaev‟s view is not an attempt to usurp God, rather it propounds that 
the highest forms of creativity, like freedom, can only occur in relation with God.  As 
Moltmann rightly asserts, “. . . divine creativity and human activity are not comparable with 
one another.”101  Berdiaev identified the problem of human creativity attempting to usurp 
God as developing in the Renaissance, and he believed that this will continue till Christ‟s 
return.  Yet, the proper theological protestations against this „usurping‟ should not so 
completely define the discourse on creativity that any talk of creating „with‟ God is excluded. 
Berdiaev‟s enthusiastic discourse on „divine-humanity‟ may be questionable, but a 
commendable idea within his thought is this idea that the person creates with God.  We can 
build on Berdiaev‟s idea by stating that it is in relation with God where the person‟s creative 
abilities will reach their highest potential.  By stressing the importance of relation we can 
possibly allay some of the fears that „co-participation‟ may raise – the person does not create 
to replace God.  The person creates because he exists in relation with a God who creates.  
Relationship is a parameter for human creativity.  Thus the person‟s creative activity is 
circumscribed by relationship with God and others while being encouraged and valued by 
those same relationships. 
 
(d)  Love 
The importance of relationship in human creativity is reflected in what Berdiaev 
considers to be the highest form of creativity, love.  By positing love as the highest form of 
human creativity he affirms several key ideas within his thought – ideas such as freedom, 
subjectivity, newness, which are all central for his vision of freedom and also for love.  In the 
ability of the person to love, Berdiaev sees all the central elements of freedom coming to 
fruition.  Love, which obviously involves commitment to others, is not seen as an 
abridgement to freedom, but as the culmination of it.  For Berdiaev, a loving relationship is a 
union of persons with God and with each other, a union where limits exist, but those limits 
are existentially affirmed, not externally commanded.  Jesus‟ command to love God is 
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predicated upon the fact that “We love because he first loved us.”102  Thus love, with its 
mutual concern for the „other‟, makes ever-expanding experiences of freedom possible.  We 
have seen a similar line of reasoning in Moltmann‟s thought as well, with regard to his views 
on friendship.  Consequently God „commands‟ the person to love and yet the free person who 
follows the commandment finds deeper expressions of freedom, not limitations on his 
freedom. 
Having addressed some of the contributions Berdiaev‟s view of creativity can offer to 
a theological discourse, we now turn to the problematic areas in this thought. 
 
B.  The Equivocal Areas within Berdiaev‟s „Creative Act‟ 
The equivocal areas within Berdiaev‟s conception of creativity stem from two of the 
basic assumptions that underlie his thought: a bifurcated view of reality and the „divine-
human‟ nature of the person.  We have seen that neither of these assumptions, which have a 
noticeable imprint upon his view of creativity, can be supported and that they are a 
detraction. 
The bifurcated perspective leads Berdiaev to a questionable understanding concerning 
the value of materiality within creativeness.  His commitment to a „divine-human‟ 
perspective results in Berdiaev considering creativity not only as a way in which the free 
person can act; creativity also reveals, Berdiaev asserts, the „divine-human‟ nature of the 
person. 
Man is not only called to creativeness, as an activity which operates in the world and 
is exerted upon the world, but he is himself creative power and without that creative 
power his human countenance is lacking. . . . Man is a being who masters and 
surmounts himself and overcomes the world; it is in that that his value and dignity 
consist.
103
 
 
Consequently, part of his commitment to the creative act is his commitment to show the 
person‟s elevated status.  This is based on his belief that human creativity demonstrates the 
person‟s „divine‟ nature.  To illustrate the ambiguities that result from these assumptions we 
highlight three areas of his thought as the following: materiality, genius, and Basileia. 
 
(a)  Materiality 
The bifurcated understanding of reality obviously raises problems with regard to the 
materiality of creation; not only with regard to a valuation and appreciation of the material, 
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but also pertaining to how the material is to be regarded in the creative process.  From the 
beginning of his career, the material world was a source of tension within his thought.  While 
there was some modification towards the end of his life, Berdiaev‟s thought was basically 
unchanged – the material must be overcome.  This is a noticeable fault in his thinking. 
Creativity is dependent upon the material, not only for the „outer‟ creative act but for 
the „inner‟ creative act as well.  Berdiaev‟s insistence that „inner‟ creativity takes place on a 
„spiritual‟ plane outside of the material world and, therefore, beyond the reach of 
objectification, may be consistent with his vision, but it does not reflect the reality of how 
human creativity occurs.
104
  Berdiaev claims that he never held that the person can create in a 
„vacuum‟ or that the materiality of creativeness was unimportant.105  Yet, even if we accept 
Berdiaev‟s defense of his position (and there are grounds for this), we are still left with the 
problem that while he may have accepted the need for materiality, it was a grudging 
acceptance at best.  Thus an underlying theme within his thought is the devaluation of the 
material.  Harned writes, with regard to Berdiaev‟s view, that an understanding of creativity 
“must see more than the negative aspect of man‟s relation to nature.  It must not divorce 
freedom and authentic creativity from man‟s response to the challenges of his 
environment.”106 
In Berdiaev‟s bifurcated view the „spiritual‟ is the focus; anything outside of the 
spiritual is considered degraded.  He does, of course, assert that God‟s transfiguration will 
restore the two worlds, so that the physical and spiritual will once again be unified (thereby 
showing a concern for the material); however, until that point the material world is a lesser 
value.  This position creates a significant ambiguity within his thought.  How can one 
envisage a creative act within a spiritual realm without reference to the material? 
Berdiaev maintains that the human creator is swept up in union with the Spirit, 
receives his inspiration and begins to imagine, contemplate, and eventually humble himself to 
this vision.  The problem is that in this vision, creativity, conceived in the spiritual as part of 
the inner creative process, does not appear to be dependent upon the material.  Could 
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Beethoven have conceived his music without reference to the actual sounds that the musical 
instruments create?  Could Giotto receive his inspiration, and imagine what his vision would 
be, without reference to his tools and medium?  Berdiaev‟s premise “the basic characteristic 
of a creative act consists in not being wholly determined by its medium”107 seems to intimate 
that the creator is not dependent upon his material. 
Berdiaev tried to ameliorate this with his conception of embodied creativity and the 
recognized need for „realization‟ in the creative act.  Yet he never clearly outlined how the 
noumenal is revealed in and through the phenomenal and even if he was able to explain how 
this revelation occurs, it is still an idea that privileges the „spiritual‟ over the „material‟.  His 
view falls short, as the material remains a decidedly secondary concern; when in actuality, the 
„inner‟ creative act is just as dependent upon the „outer‟ creative act as vice versa. 
Berdiaev could not accept that there was an interdependence between the two phases 
of creativity (as opposed to the outer creative act being only a necessary by-product) since 
that would mean that there is an inherent material parameter within the initial creative 
process.  The „inner‟ creative act, as he conceives it, is independent of the material world.  
Yet in the creative process the creator does not transcend the boundaries of this world and 
become a disembodied person; rather the human, as mind, body, and spirit, creates in and 
through an interaction with the material.  The material is not an obstacle to be transcended, 
but a resource to be engaged.  Berdiaev‟s thought in this regard allows for no such 
interdependence but instead creates a stark dichotomy where the manifested realization of 
creativity is devalued. 
The devaluing of the material also raises other issues.  Among them is the concern 
that Berdiaev did not appear to realize that his consistent de-valuing of the material can also 
be extrapolated to de-value the person.  The person is a material being, she is neither a „spirit‟ 
nor does she create as a „spirit‟, but as a bodily creature.  By de-valuing the material, an 
essential aspect of what it means to be human is also de-valued.  As Elshtain comments, “We 
do not have a body.  We simply are body and soul, ensouled bodies.”108  The devaluation of 
the individual‟s „humanness‟ is a troubling idea within his thought, especially from a writer 
who placed such emphasis on the Incarnation and Christ being „human‟. 
Another concern is that his focus on the inner creative act leads to a faulty view of 
what is „original‟.  As we saw in chapter 5, one of the ways in which Berdiaev uses the term 
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„original‟ is to indicate a created realization that is without precedent.109  It is accepted that 
the creative acts of the person will be unique as the person is unique, but human creativity 
does not exist in a vacuum.  Human creativity is grounded in a vast matrix of factors that 
make up who the person is at that creative moment.  To insist on the created act as being 
original and without precedent because it originates within a „spiritual‟ realm denies the 
varied influences upon the person.  Once again Berdiaev‟s prejudice against anything that can 
be construed as „external‟ to the person results in him failing to see the necessity and 
giftedness of external „resources‟ in the person‟s life.  As sobornost‟ maintains, life cannot be 
lived in isolation, and neither can creativity occur in isolation.  The created act may be 
„original‟ but it is not without precedent. 
 
(b)  Genius 
Berdiaev‟s thought on „genius‟ (geniality) is problematic in several respects.  First, 
there is nothing in scripture and little in the Christian tradition to support his premise that the 
imago Dei can be interpreted as „genius‟.  As we have commented, Berdiaev‟s reliance on the 
imago to support his claim for the divine nature of the person is problematic.  To then push 
the idea further, and propound that the imago can be regarded as the inner „genius‟ that 
makes human creativity possible, obfuscates both the idea of the imago and the concept of 
genius.  For this idea to have merit, Berdiaev would have had to support this formulation with 
some type of further evidence or a more elaborate picture as to how the imago and „genius‟ 
interrelate.  As it stands within his thought, it remains an interesting, but undeveloped idea. 
A second problem is the basic premise behind this concept.  Berdiaev believes that by 
reformulating the imago as „genius‟ he can maintain creativity as originating with the person 
and also having a „divine‟ source.  He is convinced that human creativity must be attributable 
to the person.  “Man‟s answer to God‟s call cannot entirely consist of elements that are given 
by and proceed from God.”110  In this convoluted thought „genius‟ is used to claim that the 
person‟s creative act can be attributed to the person, since creativity is predicated upon 
„genius‟ and „genius‟ is the imago within the person. 
In recasting the imago as „genius‟ he turns God‟s image into a personal characteristic 
of the person, almost as if it is something the person can claim as a possession.  He thus ends 
up asserting the paradoxical position that the person‟s creative activity is distinctly his own 
because of God‟s image within him.  Yet if the creative activity is distinctly the person‟s, 
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how can it depend on God‟s image?  Here we see that „genius‟ (imago), in this area of 
thought, represents a nature that is „divine‟ (or possibly god-like) more than an „image‟ of 
God.  On the basis of this claim, Berdiaev goes so far as to envisage the person‟s creative 
activity as being outside the influence not only of God but of society also.  The existence of 
„genius‟ “indicates that man is capable of breaking through to the primary source of life and 
that his spiritual activity is truly original and not determined by social influences.”111   
From a Christian theological perspective this is an impossible position to support.  As 
with our previous critiques, the idea that the person can „self-transcend‟ because of a „divine‟ 
nature so that her creative act is without precedent simply does not agree with scripture, or 
accepted understandings of personhood and human creativity.  Union with God and the 
experience of the Divine never negate the multiple influences that constitute the person.  The 
ideas (1) that the person‟s creative act is valuable because it originates in a state of „pure‟ 
self, and (2) that the person is valued because she can create on the basis of her „genius‟, 
cannot be supported.  Berdiaev‟s view of genius detracts from the positive contributions his 
thought can make. 
As we have already stated, Moltmann‟s idea of the imago is much more coherent 
from the perspective of scripture and tradition.  The person is in God‟s image because of 
God‟s grace and faithful presence, and creativity is possible because the person exists in 
relation with a Creator God. 
 
(c)  Basileia 
The significance of creativity for establishing the value of the person is most readily 
apparent in the role of human creativity in the Basileia.  In this thought the person goes 
beyond the role of participant to become a principle element in God‟s plan.112  For Berdiaev, 
the person‟s role is so central that God waits upon the person‟s free created response to bring 
about the consummation of the world.  So, when Berdiaev writes that he regards “the Second 
Coming of Christ in power and glory as dependent on the creative act of man,”113 the person 
becomes arbiter for God‟s intention. 
Berdiaev: 
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Thus I understand by creative spiritual activity not only the creation of cultural 
products which are always symbolical, but also a real transformation of the world and 
of human relationships – in other words, the creation of a new life, of a new being.114 
 
Even though Berdiaev is propounding that creative spiritual activity is accomplished in 
unison with God, his thought has the strong intimation of God and agent being on an equal 
footing.
115
  God must wait upon the person to engage in true creative acts for the 
transfiguration of the world to occur.  This is a troubling notion coming from a writer who 
experienced the results of „utopian‟ societies; a philosopher who realized that, “. . . human 
nature is prone to evil.”116 
In examining how Berdiaev understood the person‟s role in God‟s design, Copleston 
writes, 
If human beings are free, as Berdyaev insists that they are, it follows that they may 
not do that to which they are called.  In that case the second coming of Christ would 
presumably not take place.  But Berdyaev seems to be confident that the goal of 
history will be realized, though not by evolution within historical time.  This is 
doubtless a matter of faith.  It involves, however, not simply faith in God but faith that 
human beings will freely prepare the way for the kingdom of God.  At any rate this 
seems to the present writer to be the case.
117
 
 
Dye, examining a similar issue within Berdiaev‟s thought, concludes that Berdiaev‟s 
Christological and Trinitarian commitments result in a world process where there is an “idea 
of reality as purposive but not entirely determined.”118 
Thus, while Dye‟s analysis partly answers Copleston‟s query (God still acts, God still 
has a purpose), in the end it is inconclusive.  Berdiaev never adequately addresses how God‟s 
non-determinative purposive reality is fulfilled by relying in some way (Berdiaev is unclear 
as to the degree) on the free creative acts of individuals.  Copleston‟s observations are apt; 
when Berdiaev elevates the role of the person to such a degree that the Basileia is dependent 
                                                 
114
 SR, 175. 
115
 An example of this can be seen in DR: “Redemption and salvation are, therefore, also acts of divine-
human creativity.  Similarly, the ultimate fulfilment of redemption and the coming of God‟s Kingdom comprises 
a creative act on the part of man.”  DR, 213. 
116
 EOT, 192 (Italics mine). 
117
 Copleston, 387 (Italics mine).  In examining the writings of Dorothee Sölle and her views on God‟s 
suffering Moltmann arrives at a similar critique: “If God is no longer the Almighty, who has everything under 
control, then we human beings are called to participate in God‟s suffering in the world and to collaborate – to be 
co-instrumental – in its redemption.  Then „the sanctifying of his Name‟ and „the doing of his will‟ is in our 
hands, and hence „the coming of his kingdom‟ too.  I respect this humanist interpretation of our responsibility 
for God, as Dorothee Sölle maintains it.  But I feel that it makes too great a demand on beings as ambiguous as 
us.  God himself must help us.  If, as Bonhoeffer said, God does not help through his omnipotence but through 
his powerlessness, not through his untroubled bliss in heaven but through his suffering on this earth, then God is 
still the determining subject of redemption, both his own redemption from his suffering with us, and the 
redemption of this unredeemed world too.”  GSS, 184. 
118
 Dye, “Nikolai Berdyaev and His Ideas,” 116. 
223 
 
upon human action, faith must be not only in God but also in the human ability to follow 
God.  It is recognized that although there is no definitive understanding concerning what role 
the human plays in bringing about the Basileia, yet when Berdiaev claims that the human is 
such a prominent factor in God‟s intent, the onus is placed on him to provide further detail. 
Lampert observes, 
Many are alarmed and repelled by Berdyaev‟s exaltation of creativeness, and 
objections have been raised from all sides to the very understanding of man as creator 
and as called to creativity.  It may seem however that his critics, who accuse him of 
over-valuing  and divinizing man, of “titanism” and humanism, have largely 
misunderstood  the particular way in which he posits the whole problem.”119 
 
This research does concur with Lampert that there are misunderstandings of Berdiaev 
(Berdiaev recognizes that in certain respects he is responsible for them).  Also, it is accepted 
that Berdiaev was not attempting either to replace God with the person as creator or to grant 
the person equal status with God.  As the above criticisms demonstrate, however, Berdiaev‟s 
ambitious agenda to prove the „divine-humanity‟ of the individual leads him to transgress the 
very boundary that he himself acknowledges – a boundary based on the substantial difference 
between the creative abilities of God and the person.  The desire to elevate the person, to 
assert the person‟s „divine-human‟ nature, in conjunction with his faulty bifurcated view of 
reality, lead to ambiguities in this thought on the creative act.  While the charge of „titanism‟ 
may be too harsh, it is not difficult to see why the charge has been leveled against him. 
 
C.  A Suggestion 
The ambiguities in Berdiaev‟s conception of the creative act can be easy targets for 
critics, especially theologians, and this can lead to a premature dismissal of his work.  Clearly 
what he perceived to be a central feature of human creativity (the Basileia depending on 
human creativity) is antithetical to a wide portion of Christian thought.  Lampert‟s claim (as 
quoted above) is unconvincing – to say that Berdiaev was not „over-valuing and divinizing‟ 
the human is difficult to support.  It seems clear, at least to this researcher, that this is 
precisely the direction of Berdiaev‟s „creative act‟. 
Yet Lampert‟s position of trying to absolve Berdiaev by following the line that 
Berdiaev was trying to preserve the dignity of the person (a position that is evident in a 
number of early works on Berdiaev) is not the only means of defending, and more 
importantly, appreciating his thought.  The value of Berdiaev‟s work lies in the insights he 
                                                 
119
 Lampert, The New Middle Ages, 47-48. 
224 
 
gives into what creativity can be for the human.  It is possible to demarcate the questionable 
telos of his thought from the insights he achieves regarding the creative act.  Consequently 
we can recognize that though some of what he formulates from these insights is questionable, 
the basic insights are cogent. 
Thus, we need not subscribe to his position that creativity demonstrates the divinity of 
the person, with its accompanying thought that creativity must transcend the material world, 
or that God is dependent upon human creativity, to appreciate the contributions his thought 
makes.  Indeed if we remove these unattainable expectations from the conception of human 
creativity, and draw instead on the insights we have gained from Moltmann‟s thought 
regarding the integral relationship of the material and spiritual, we are able to conceive of 
human creativity in a more comprehensible and better supported pattern. 
Beginning with Berdiaev‟s conception of embodied freedom we can propose that 
creativity occurs in everyday acts.  At some points creativity produces great works of art, 
thought or culture, at other times its outcomes are much more quotidian.  As Johnson 
observes: 
Creativity occurs at all levels of our experiential organization and not just in those 
rare moments when we discover novel ideas.  We are imaginatively creative every 
time we recognize a schema in a new situation we have never experience before and 
every time we make metaphorical connections among various preconceptual and 
conceptual structures.  For example, we are creative even when come to see a dinner 
conversation as a process moving from a beginning point toward some indeterminate 
completion, for example, a new understanding of the participants in the conversations.  
This creativity is modest and unnoticed, but it is the basis for our more remarkable 
acts of innovations, too.
120
 
 
Considering creativity from this broad perspective we are able to appreciate the insights that 
Berdiaev‟s view of creativity provides.  For example, it is possible to affirm that human 
creativity does involve „self-will‟, „newness‟, and „freedom‟, and his thought that creativity 
has an „inner‟ and an „outer‟ aspect is coherent with how creativity occurs.  Most importantly, 
his belief that there is an interdependency between freedom and creativity is astute. 
It is recognized that his thought does not provide a comprehensive account of human 
creativity; as we have said, it is a „sketch‟.  But, as Pope observes, neither should we think 
that a definitive account of human creativity is possible.  “Something relevant may be said 
about creativity, provided it is realized that whatever we say about creativity there is always 
„something more and something different.‟”121  By setting aside his questionable ideas as to 
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what creativity accomplishes, we can appreciate Berdiaev‟s recognition of the important role 
creativity plays in being a person, and in what God desires from the person.  We can then see 
that creativity does not prove the person is divine, but rather, and more significantly, that the 
person is human. 
 
§3  SUMMARY 
Moltmann‟s theology of freedom has provided a much firmer grounding for 
Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom without compromising Berdiaev‟s overall concerns.  By 
inserting Moltmann‟s perspective into Berdiaev‟s view we can see that it is possible to 
understand embodied freedom as originating with God.  We are thus able to affirm the 
following positive contributions of this reconfigured vision: 
i. Embodied freedom is a dynamic concept with freedom being experienced in 
different modalities depending on multiple variables. 
ii. Embodied freedom is to be understood by a subjective-relational approach that 
recognizes the centrality of relationship for the experience of freedom, and also 
the potential for tragedy. 
iii. A good understanding of embodied freedom recognizes the importance of 
creativity for the expression of freedom and for the person‟s existence. 
iv. Although Berdiaev‟s view of creativity is not fully developed and is susceptible 
to faulty interpretations and extrapolations, his view still possesses valuable 
insights as to the nature of creativity and its relation to freedom. 
 
Having used Moltmann‟s theology of freedom to reconfigure Berdiaev‟s vision we 
are able to see that Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom can be made theologically tenable.  As was 
stated at the beginning of chapter 6, even though Berdiaev had a definite prejudice against the 
theological endeavor, his vision of freedom is theologically relevant.  His vision asserts that 
whatever else may be said about God and the person, a non-determined, relational freedom 
that results in creative acts must be part of our theology.  It is the contention of this research, 
that when his vision of freedom is constructively engaged with Moltmann‟s theology of 
freedom, Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom is compelling and of value for a theological discourse 
on freedom. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, let us recall what this research has surveyed.  We began with a brief 
introduction to the life of Berdiaev, highlighting his significant influences and placing his 
thought within the context of the Russian Silver Age.  We also noticed that certain formative 
events in Berdiaev‟s life share a similarity with events in Moltmann‟s life, which helps 
explain the importance of freedom for both writers. 
The exposition of Berdiaev‟s thought started with the analysis of his orientation and 
style.  We agreed with his suggestion that his thought on freedom should be regarded as a 
„vision‟ of freedom.  Although Berdiaev claimed that his thought was non-systematic and 
aphoristic, we have seen that there are clear and discernible themes that shape his thought and 
guide his work.  We also gave considerable attention to his view of the „origins‟ of freedom, 
particularly his mystical claim that the Ungrund is a primal void that is the origination of 
freedom, and from which God brings forth all Being. 
We then examined the motivations behind this highly speculative thought – 
Berdiaev‟s proposal that there must be a justification of God and a justification of the person.  
The justification of God was Berdiaev‟s attempt to put forth what he believed was an 
unassailable theodicy based on the Ungrund.  The justification of the person detailed his 
complex understanding of personality and how personhood is achieved, which gave particular 
attention to the Incarnation. 
Meonic freedom within the created order then became our focus.  Our proposal was to 
re-conceive meonic freedom within existence as „embodied‟ freedom, and the latent quality 
of meonic freedom within Being as „existential liberty‟.  Embodied freedom was examined 
within a model that distinguished four modes of freedom.  The experience of freedom within 
any of these modes is modulated by numerous variables, one of the most significant being the 
person‟s relation to God, others, and self.  Within this discussion of freedom we also 
examined Berdiaev‟s interpretation of „Godmanhood‟ and considered how Berdiaev deploys 
this thought to claim that the most robust expressions of freedom are dependent upon the 
person‟s communion with the Divine.  We also explored the distinctively Russian idea of 
sobornost‟, examining the importance Berdiaev attached to this concept of persons relating to 
one another and to God, based on love and the presence of the Holy Spirit. 
Our examination of embodied freedom led us to Berdiaev‟s understanding of the 
creative act.  We described his view as a „sketch‟, and while his view raises substantial 
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questions, we were able to follow a general line of thought that began with the formation of 
what we termed a „novel‟ act, and from that proceeded to the complex process of the creative 
act, a process that depended on an „inner‟ and „outer‟ creative action.  We concluded our 
discussion with his highly suggestive thought pertaining to the interdependence of freedom 
and the creative act – discussing creativity as necessary for the free person to be able to act in 
a self-determined way, and the necessity of freedom for creativity to occur. 
This concluded our examination of Berdiaev‟s work and we then turned our attention 
to Moltmann‟s multifaceted theology of freedom.  We identified five factors that comprise 
Moltmann‟s view on freedom, and detailed his thought accordingly.  It was shown that 
Moltmann understands freedom as being grounded in the nature and actions of the Triune 
God.  We then examined what Moltmann believes the implications of this freedom to be for 
the created order – being freed from sin and oppression and being freed for creativity and a 
„project‟.  Moltmann‟s view has distinct similarities to Berdiaev‟s conception – the 
importance of human subjectivity, freedom as self-determined, and the importance of 
creativity for freedom – as well as having importance differences – freedom originating in 
God alone, a strong appreciation for the material aspect of creation, and a much more 
comprehensible and supportable approach to theodicy. 
In our penultimate chapter we offered a critique, assessment and reconfiguration of 
Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom.  We rejected his bifurcated view of reality and his claim 
regarding the person‟s „divine-human‟ status, along with his over-emphasis on „intuition‟.  
We found in Moltmann more solid grounds for appreciating the materiality of creation, the 
humanity of the individual, and the person‟s participation with God in the created order.  We 
affirmed Berdiaev‟s view of embodied freedom and identified several contributions his view 
can offer.  We also affirmed his view of the creative act and detailed four different 
contributions his view makes, most importantly the interdependence of freedom and 
creativity within his thought.  We concluded with an examination of several areas that are 
problematic within his thought on creativity. 
By reconfiguring Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom with Moltmann‟s theology of freedom 
we achieved a view of freedom that is theologically tenable, as well as having implications 
for a theological discussion on what freedom means for the person and the created order.  
Berdiaev‟s overall objective has been maintained – this reconfigured view still propounds the 
importance of human subjectivity and non-determination as base characteristics of freedom, 
as well as affirming Berdiaev‟s interpretation of sobornost‟.  This re-configured view, then, 
posits that freedom depends on human subjectivity and relationship with God and others – 
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freedom is a subjective-relational phenomenon.  In addition, this reconfiguration also 
addresses the problem of evil and suffering, and stresses the importance of the individual‟s 
role in his/her development as a free person participating with God in God‟s ongoing 
creativity.  While we have affirmed Berdiaev‟s overall objective, we have also rejected those 
areas of his thought that were equivocal and, in certain instances, obfuscations to his creative 
synthesis and original ideas. 
It is acknowledged that this research has raised questions that have been left open.  
Further research and development is certainly warranted in areas such as Berdiaev‟s 
epistemology, his concept of the „creative act‟ (especially concerning „embodied‟ creativity), 
and the relationship between freedom and its framework of limits and constraints.  Also, with 
regard to Moltmann‟s thought, we have not fully addressed the implications of his Trinitarian 
thought with regard to perichoresis, and how fully the human can participate in the 
perichoretic life of the Trinity.  While these questions invite further discussion, their open-
endedness should not detract from our aim to put forward Berdiaev‟s vision as a theologically 
tenable understanding of freedom.  We have seen that this vision of freedom, when 
reconfigured through Moltmann‟s theology, can be a vision that challenges and pushes 
forward the ongoing dialogue concerning what freedom means for the Christian and for the 
world. 
We hope that through this research the reader has begun to appreciate the creative 
insights of Berdiaev‟s thought.  We have found in Berdiaev a complex and robust 
understanding of freedom and of its importance for the person and the community.  His 
vision of freedom has significant implications for the theologian and the Christian community 
who value freedom.  If Berdiaev is correct, that there is a direct relationship between freedom 
and creativity, and we believe he is, the question becomes: how does theology account for 
creativity?  Is theology merely a „defense‟ of established truth, or does theology build on the 
truths that scripture reveals and past generations have discovered?  How do the theologian, 
and more importantly, the Body of Christ, respond to the creative activity of people who 
experience freedom in union with God and one another? 
Berdiaev‟s vision strongly intimates that human creativity should not be a matter of 
debate for the Church; if people experience God‟s liberative works, creativity will sooner or 
later result.  Hence one of the areas Berdiaev‟s vision lead us to is the current dialogue taking 
place between theology and the arts, which would seem to have an even greater import under 
a Berdiaevian view.  This dialogue is not only of consequence for what theology can 
contribute to the artistic endeavor, but, equally importantly, for what the theologian can learn 
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from the person who creates.  Can the artist offer insights into creativity and freedom that the 
theologian and the Church might find meaningful as they ponder what it means to be free, 
creative individuals who are grafted into Christ‟s Body to the degree that Paul talks about in I 
Corinthians 12?  These are questions that deserve further attention. 
Berdiaev‟s vision of freedom can be a rich resource for this current generation to 
reflect on these questions.  As Christians continue to try to understand what it means to be 
„one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church‟, in a global context, and as various denominations 
struggle to maintain their identities, it may be time to consider again Berdiaev‟s vision of a 
freedom that is self-determined and relational, a freedom that looks towards creative acts that 
can benefit the person, the community, and further God‟s desire for this world. 
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